Nos. 13-03-353-CR, 13-03-354-CR
Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed August 30, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On appeal from the 214th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices HINOJOSA and CASTILLO.
VALDEZ, Chief Justice.
Appellant, Philip Tanksley, brings this appeal following the revocation of his community supervision in two cases. In a single issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision. In both cases, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
In both cases, the trial court certified appellant has the right of appeal. See Tex.R.App.P. 25.2(a)(2).
I. Background and Facts
In cause number 13-03-00354-CR, appellant was charged with possession of cocaine. Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced to twelve months in jail. His sentence was suspended, and he was placed on community supervision for twelve months, subject to various terms and conditions. In cause number 13-03-00353-CR, appellant was charged with robbery. Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years in prison and assessed a $5,000 fine. Both his sentence and his fine were suspended, and he was placed on community supervision for five years, subject to various terms and conditions. The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke appellant's community supervision in each case, alleging he had violated the conditions of his community supervision. The motions were heard in a combined proceeding. Appellant pleaded not true to all the allegations in the State's motions to revoke community supervision. The State presented the testimony of Michelle Pena, appellant's probation officer. Pena testified that appellant failed to attend his scheduled appointments with her in November and December 2002 and January 2003 and was in arrears on his court costs and monthly supervision fees in both cases. She also testified that appellant failed to attend the Texas Drug Offender Education Program, complete the community-service requirement of his community supervision, and bring Pena verification of attendance as required by the terms of his community supervision in the robbery case. Appellant admitted he met with Pena only twice out of the five times he was supposed to meet with her. However, he said he tried calling Pena several times and was unable to meet with Pena regularly because: (1) of his work; (2) he had to care for his sickly, elderly parents; and (3) he sustained an eye injury in January 2003. Appellant also said he was not given a deadline to complete the drug rehabilitation school, and the deadline to complete the community service had not yet passed. Appellant admitted he did not pay the money required to be paid under the terms of the community supervision but also stated he has no money. In the cocaine-possession case, the trial court found appellant violated four conditions of his supervised release. Appellant failed to: (1) report to his probation officer; (2) attend, participate, pay for, and complete in a satisfactory manner the Texas Drug Offender Education Program; (3) complete the community service requirement; and (4) pay court costs, restitution, and supervision fees. In the robbery case, the trial court found appellant violated two conditions of his supervised release in that he failed to: (1) report to his probation officer and (2) pay court costs and monthly supervision fees. Appellant was sentenced to twelve months incarceration in the Nueces County Jail in the cocaine-possession case and five years incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division in the robbery case, sentences to run concurrently. II. Standard of Review
We review an order revoking community supervision for abuse of discretion. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex.Crim. App. 1984); Herrera v. State, 951 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.). In a community supervision revocation hearing, the State need only prove its allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981). We must view the evidence presented at the revocation hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. It is the trial court's duty to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to determine whether the allegations in the motion to revoke are true. Id. Once a single violation of community supervision has been proven and established, we need not consider whether any other allegations of violations against appellant are supported by the evidence. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Herrera, 951 S.W.2d at 199. III. Analysis
Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the community supervision in the cocaine-possession case because: (1) he was financially unable to pay his fees; (2) his family situation kept him from reporting to Pena; (3) there was no time limit for completing the Texas Drug Offender Education Program; and (4) the State failed to prove that he did not complete his community service requirement. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the community supervision in the robbery case because: (1) appellant was financially unable to pay the fees and (2) his family situation kept him from reporting to Pena. Pena's testimony alone is sufficient evidence that appellant violated at least one of the conditions of his community supervision in both cases: he did not report to her monthly as required. Furthermore, appellant himself testified at trial that he did, in fact, fail to keep scheduled appointments with Pena as required by the conditions of his community supervision in both cases. While appellant argues that he had "family problems," Pena scheduled appointments in advance. Pena testified she called appellant in early December 2002, warned appellant he needed to report to her monthly "regardless of his situation," and scheduled an appointment for later that month. Appellant failed to reschedule and failed to advise her he was not coming. Moreover, appellant belatedly observed during his testimony that "these people ain't playing down here," suggesting he had not taken the terms of his community supervision seriously until his supervised release was threatened. Viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's revocation order, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that appellant failed to report to Pena as required by the terms of the community supervision in both cases. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision in both cases on this ground. IV. Modification of Judgments
The State asks us to modify both judgments to correct minor errors. Both judgments are modified to reflect appellant's name is "Philip Tanksley" rather than "Phillip Tanksley." The judgment in 13-03-00353-CR is also modified to reflect that: (1) the trial court found appellant violated condition 8(d) "SUPERVISION FEE" instead of "RESTITUTION"; and (2) the revocation hearing was held and sentence pronounced on May 12, 2003, instead of May 13, 2003. V. Conclusion
Because we find the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that appellant violated at least one term of his community supervision in each case, we need not address appellant's contentions challenging the trial court's remaining findings. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex.Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). We modify the judgments as noted above and, as modified, affirm the judgment of the trial court in both cases.