Opinion
J-S06033-18 No. 1018 EDA 2017
04-13-2018
KENNETH TAGGART, Appellant v. MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC; OCWEN LOAN SERVCING, LLC; EVERBANK; MERSCORP, INC.; GINNIE MAE; GMAC MORTGAGE, INC.; ANGELA MCFADDEN; LISA ROACH; ALLY BANK/GMAC MORTGAGE
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order February 6, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Civil Division at No(s): No. 2015-29789 BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Kenneth Taggart ("Taggart") appeals from the Order (hereinafter, "the Dismissal Order") granting the Motion to Dismiss filed by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC; EverBank; MERSCORP, Inc.; Ginnie Mae; GMAC Mortgage, Inc.; Angela McFadden; Lisa Roach; and Ally Bank/GMAC Mortgage (collectively, the "Defendants"), and dismissing Taggart's Complaint, with prejudice. We affirm.
Taggart initially instituted this quiet title action in November 2015. Taggart contested the validity of a 2008 mortgage to an investment property located in Telford, Pennsylvania (hereinafter, "the Property") that he had secured from certain of the Defendants. Following a tortured procedural history that is not relevant to the instant appeal, Taggart, pro se,filed a Third Amended Complaint against Defendants on April 20, 2016.,
In his initial Complaint and all subsequent Amended Complaints, Taggart sought a declaration that he is entitled to ownership of the Property, which he had purchased for over $500,000, free and clear of any mortgage, despite, inter alia, his failure to make any mortgage payments since 2009.
Throughout the duration of the proceedings up to this point, Taggart had acted pro se. Moreover, Taggart has a long history of instituting, in both state and federal courts, myriad pro se actions against his various mortgage lenders, including some of the Defendants herein.
After his initial Complaint, Taggart amended his Complaint three times in a span of five months, each of which mooted separate Preliminary Objections filed by Defendants. All of these Amended Complaints were largely identical.
On May 20, 2016, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Taggart's Third Amended Complaint pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 233.1. Therein, Defendants argued that the trial court should dismiss Taggart's frivolous, pro se action because, inter alia, it raises essentially the same claims against the same or related Defendants as Taggart did in several prior actions. A few days thereafter, Taggart filed a pro se Motion for Enlargement of Time, urging the trial court to (1) give him more time in which to respond to all outstanding Motions and pleadings because he had just recently retained counsel, who needed time to review the record; and (2) permit Taggart to file a counseled amended complaint. Before the trial court ruled on the Motion for Enlargement of Time, Taggart's counsel filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on June 28, 2016. The trial court thereafter denied the Motion for Enlargement of Time.
Rule 233.1 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that
(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the same or related defendants, and
(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a written settlement agreement or a court proceeding.
* * *
Pa.R.C.P. 233.1(a), (c).
(c) Upon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the court may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se litigation against the same or related defendants raising the same or related claims without leave of court.
Following a procedural history that is not relevant to this appeal, on February 6, 2017, the trial court entered the Dismissal Order, granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Taggart's Third Amended Complaint, with prejudice. Additionally, the Dismissal Order precluded Taggart from pursuing further litigation against Defendants related to the Property without leave of the trial court. Importantly to this appeal, merely one day prior to the date of the Dismissal Order, Taggart filed a Praecipe to voluntarily discontinue all claims against all Defendants, without prejudice. Taggart filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, which the trial court later denied.
Taggart filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the Dismissal Order, in response to which the trial court ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Taggart timely filed a Concise Statement, presenting 17 separate allegations of error. The trial court thereafter issued a Rule 1925(a) Opinion, consolidating Taggart's numerous claims into three main issues.
Taggart now presents the following questions for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction to enter an Order after the case had been voluntarily terminated by [Taggart?]
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Motion pursuant to [] Rule 233.1 was properly before the court[?]
3. Whether the trial court erred in entering an Order[,] which granted a Motion to Dismiss [Taggart's] third Amended Complaint[,] after the case had been voluntarily discontinued as to all Defendants by [Taggart], and a fourth Amended Complaint had been filed by counsel[?]
4. Whether the trial court erred in finding that [] Rule 233.1 was applicable to the case when it entered the [Dismissal] Order on February [6], 2017[?]
5. Whether the trial court erred in finding that it had legal authority to [d]ismiss [Taggart's c]laims with [p]rejudice and without a hearing[?]
6. Whether the trial court erred in finding that [] Rule 233.1 was applicable when [Taggart] was represented by counsel[?]
7. Whether the trial court erred in finding that it had legal authority to [d]ismiss [the] third Amended Complaint[,] filed by [Taggart] pro se[,] when it was rendered moot by a fourth Amended Complaint filed by counsel[?]
8. Whether the trial court erred in terminating the [d]ue [p]rocess [r]ights of [Taggart] without a hearing prior to entering an [O]rder barring claims with prejudice on February [6], 2017[?]
9. Whether the trial court erred in [v]acating the Order denying [the] Motion to Dismiss the third Amended Complaint[,] ... which properly denied the Motion to Dismiss the third Amended Complaint[?]
10. Whether the trial court erred in [d]enying [Taggart's] Motion for Reconsideration [of] the [O]rder dated July 21, 2016 ... [?]
11. Whether the trial court erred in finding that failing to allow safe[]guards for [Taggart] to [a]ttend a [m]eeting[?]
12. Whether the trial court erred in failing to find that the Motion pursuant to[] [Rule] 233.1 was not timely filed by [Defendants?]
13. Whether the trial court erred in failing to allow claim to be adjudicated on the merits and which have not been resolved[?]Brief for Appellant at 4-6.
14. Whether the trial court erred in failing to allow claims to be adjudicated which are against [Taggart's] property denying [Taggart] to adjudicate claims against his property[?]
15. Whether the trial court erred in failing to allow claims to be adjudicated pursuant to the Pennsylvania and United States Constitution[s] pertaining to Due Process and Property [r]ights[?]
16. [Whether the trial] court erred when it failed to adjudicate claims of [Taggart] pursuant to [the] minimum requirements set forth by the United States Constitution [and] Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254 (1970)[?]
17. [Whether the trial] court erred when it failed to adjudicate claims of [Taggart] of Fraud and Fraud on the Court whereas, among a plethora of other defects, [Defendants] have produced two notes, one of which is fraudulent[?]
Preliminarily, we note that Taggart's brief does not comply with our Rules of Appellate Procedure. Namely, Taggart has failed to comply with Rule 2119, which requires that
[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part - in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed - the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation to authorities as are deemed pertinent.Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Here, Taggart's Argument section headings in no way correspond to the issues he sets forth in his Statement of Questions Presented. Nevertheless, we will overlook this defect and briefly address the merits of Taggart's claims to the best of our ability, under the circumstances created by his noncompliant brief.
Like the trial court's Opinion, we will consolidate Taggart's numerous, repetitive issues into three main claims of trial court error, namely, that the court erred in dismissing the Third Amended Complaint where
1) Taggart had already filed a Fourth Amended Complaint, which thus mooted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint;See generally Brief for Appellant at 4-6.
2) Taggart was represented by counsel at the time the court entered the Dismissal Order, and, thus, his claims could not be dismissed under Rule 233.1 because he was no longer pro se;
3) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, since Taggart had voluntarily discontinued all claims against all Defendants, one day prior to the issuance of the Dismissal Order.
We review a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 233.1 under an abuse of discretion standard. See Coulter v. Ramsden , 94 A.3d 1080, 1086 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also Bolick v. Commonwealth , 69 A.3d 1267, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that "Rule 233.1 makes clear that the power to bar frivolous litigation at the trial court level rests with the trial court."). "[T]he court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason [or] if it does not follow legal procedure." Coulter , 94 A.3d at 1086 (citation omitted). Moreover, to the extent that Taggart's claims require us to interpret Rule 233.1, "the interpretation and application of a Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure presents a question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary." Boatin v. Miller , 955 A.2d 424, 427 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citation and question marks omitted).
In his first issue, Taggart argues that the trial court improperly entered the Dismissal Order, dismissing his Third Amended Complaint, where he had filed a Fourth Amended Complaint, which thus mooted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. See Brief for Appellant at 15, 21.
The trial court concisely addressed this claim in its Opinion, set forth the applicable law, and determined that the court did not lack authority to enter the Dismissal Order, since the filing of an amended pleading does not render a motion to dismiss moot under Rule 233.1. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/17, at 3-4. We agree with the trial court's sound rationale and determination, and therefore affirm on this basis as to Taggart's first issue. See id.
Next, Taggart contends that the trial court erred in entering the Dismissal Order, where he was represented by counsel at the time, and, thus, his claims could not properly be dismissed under Rule 233.1 because he was not acting pro se at that time. See Brief for Appellant at 15, 17, 22; see also Pa.R.C.P. 233.1(c) (providing that "[u]pon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the court may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se litigation against the same or related defendants raising the same or related claims without leave of court." (emphasis added)).
The trial court addressed and rejected this claim in its Opinion, and determined that the court properly applied Rule 233.1 to Taggart under the circumstances. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/17, at 4. As we agree with the trial court's legal determination, and discern no abuse of discretion, we affirm on this basis concerning Taggart's second issue. See id.
In his third and final issue, Taggart argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, where he had voluntarily discontinued all claims against all Defendants, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 229, prior to the issuance of the Dismissal Order. See Brief for Appellant at 10-14, 20-21 (citing, inter alia, Williams Studio Div. of Photography by Tallas , Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 1333, 1335 (Pa. 1988) (stating that "when a plaintiff takes a voluntary nonsuit, it is as if the original suit was never initiated.")). Taggart argues that the trial court lacked legal authority to act upon Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint after Taggart had entered the discontinuance. See Brief for Appellant at 11; see also id. at 12 (arguing that after Taggart discontinued his claims, "there was no actual case, or case controversy.").
Rule 229 provides, in relevant part, as follows: "A discontinuance shall be the exclusive method of voluntary termination of an action, in whole or in part, by the plaintiff before commencement of the trial." Pa.R.C.P. 229(a); but see also Pa.R.C.P. 229(c) (stating that "[t]he court, upon petition and after notice, may strike off a discontinuance in order to protect the rights of any party from unreasonable inconvenience, vexation, harassment, expense, or prejudice.").
The trial court addressed Taggart's claim in its Opinion, summarized the applicable law, and determined that the court did not lack authority to rule on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, where Taggart filed the Praecipe to Discontinue with unclean hands, for a procedural advantage. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/17, at 4-7. We agree with the trial court's cogent reasoning and determination, and therefore affirm on this basis in rejecting Taggart's final issue. See id.
Accordingly, as we discern no error of law or abuse of the trial court's discretion in granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, see Coulter , supra , and none of Taggart's claims entitle him to relief, we affirm the Dismissal Order.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/13/18
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