Opinion
Case No. 20010356-CA.
Filed January 3, 2003. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District, Salt Lake Department, The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki.
Dawn A. Sweazey, Salt Lake City, Appellant Pro Se.
Lawrence E. Corbridge and Christopher G. Jessop, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, Orme, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on appeal. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ¶ 17, 12 P.3d 92. She must identify and properly develop the arguments that entitle her to the reversal she seeks, and she may not treat the court of appeals as "`"a depository in which [she] may dump the burden of argument and research."'" Water Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, ¶ 21, 48 P.3d 888 (citations omitted). Plaintiff has not met her burden of persuasion, and she has, in essence, sought to foist upon this court the work of developing the arguments possibly available to her.
With these considerations in mind, we limit our analysis to the argument actually identified and developed by Plaintiff in this appeal, which she apparently believes is dispositive of the several issues she identifies. She relies on the plain meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) and three reported opinions in support of her argument that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendant.
The cases she relies upon are inapplicable. Each concerns the propriety of setoff. Setoff occurs when obligations are owed by two parties to each other. Setoff simply permits the obligee who is owed the larger balance to offset what it owes the other party and collect the net amount. See Black's Law Dictionary 1372 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "set-off" as "[t]he equitable right to cancel or offset mutual debts or cross demands, commonly used by a bank in reducing a customer's checking or other deposit account in satisfaction of a debt the customer owes the bank"). Thus, if A owes B $1,000 and B owes A $400, A will simply owe B $600 if a setoff is implemented.
The involvement of a third party in this case, Plaintiff's adult son who actually borrowed the money from Defendant and who had nothing to do with Plaintiff's previously discharged indebtedness, defeats the applicability of setoff analysis. Cf. International Equip. Serv., Inc. v. Pocatello Indus. Park Co., 695 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Idaho 1985) (invoking setoff analysis where a third party "stands in the shoes of" one of the two principal parties). Plaintiff and Defendant in this case did not have offsetting obligations. Rather, Defendant loaned money to Plaintiff's son and required Plaintiff's son to permit a portion of the loan to be applied to an obligation once owed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff agreed to pledge security to Defendant to which Defendant could look in the event of Plaintiff's son's default. Very simply, given these facts, no combination of Plaintiff, Plaintiff's son, and Defendant have mutual obligations giving rise to even the opportunity for a setoff.
That leaves only the plain language of the statute. Defendant did not seek to recover Plaintiff's discharged debt "as a personal liability of the debtor." 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) (West 1993). On the contrary, Defendant sought to recover the discharged debt by persuading Plaintiff's son to borrow money from Defendant that could be applied thereto. Thus, Plaintiff's son has personal liability for repayment of the loan, but Plaintiff, who merely pledged security for the loan, does not. As a result, Defendant's actions do not run afoul of the plain meaning of subsection 524(a)(2).
We are concerned that Plaintiff's brief quotes the pre-1984 version of subsection 524(a)(2) and presents it to us as the current version. We are similarly perplexed that Defendant's brief indicates that Plaintiff "correctly states" subsection 524(a)(2).
The current version of that subsection differs from the pre-1984 version in one significant way. It excludes the phrase "or from property of the debtor," which appeared in the subsection prior to the 1984 amendments. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524 historical and statutory notes (West 1993). Therefore, prior to 1984, it was unlawful for a creditor to attempt to collect a discharged debt either "as a personal liability of the debtor" or "from property of the debtor." Id. Subsection 524(a)(2) now only prohibits attempts to collect a debt "as a personal liability of the debtor." 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(a)(2) (West 1993).
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment in favor of Defendant is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.