Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-1123, SECTION: "L"(1)
May 16, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, defendants' motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 13, 1998, plaintiffs Lawrence Hingle and Deantral Martin were arrested by defendant officers Winston Harbin and Omar Diaz and charged with kidnaping, false arrest, and simple battery. Earlier that afternoon, Hingle and Martin had gone with Martin's sister, Natosha Wells, to retrieve property from Well's home. On their return from the house, Wells witnessed D' Andrea James driving the Toyota truck which belonged to Wells and her husband, Dwayne Anthony. Wells approached James and asked her to exit the vehicle. When James refused, Wells and Martin assumed control of the truck and attempted to drive to confront Anthony about his alleged affair with James.
Wells proceeded on Interstate 10 and was followed by Hingle in another vehicle. While in route, James unsuccessfully attempted to exit the truck. Hingle, a New Orleans police officer, then forced the truck to pull over and convinced James to ride in his car. James, however, refused Hingle's offer to drive her home. She left Hingle's car with her son at the Carrollton Shopping Center and called the police to report a carjacking. As officers Harbin and Diaz began to investigate the carjacking, Hingle, Martin, and Wells arrived at the Second District police station to file a domestic violence complaint against Anthony.
Sergeant Hebert traveled to the station and interviewed Hingle about the carjacking. During the time he and Martin were detained at the station, Hingle explained that the incident was a misunderstanding. Hebert consulted with the district attorney's office and then decided to arrest and charge Hingle and Martin.
Plaintiffs contend that they were falsely arrested with excessive force and without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code, and article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Defendants assert a qualified immunity defense and state that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint based on the "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, assuming all factual allegations to be true. See Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1999). A complaint may not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (quoting Lowrey v. Texas A M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997)). Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as facts, however, will not prevent a motion to dismiss. See Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. 106 F.3d 1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1997).
III. ANALYSIS
The defendant officers argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity and that plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts in their complaint, which if proved, would defeat a claim of immunity. A qualified immunity defense protects "government officials performing discretionary functions from liability unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995). Qualified immunity provides defendants "immunity from suit, not simply immunity from liability." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, issues of immunity are to be resolved during the incipient stages of litigation because a valid immunity defense entitles a defendant to immunity from being sued. Id.
The standard for determining qualified immunity in suits alleging illegal arrest is "whether a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the officer possessed." Id. (quoting Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1994)). "Even law enforcement officials who reasonably, but mistakenly, conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity." Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). The Court, therefore, must decide whether the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts in their complaint from which it can be determined that no reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest them for kidnaping, false arrest, and battery. See Babb, 33 F.3d at 477.
Plaintiffs have alleged facts in their complaint insufficient to overcome defendants' motion to dismiss. In their complaint, plaintiffs explain the events leading to their arrest and then declare they were falsely arrested without probable cause and in violation of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs describe how they assumed control of the vehicle driven by James and attempted to drive her to see Anthony. Pls.' Compl. ¶ 5-10. The complaint also states that the plaintiffs voluntarily arrived at the police station to discuss a domestic violence complaint and were questioned about the carjacking report registered by James. Id. at ¶ 13. Furthermore, the defendant officers indicate that they interviewed James, Hingle, and Martin about the incident, discussed their investigation with Captain Louis Dabdoub, and conferred with the district attorney's office before arresting the plaintiffs. It was reasonable for the officers to arrest the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs themselves admitted to taking control of the vehicle driven by James. See Babb, 33 F.3d at 479 (stating that to defeat a motion to dismiss a plaintiff must allege facts showing that an arrest was so illegal that it violates clearly established law).
Plaintiffs respond that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity because a probable cause hearing resulted in a finding of no probable cause for Hingle's arrest. For purposes of probable cause, the Court considers whether the facts and circumstances available to the officers at the moment of arrest were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that Hingle had committed the offense. See id. (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). The fact that a hearing later determined that there was no probable cause for Hingle's arrest does not overcome the officers' qualified immunity defense. See id. (finding that plaintiff's subsequent acquittal of an offense did not defeat the qualified immunity defense).
Plaintiffs also fail to present a viable claim for false arrest under article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code. They allege no damages upon which a claim may be made because the officers could make an arrest when they had "reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the offense." La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 213; see State v. Buckley, 426 So.2d 103, 107 (La. 1983) (holding that probable cause to arrest exists when the officer has articulable knowledge of facts sufficient to reasonably suspect the detained of criminal activity). In this case, the officers had reasonable cause because of the complaint filed by James and the interviews given by the plaintiffs.
Finally, plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the City of New Orleans. The City of New Orleans cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of its police officers. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Plaintiffs fail to suggest that the defendants' alleged tortious conduct is a result of an official policy of the City of New Orleans. See id. at 694; Burge v. St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 471 (5th Cir. 1999).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is GRANTED.