Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. GC039100. Jan A. Pluim, Judge.
Wellman & Warren, Scott W. Wellman and Stuart Miller for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Rutan & Tucker, Jeffrey A. Goldfarb and Karen E. Walter for Defendant and Respondent.
CHAVEZ, J.
Appellants Taboo Gentlemen’s Club (Taboo), Bill Badi Gammoh (Gammoh), Chawkat Jajieh (Jajieh), and Peck Entertainment Adventure, Inc. (Peck) appeal from the judgment entered against them after the trial court denied their petition for administrative mandamus to set aside the City of Arcadia’s (the City) revocation of Taboo’s adult business regulatory permit. We affirm the judgment.
Taboo, Peck, Gammoh and Jajieh are referred to collectively as appellants.
BACKGROUND
Taboo is an adult business establishment that features nude and clothed female dancers appearing on a raised stage, and clothed dancers performing individual dances for patrons. On January 14, 2004, the City issued an adult business regulatory permit to appellants Jajieh and Gammoh to operate Taboo.
A. The City’s Adult Business Regulatory Permit Ordinance
To operate an adult business establishment within the City, the owner is required to obtain and maintain an adult business regulatory permit issued pursuant to the City’s adult business regulatory ordinance, Arcadia Municipal Code (AMC) section 6800 et seq. (the ordinance). An adult business establishment may lose its permit, and its right to operate, if it violates applicable provisions of the ordinance. (AMC § 6807.) Relevant portions of the ordinance are discussed below.
AMC section 6807(B)(11)(f) provides in part: “A permit may be suspended or revoked based on the following causes arising from the acts or omissions of the permit holder . . . . The permit holder . . . has knowingly allowed or permitted, and has failed to make a reasonable effort to prevent the occurrence of . . . [a]n act or omission in violation of any of the requirements of this Chapter if such act or omission is with the knowledge, authorization, or approval of the permit holder or is as a result of the permit holder’s negligent supervision of the employees of the adult facility. . . .”
1. The No Sexual Contact with Patrons Rule
AMC section 6805(I)(4) prohibits entertainers at adult businesses from having any sexual contact with the businesses’ patrons. It states in part: “No performer . . . shall have physical contact with any patron . . . which physical contact involves the touching of the clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, cleft of the buttocks, perineum, anal region, or female breast with any part or area of any other person’s body either before or after any adult live entertainment by such performer.” A “performer” is defined as “any person who is an employee or independent contractor of an adult business, and who, with or without any compensation or other form of consideration, performs adult live entertainment for patrons of an adult business.” (AMC § 6801(O).)
“Adult live entertainment” is defined as “any physical human body activity, whether performed or engaged in, alone or with other persons, including but not limited to singing, walking, speaking, dancing, acting, posing, simulating, wrestling or pantomiming, in which (1) the performer (including but not limited to a topless and/or bottomless dancers, go-go dancers, exotic dancers, strippers, or similar performers) exposes to public view, without opaque covering, ‘specified anatomical areas’; and/or (2) the performance or physical human body activity depicts, describes, or relates to ‘specified sexual activities’ whether or not the specified anatomical areas are covered.” (AMC § 6801(F).) Definitions for the terms “specified anatomical areas” and “specified sexual activities” are set forth in footnotes 5 and 6.
2. The Six-Foot Buffer Rule
AMC sections 6805(I)(2) and (3) set forth what is commonly referred to as the “six-foot buffer rule,” prohibiting performers from exposing specified anatomical areas or performing specified sexual activities within six feet of a patron, regardless of whether the performer is on or off stage.
AMC section 6805(I)(2) provides: “Except as provided below, no performer then performing adult live entertainment characterized by the exposure of specified anatomical areas or specified sexual activities shall perform such adult live entertainment at an adult business except upon a permanently fixed stage at least eighteen (18) inches above the level of the floor surrounded by a railing at least thirty (30) inches high which railing is set back from the outside edges of the stage by six (6) feet. The performer then performing live entertainment characterized by the exposure of specified anatomical areas or specified sexual activities shall perform such live entertainment six (6) feet or more from a patron while the performer is so performing.
The term “specified anatomical areas” is defined to include “1. Less than completely and opaquely covered, and/or simulated to be reasonably anatomically correct, even if completely and opaquely covered human: [¶] (a) genitals, pubic region; [¶] (b) buttocks, anus; [¶] (c) female breasts below a point immediately above the top of the areola; or [¶] 2. Human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely or opaquely covered.” (AMC § 6801(T).)
The term “specified sexual activities” is defined in relevant part as “any of the following, irrespective of whether performed directly or indirectly through clothing or other covering: [¶] 1. Human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal; [¶] 2. Acts of human masturbation, sexual stimulation or arousal; [¶] 3. Simulated sexual intercourse; [¶] . . . [¶] 7. Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock, or female breast.” (AMC § 6801(U).)
3. The Open Booth Rule
AMC section 6805(E)(2) requires that all areas within an adult business establishment be generally visible to management. It states:
Subsection (E)(3) similarly provides: “No doors are permitted on an adult booth/individual viewing area. No partially or fully enclosed adult booth/individual viewing areas or partially or fully concealed adult booth/individual viewing areas shall be permitted.” (AMC § 6805(E)(3).)
4. The Unlicensed Entertainer Rule
AMC section 6812 prohibits the owner or operator of an adult business from allowing any person to perform adult live entertainment displaying specified anatomical areas or specified sexual activities unless the person possesses a valid adult business performer license issued pursuant to AMC section 6800.
AMC section 6812 provides: “It shall be unlawful for any owner, operator, manager, permit holder, partner, director, officer, shareholder with a ten percent (10%) or greater interest, agent, employee or other person in charge of an adult business which provides live entertainment displaying specified anatomical areas or specified sexual activities to allow any person to perform such entertainment who is not in possession of a valid, un-revoked, un-suspended adult business performer license.”
B. Taboo’s History of Non-Compliance
On June 28, 2004, the City found that unlicensed entertainers were performing adult live entertainment at Taboo in violation of AMC section 6812. Police officers warned appellant Jajieh that AMC section 6812 prohibited him from allowing unlicensed persons to perform adult live entertainment.
On July 16, 2004, officers returned to Taboo to determine whether the violations had been corrected and found that the violations had worsened. Appellant Jajieh admitted that none of the entertainers performing that day were licensed. The officers again advised appellant Jajieh that AMC section 6812 prohibited performances by unlicensed persons.
Police officers returned to Taboo on August 3, 2004, and found that appellants were continuing to violate AMC section 6812. The officers warned appellant Jajieh for a third time that AMC section 6812 prohibits adult businesses from allowing entertainers to perform adult live entertainment without a license. On August 11, 2004, the City wrote to appellants advising them that if they continued to allow unlicensed entertainers perform, the City would commence an enforcement action against Taboo.
On June 24, 2004, the City received a complaint that Taboo’s performers were violating the six-foot buffer rule. On October 22, 2004, undercover police officers conducted an investigation during which one of the officers observed a private performance by an entertainer that violated both the six-foot buffer rule and the rule prohibiting sexual contact between the entertainer and a patron.
Undercover officers returned to Taboo on October 27, 2004, and observed multiple violations of the six-foot buffer rule and the no sexual contact rule by entertainers performing on stage. The officers also reported that Taboo’s entertainers regularly took patrons for private performances in a fixed seating area furnished with benches and booths. Although the fixed seating area was shown as an open area on Taboo’s approved floor plan, the booths were walled off from public view, in violation of AMC section 6805(E)(2) and (E)(3). Officers who observed entertainers performing private “lap dances” in the booths reported violations of both the six-foot buffer rule and the prohibition against sexual contact.
Given the seriousness of the observed violations, the City asked the undercover officers to return to verify that the violations represented the standard practice of Taboo’s entertainers. The officers returned on December 10, 2004, and confirmed that the same violations were occurring. Officers observed “lap dances” in private booths from partially clothed entertainers who made sexual contact with the officers by touching the officers or by rubbing themselves against the officers, simulating oral sex or sexual intercourse.
On February 10, 2005, the City sent appellants another letter describing the violations and warning that failure to correct them would result in suspension or revocation of Taboo’s permit. Undercover officers returned to Taboo in March and April 2005 to determine whether the violations had been corrected. None had.
Nearly a year later, the City asked the officers to determine whether appellants had corrected the violations at Taboo. The officers returned on February 15, 2006, and observed that none of the violations had been corrected. Entertainers on stage violated both the six-foot buffer rule and the rule prohibiting sexual contact with patrons. In addition, every “lap dance” observed by an undercover officer violated both the six-foot buffer rule and the no sexual contact rule.
In a letter dated May 4, 2006, the City notified appellants of the specific violations observed, and its intent to hold a permit suspension hearing. On May 20 and 21, 2006, the City conducted a business license compliance check at Taboo and discovered that none of the entertainers performing on those days possessed valid licenses. On May 30, 2006, the City informed Taboo of the additional violations supporting the proposed permit suspension.
During the next two months, appellants’ attorneys advised the City that all violations had been corrected at Taboo and asked the City to terminate the permit suspension proceedings. The parties discussed a proposed arrangement whereby the City would forego the suspension proceedings so long as appellants demonstrated compliance with the ordinance. Following these discussions, the City sent officers to Taboo to verify appellants’ compliance.
Plain clothes officers returned to Taboo on July 6, 2006, and found that not only had appellants not corrected the previously observed violations, but the scope and breadth of the violations had become substantially worse. The officers observed flagrant and pervasive sexual contact between Taboo’s dancers and its patrons. In a letter dated August 2, 2006, the City advised appellants that the results of the July 6, 2006 inspection revealed that Taboo’s violations “are becoming more flagrant, more numerous, and more serious.” The letter specified in detail the new violations the officers observed. Based on the investigation, the City concluded that there was “an uncorrectable culture of violations at Taboo” and informed appellants that “the City sees no choice but to seek revocation of Taboo’s permit.”
An evidentiary hearing was held between October 24 and October 27, 2006, before retired United States District Court Judge Lourdes Baird, the hearing officer appointed by the City’s Business License Appeals Board (the Board). The evidence presented included the declarations of nine police officers who visited Taboo on various occasions in an undercover capacity and observed private “lap dances” by 25 different performers. The officers testified that sexual contact by the performers was pervasive and occurred during the majority of each lap dance. The testimony of some of Taboo’s witnesses, including a manager and a security guard, supported the officers’ testimony. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Baird issued a 15-page proposed order in which she concluded the City had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Taboo knowingly violated AMC section 6805(I)(4) by allowing its performers to have sexual contact with patrons. Judge Baird further concluded that appellants did nothing to correct the violations and flagrantly continued to violate the City’s regulations with complete disregard of the City’s warning letters and admonishments, making the revocation of Taboo’s operating permit necessary. The Board adopted Judge Baird’s written decision and unanimously voted to revoke Taboo’s permit on May 15, 2007.
Appellants filed their petition for administrative mandamus on June 5, 2007. Following a hearing on August 23, 2007, the trial court denied the petition. No statement of decision was requested or issued, and on September 27, 2007, judgment was entered in favor of the City. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Appellants filed this action under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.8, which provides for expedited judicial review of a proceeding to suspend or revoke a permit for expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Such actions are governed by the standards set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.8, subd. (d)(2).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (b) establishes the parameters for the trial court’s review of an administrative agency’s determination: “The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the [agency] proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the [agency] has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.”
When an agency’s decision affects a “fundamental vested right,” as the parties agree is the case here, the trial court reviewing that decision “exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo in which the court must examine the administrative record for errors of law and exercise its independent judgment upon the evidence. [Citations.]” (JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1056-1057.) In exercising its independent judgment, the trial court determines whether the agency’s findings are supported by the weight of the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c).)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (c) provides in part: “Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence.”
We review the trial court’s independent, factual determination that the weight of the evidence in the record supports the agency’s findings under the substantial evidence standard. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824.) “Applying the substantial evidence test on appeal, we may not reweigh the evidence, but consider that evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court, indulging in every reasonable inference in favor of the trial court’s findings and resolving all conflicts in its favor. [Citations.]” (Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1078.) Moreover, when no statement of decision was requested by the parties, such as was the case here, we must assume the trial court made whatever findings were necessary to support the judgment. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1134; Horning v. Shilberg (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 197, 202.) We review de novo the trial court’s legal determination that the City proceeded in the manner required by law. (Fukuda v. City of Angels, supra, at p. 824.)
II. The City’s Purported Accumulation of Violations
Appellants contend the City’s revocation of Taboo’s permit was an abuse of discretion because it was based on an improper accumulation of violations over a period of years, impeding appellants’ defense and precipitating an improper finding of an “uncorrectable culture of violations” at Taboo. As we discuss, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s factual determination that the weight of the evidence supports the Board’s finding of an “uncorrectable culture of violations” at Taboo. By contrast, there is no evidence to support appellants’ claim that the City engaged in the improper practice of accumulating violations over a period of time in order to seek a more stringent penalty against Taboo.
The record contains substantial evidence of pervasive, knowing, and ongoing violations of the City’s ordinance by appellants, despite repeated warnings by the City. As early as June 2004, police officers documented multiple violations of the prohibition against unlicensed performers at Taboo. The officers issued oral warnings to appellants about these violations on three separate occasions on June 28, 2004, July 16, 2004, and August 3, 2004. When appellants failed to heed the oral warnings, the City sent appellants two warning letters, dated August 11, 2004 and February 10, 2005, explaining that if the violations were not corrected, the City would commence permit suspension or revocation proceedings.
Subsequent inspections at Taboo revealed additional, more egregious violations. The record includes the declarations of nine undercover police officers attesting to more than 40 violations of the six-foot buffer rule and the prohibition against sexual contact between patrons and entertainers by 25 different Taboo performers during private “lap dances” on multiple occasions between October 2004 and July 2006. The sexual contact by the Taboo performers during the “lap dances” was both flagrant and prolonged, lasting throughout most of the session. All of the private “lap dances” were performed in individual booths partially obscured from public view, in violation of AMC section 6805(E). Undercover officers also observed multiple on-stage performances by Taboo performers that violated the six-foot buffer rule and the no sexual contact rule. Undercover officers continued to find flagrant and pervasive violations at Taboo while permit suspension proceedings were pending, and after appellants’ attorneys had assured the City that all violations had been corrected. There is substantial evidence of an “uncorrectable culture of violations” at Taboo.
There is no evidence that the City improperly accumulated violations in order to impose a more stringent penalty against appellants. Rather, the record shows that the City repeatedly warned appellants, for more than two years, of the need to correct the violations or face enforcement proceedings. Walsh v. Kirby (1974) 13 Cal.3d 95, on which appellants rely as support for their position, is distinguishable. In that case, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control discovered that a retailer was selling alcohol at less than the minimum retail price, in violation of Business and Professions Code section 24755.1. The penalty for such violations were $250 for the first offense, and $1,000 for each subsequent violation. Rather than notifying the retailer of the initial violation, the agency elected to accumulate evidence of numerous violations in order to impose cumulative penalties that would have resulted in a de facto permit revocation. (Id. at pp. 103-104.) The Supreme Court concluded that the agency had acted improperly by proceeding against the licensee in a manner designed not to induce conformance with the statute, but to impose cumulative penalties that were excessive when measured against the licensee’s conduct. (Ibid.) In the instant case, the record shows that the City repeatedly warned appellants of the need to correct the violations at Taboo, and gave them multiple opportunities to come into compliance. When these warnings went unheeded, the City notified appellants of its intent to hold a permit suspension hearing. While that hearing was pending, the City discussed with appellants the possibility of terminating the suspension proceedings if appellants could demonstrate ongoing compliance with the City’s ordinance. The City did not seek to impose the penalty of permit revocation until it thereafter discovered additional, continuing, flagrant violations at Taboo. Appellants cannot claim the penalty of revocation was excessive under these circumstances, and in any event, a reviewing court cannot substitute its own discretion as to the penalty imposed by an administrative agency. (Lake v. Civil Service Commission (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 224, 228.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual determination concerning appellants’ violations of the City’s ordinance. The trial court did not err by concluding that the City proceeded in the manner required by law when it revoked Taboo’s permit.
III. The City’s Discretion to Revoke Taboo’s Permit
Appellants contend the City’s revocation of Taboo’s permit was an unconstitutional prior restraint on activity protected by the First Amendment because the City’s ordinance contained no standards for the imposition of penalties and therefore accorded the City unrestrained discretion to revoke the permit. “‘The term “prior restraint” is used “to describe administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.”’ [Citation.] A licensing scheme may constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint if it puts unbridled discretion in the hands of government officials charged with granting or denying licenses or allows the decision maker unlimited time to render a decision on the matter affecting the license; to be constitutional, licensing schemes for adult entertainment establishments must contain sufficient procedural safeguards. [Citations.]” (Krontz v. City of San Diego (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133 (Krontz).)
“Prior restraints must be distinguished from subsequent punishments. [Citation.]” (Krontz, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133.) A governmental entity may penalize illegal conduct that has nothing to do with activity protected by the First Amendment. (Ibid.) For example, “[b]ookselling in an establishment used for prostitution does not confer First Amendment coverage to defeat a valid statute aimed at penalizing and terminating illegal uses of premises.” (Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. (1986) 478 U.S. 697, 707.) “Similarly, nude dancing in an establishment where [the owner] allowed violations of valid regulations (the no-touch and six-foot rules) does not confer First Amendment coverage to defeat the regulations, which are aimed at penalizing and terminating the illegal conduct, not the expressive activity, on the premises.” (Krontz, at pp. 1133-1134.) The provisions of the City’s ordinance governing permit suspension and revocation are not prior restraints, but subsequent punishments for violation of the ordinance. The cases cited by appellants, concerning a governmental entity’s discretion in deciding whether to issue a permit in the first instance, are therefore inapposite. (See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. (1988) 486 U.S. 750; Gammoh v. City of Anaheim (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 186; Smith v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 990.)
Appellants do not challenge the provisions of the ordinance imposing the six-foot buffer rule, the no sexual contact rule, or the open booth rule, nor do they challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings that they allowed violations of those rules to occur at Taboo. “An adult entertainment license may be constitutionally revoked when the licensee has violated valid provisions of a licensing ordinance. [Citations.]” (Krontz, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th. at p. 1134.) The City’s revocation of Taboo’s permit was not an unconstitutional prior restraint.
The ordinance does not accord the City unbridled discretion to suspend or revoke a permit. Krontz is controlling authority on this issue. In that case, the court rejected a similar argument by the owner of an adult business establishment whose permit was suspended for violating provisions of a city ordinance requiring a six-foot buffer between dancers and patrons and prohibiting contact between dancers and patrons. The owner argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it gave the chief of police unrestrained discretion to suspend a license. (Krontz, supra, 136 Cal.App.4that p. 1136, fn. 4.) The court in Krontz concluded otherwise, noting that the ordinance authorized suspension or revocation only if the licensee allowed a violation of applicable laws and regulations. (Ibid.) Here, as in Krontz, the City’s ordinance authorizes suspension or revocation of a permit only after the Board determines the permit holder “has committed acts in violation of the requirements and standards of the Adult Business Ordinance” or other unlawful acts. (AMC §§ 6703(D), 6807.) The ordinance did not accord the City unrestrained discretion to suspend or revoke a permit. The City’s revocation of Taboo’s permit, premised on appellants’ acts in violation of the ordinance, was not unconstitutional.
IV. Entertainer Licensing Requirement
Appellants contend the City’s adult entertainer licensing requirement is unconstitutional and cannot serve as a basis for revoking Taboo’s permit. Appellants do not deny that they failed to comply with the licensing requirement, but claim that the requirement is an unconstitutional prior restraint because the licensing fee is excessive and because “the City made it as difficult as possible for the dancers to obtain licenses.”
Appellants maintain they “presented extensive and compelling evidence that the City made it as difficult as possible for the dancers to obtain licenses,” by requiring advance appointments to obtain entertainer licenses; by making the City’s licensing officer available only on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays; and by failing to provide temporary licenses immediately, as required by AMC section 6701(E). We review the trial court’s factual determination, not for “compelling evidence,” however, but for substantial evidence. (Holmes v. Lerner (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 442, 445.) Under the substantial evidence standard, “‘the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor . . . . [Citations.]” (Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660.)
AMC section 6701(E) provides: “Upon receipt of a completed adult business performer application and payment of the license fee . . . the Officer shall immediately issue a temporary license.”
Appellants’ claim that the City made it difficult to obtain adult performer licenses was contradicted by the testimony of Arcadia Police Officer Ron Buckholtz, the person responsible for licensing adult performers in the City. Officer Buckholtz testified that he told appellant Jajieh in June 2004 that although advance appointments made things easier, they were not necessary. Officer Buckholtz further testified that while Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays were the best days to obtain licenses, he told appellants that he would make himself available on other days. Officer Buckholtz stated that applicants who submitted an adult business performer application and paid the fee were immediately given temporary licenses to work. Substantial evidence supports the determination that the City’s performer licensing procedure was neither difficult nor unduly burdensome.
Appellants challenge the amount of the fee imposed by the City for adult performer licenses as excessive, and therefore unconstitutional. “[W]hen core First Amendment freedoms are made subject to a licensing scheme, only revenue-neutral fees may be imposed so that government is not charging for the privilege of exercising a constitutional right. [Citations.]” (Fly Fish, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach (11th Cir. 2003) 337 F.3d 1301, 1314, citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943) 319 U.S. 105, 113-114 and Cox v. New Hampshire (1941) 312 U.S. 569, 577.) To be constitutional, a licensing fee must be “reasonably related to recoupment of the costs of administering the licensing program. [Citation.]” (Fly Fish Inc., supra, at p. 1314.) The government entity bears the burden of demonstrating that its licensing fee is reasonably related to recoup the costs of administering the licensing program. (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the determination that the City’s $100 licensing fee is reasonably related to recouping the cost of administering the adult entertainer licensing program. The record includes a “cost detail worksheet” showing that it costs the City approximately $238 to evaluate an adult entertainer permit, and an additional $32 to process the applicant’s fingerprints. The amount of the fee is thus reasonably related to recouping the costs of administering the licensing program. The City’s adult business performer licensing requirement is not an unconstitutional prior restraint and appellants’ failure to comply with that requirement was a valid basis for revoking Taboo’s adult business regulatory permit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The City is awarded its costs on appeal.
We concur: DOI TODD, Acting P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.
AMC section 6805(I)(3) provides in part: “A performer shall only be permitted to perform off-stage adult live entertainment characterized by the exposure of specified anatomical areas or specified sexual activities when such performer is at least six (6) feet from a patron while the performer is so performing.”