Opinion
CIVIL ACTION 16-5360
04-06-2017
CHARLES TALBERT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al. Defendants.
MEMORANDUM STENGEL, J. I. BACKGROUND
Because this is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, I will "accept all [plaintiff's] factual allegations as true" and "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2016). However, my acceptance of all allegations as true does not apply to "legal conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). --------
In August of 2015, Charles Talbert was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center ("PICC"). On August 4, 2015, Mr. Talbert returned to his cell after he had been in court for a hearing in one of his criminal cases. There was a dinner tray waiting for him in his cell when he returned. Mr. Talbert found a razor blade in his dinner.
Mr. Talbert complained to supervisors on his block about the razor blade being placed in his dinner. By watching a surveillance video, PICC supervisors were able to determine that defendant Jahlik Mathis, a PICC correctional officer, was the person who delivered the dinner tray containing the razor blade to Mr. Talbert's cell. Mathis was verbally reprimanded for this incident.
The next day, Mathis and another defendant correctional officer, Hector Rosa, went into Mr. Talbert's cell and trashed it while Mr. Talbert stood outside watching. Mathis and Rosa threw around Talbert's legal documents, left his cell in disarray, and intentionally broke his only pair of reading glasses. Mr. Talbert alleges this was done in retaliation for his complaint to supervisors about the razor blade.
Prior to these incidents, Mr. Talbert alleges that Mathis and Rosa, along with various other defendants who work at PICC, harassed him by calling him a "jailhouse snitch." Mr. Talbert claims they treated him this way because he has previously filed grievances and lawsuits against the Philadelphia Prison System and its staff. Mr. Talbert claims this harassment began in February 2015 and continued through August 2015.
Several weeks after the razor blade incident, Mr. Talbert had a visit scheduled with his attorneys: Mr. Ned M. Gelhaar and Mr. Joshua B. Kaplan. Mr. Gelhaar and Mr. Kaplan, at the time, were representing Mr. Talbert in a lawsuit he filed against Corizon Inc. (a corporation that contracts with the Philadelphia Prison System to provide medical care to inmates). Mr. Talbert alleges that the defendant correctional officers intentionally prevented this attorney visit from happening.
Anticipating that Mr. Talbert might file a grievance for being deprived of his right to meet with his attorneys, Mathis falsely accused Mr. Talbert of assaulting and threatening Mathis. Other correctional officers signed off on Mathis's version of events. This is documented in a police report and prison misconduct form. Formal criminal charges were brought against Mr. Talbert based on the correctional officers' assault allegations. However, on March 29, 2016, these criminal charges were dismissed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after Mathis and defendant Robert Bruce committed perjury on the witness stand regarding Mr. Talbert's alleged assault. Mr. Talbert was found innocent of all charges.
Based on all of the above, Mr. Talbert filed the instant complaint against the City of Philadelphia and various defendants in which he alleges his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated. In addition to constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Talbert claims the conduct violated state law. In support of his claim against the City, Mr. Talbert alleges the following custom or policy by the City of Philadelphia: "The City, through its Mayor, has implemented and maintained a practice of authorizing the [Philadelphia Prison System] and [Philadelphia Police Department] to conspire and forge known fraudulent criminal complaints over to the Philadelphia District Attorneys [sic] Office against various innocent pretrial detainees, either in an attempt to cover up their wrongs, or to use as a vehicle for retaliation." (Compl. ¶ 11).
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. I will deny the motion to dismiss.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted examines the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The factual allegations must be sufficient to make the claim for relief more than just speculative. Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a federal court must construe the complaint liberally, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id.; see also D.P. Enters. v. Bucks County Cmty. Coll., 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir.1984).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to plead in detail all of the facts upon which she bases her claim. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. Rather, the Rules require a "short and plain statement" of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Id. The "complaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. Neither "bald assertions" nor "vague and conclusory allegations" are accepted as true. See Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997); Sterling v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 897 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The claim must contain enough factual matters to suggest the required elements of the claim or to "raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" those elements. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court defined a two-pronged approach to a court's review of a motion to dismiss. "First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Thus, while "Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Id. at 678-79.
A court "may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Brown v. Card Service Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 456 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). Courts construe a plaintiff's allegations liberally when he or she is proceeding pro se. Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).
III. DISCUSSION
The defendants move to dismiss on two grounds. First, they argue there are no factual allegations, or allegations of a custom or policy, sufficient to state a claim against the City of Philadelphia. Second, they argue plaintiff's complaint fails to allege any constitutional violation.
Plaintiff's complaint states a plausible claim against the City. Plaintiff alleges that the City is responsible for overseeing its prison system, which includes supervising, training, controlling, and disciplining its personnel. (Compl. ¶ 3). More specifically, plaintiff alleges the City has implemented and authorized a specific "practice": forging criminal complaints against pretrial detainees in retaliation for pretrial detainees' attempts to seek redress through the courts. (Compl. ¶¶ 11-29). This allegation is sufficient to establish liability on behalf of the City. See Mulholland v. Berks Cty., 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013) ("A course of conduct is considered to be a 'custom' when, though not authorized by law, 'such practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well-settled' as to virtually constitute law." (alteration in original) (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d. Cir. 1990)).
Plaintiff's complaint alleges plausible constitutional violations. A claim that a prisoner was retaliated against for filing lawsuits makes out a violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016). It is well-established that filing grievances or lawsuits is activity protected by the First Amendment. Id.; Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). In addition to the First Amendment, "[a] pretrial detainee's constitutional right to access to the courts is embodied in the . . . Fourteenth Amendment[]." Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff claims that he was called a "jailhouse snitch" and harassed for filing lawsuits and grievances against the Philadelphia Prison System. This harassment culminated with a razor blade being placed in plaintiff's food tray. The day after plaintiff complained about this, the correctional officer who placed that food tray in his cell rummaged through plaintiff's cell and broke his glasses. Accepting these allegations as true—which I must do at this stage—establishes a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
In the same vein, plaintiff's claim that he was prevented access to his civil attorneys presents a viable claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Prater v. City of Phila., Civ. A. No. 11-1618, 2015 WL 3456659, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 2015). Notably, a claim that a pretrial detainee was prevented access to his attorney need not involve claims regarding a "challenge to his sentence and challenges involving conditions of confinement." Id. at *6 n.7. Pretrial detainees may bring constitutional claims for right to access to the courts in connection with civil claims. Id. Plaintiff's complaint alleges the defendants prevented him from attending a scheduled visit with his attorneys. This a plausible claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.
An appropriate Order follows.