Opinion
Gerald A Taja, Jr, Petitioner, Pro se, Crescent City, CA.
For C E Ducart, Respondent: Matthew C Mulford, LEAD ATTORNEY, CAAG - Office of Attorney General, San Diego, CA.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Honorable Jay C. Gandhi, United States Magistrate Judge.
I.
BACKGROUND
On June 14, 2010, a jury convicted Gerald A. Taja Jr. (" Petitioner") of attempted premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and active gang participation. (Lodg. No. 1, Clerk's Transcript (" CT") at 334-35, 340-42, 405-06, 408.) The jury further found true that Petitioner had been vicariously armed with a firearm, had committed his crimes while on bail, and had committed his crimes in furtherance of a street gang. (Id. at 334-35, 402-04, 407, 409-410.) Additionally, the trial court found true that Petitioner had suffered a prior strike conviction and a prior serious felony conviction. (Id. at 434.) For his crimes, Petitioner was sentenced to state imprisonment for forty-one years to life. (Id. at 497-98, 522-25.)
By way of background, Petitioner, his brother Samuel Taja, and his cousin Daniel Frias -- all members of Riverside gangs associated with the Mexican Mafia -- drove the victim, Wally Giles, to an orange grove and shot him three times. (Ex. A at 3-5.) Giles was shot in retaliation for testifying or " snitching" against another gangmember. (Id. at 3-5, 7.)
Before this conviction, Petitioner underwent another trial on the same charges, which resulted in a hung jury and a mistrial. (Lodg. No. 8, Reporter's Augmented Transcript (" RAT") at 677-680; Ex. A at 1.)
After his conviction, Petitioner appealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in a reasoned decision. (Lodg. Nos. 10-13.) Petitioner's state habeas petition was likewise denied. (Lodg. Nos. 14-15.)
The Court has reviewed the record, and the evidence is accurately summarized in the California Court of Appeal's decision on direct review, which is attached as Exhibit A. (Lodg. No. 13); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (facts presumed correct). The Court discusses facts below as are pertinent to habeas relief.
II.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Petitioner asserts a single ground for relief, which fails on this record. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act) (" AEDPA"); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).
Specifically, Petitioner argues that the retrial that resulted in his conviction constituted double jeopardy, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
As a rule, the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause " protects against successive prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal or conviction." Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 727-28, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998) (citation omitted). However, " when a judge discharges a jury on the grounds that [it] cannot reach a verdict, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a new trial for the defendant before a new jury." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773-74, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14, 15-16, 97 S.Ct. 20, 50 L.Ed.2d 17 (1976) (per curiam) (citation omitted) (finding that after a deadlocked jury resulted in a trial court's sua sponte declaration of mistrial, " manifest necessity" allowed retrial); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (" [T]he hung jury remains the prototypical example" of the " manifest necessity" required to " lift[] the double jeopardy bar to a second trial.").
Here, because the jury in Petitioner's first trial was deadlocked as to the charges against Petitioner, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial and the Court of Appeals did not act unreasonably in affirming the conviction that resulted from Petitioner's retrial. See Renico, 559 U.S. at 774-74, 776-79; ( see also RAT at 666-80; Ex. A at 8-15).
Significantly, the jury in Petitioner's first trial told the trial court that it was deadlocked three times before the judge declared a mistrial. (RAT at 666-80.) Initially, on the second day of deliberations, the judge received two notes from the jury: the first stated that " All 12 jurors cannot come to an agreement, " and the second stated that two jurors sought excusal due to the " stressful" nature of the jury's ongoing disagreement. (Id. at 666-67, 670-72.) However, after conferring with the jury, the judge denied excusal and ordered the jury to continue deliberating. (Id. at 669-72.) Later that day, the judge received a third jury note: " We cannot come to a unanimous decision. We are hung." (Id. at 673.) Nevertheless, after questioning the jury and finding that at least one juror might be swayed by further discussion, the judge again ordered further deliberations. (Id. at 673-77.) That afternoon, the judge received a fourth jury note: " Nothing has changed. We're still hung." (Id. at 677.) Only then -- faced with a jury that was deadlocked nine-to-three and convinced that it would never reach a verdict -- did the judge finally declare a mistrial. (Id. at 677-80.)
Notably, Petitioner argues that the trial court's finding of mistrial was improper because the judge did not explicitly find that the jury had specifically deliberated, and was specifically deadlocked regarding, each individual count. (Pet. at 6-16; Traverse at 4-10.) However, the record indicates that (1) Petitioner's charges were all related to the same act, and (2) the jury was hung as to the factual predicates of that act. ( See RAT at 678-79; Ex. A at 3-5, 13-14.) Moreover, the record shows that the trial court confirmed with the foreman that the jury's disagreement extended to all charges against Petitioner. (Id.) Thus, as cogently explained by the Court of Appeal, " the record supports the implied conclusion that the jury deliberated on the predicate question applicable to all of the charges -- the identity of the perpetrators -- but were deadlocked on the predicate issue as to all charges ." (Ex. A at 14 (emphasis added)); see also Renico, 559 U.S. at 774, 776-79 (A " trial judge's decision to declare a mistrial when he considers the jury deadlocked is . . . accorded great deference by a reviewing court[, ]" and a state appellate court's review of that trial court's decision is owed even further deference under AEDPA.) (citation omitted).
Thus, on this record, Petitioner's retrial constituted neither double jeopardy nor a constitutional violation. See Renico, 559 U.S. at 773-74, 776-79; Sanford, 429 U.S. at 15-16; Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 672.
Accordingly, Petitioner's claim does not merit federal habeas relief.
III.
RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and accepting this Report and Recommendation; (2) directing that Judgment be entered dismissing this action with prejudice; (3) denying an evidentiary hearing; and (4) denying a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000).