Opinion
No. 04-05-00088-CV
Delivered and Filed: January 25, 2006.
Appeal from the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court Nos. 2004-CI-17406, 2004-CI-17439, and 2005-CI-00117, Honorable Janet Littlejohn, Judge Presiding.
The Honorable Barbara Nellermoe granted Barrington Condominium Association's motion for summary judgment, and the Honorable Janet Littlejohn signed the final judgment in Barrington's favor. Judge Littlejohn also granted and signed the judgment in favor of Travis Childress.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
When her condominium suffered repeated water damage requiring extensive remedial efforts, Rebecca Syma sued the unit's management, Barrington Condominium Association ("BCA"), and her upstair's neighbor, Travis Childress. BCA and Childress each moved for summary judgment on traditional and no-evidence grounds. Without specifying the ground or grounds upon which it was relying, the trial court granted each motion and severed Syma's claims against BCA and Childress into separate causes. Syma now appeals. We affirm.
Syma also sued her insurer State Farm Lloyds, Inc. However, State Farm is not a party to this appeal.
1. Syma first argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on no-evidence grounds because "sufficient evidence exists in the trial court record" to raise issues of material fact on all the challenged elements of her causes of action, notwithstanding that nearly all of her summary judgment evidence was stricken by the court — rulings that Syma does not challenge on appeal. However, Syma waived her complaint by failing to identify for us the remaining evidence she believes is sufficient to defeat the no-evidence motions. See Flume v. State Bar of Texas, 974 S.W.2d 55, 62 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (holding an appeals court has no independent duty to search a voluminous record to determine reversible error because it is the appellant who bears the burden to "demonstrate the record supports her contentions and to make accurate references to the record to support her complaint on appeal"). Consequently, because Syma has not shown reversible error, we hold the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on no-evidence grounds.
2. Syma next argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on traditional grounds. However, we need not address this complaint because we have already concluded the trial court's rendition of summary judgment on no-evidence grounds was proper. See Jeffery v. Robertson Sales Serv., Inc., No. 11-04-00042-CV, 2005 WL 2573416 at *4 n. 2 (Tex.App.-Eastland October 13, 2005, no pet. h.).
3. Finally, Syma argues the trial court violated her state constitutional right to a jury trial by granting summary judgment. However, the inviolate right to a jury trial is subject to regulation by the rules of civil procedure specifying a jury trial's availability; and the rule governing summary judgment is such a rule since the existence of material fact determines whether a matter ought to be submitted to a jury. Green v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 422 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex. 1968); Lattrell v. Chrysler Corp., 79 S.W.3d 141, 150 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied). Thus, "[w]hen a party cannot show a material fact issue[, as is the case here], there is nothing to submit to a jury, and the grant of summary judgment to the opposing party does not violate the constitutional right to a jury trial." Lattrell, 79 S.W.3d at 150.
Each judgment of the trial court is affirmed.