Opinion
Docket No. 33348.
Filed July 31, 2007.
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, for the County of Kootenai. Hon. John Thomas Mitchell, District Judge.
John Patrick Whelan, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, for appellants.
Beck Poorman, LLC, Hayden, Idaho, for respondent.
Donald and Leslie Smith appeal from the district court's denial of their request for an award of attorney fees and costs. We affirm.
I.
In March 2004, respondent Cori Straub and appellants Donald and Leslie Smith entered into a real estate transaction wherein Straub purchased commercial rental property located in Post Falls, Idaho, from the Smiths. Several months later Straub filed a complaint against the Smiths, alleging fraud in relation to the sale. The Smiths filed a pro se answer denying Straub's allegations.
Approximately one month before the scheduled trial, the parties participated in an unsuccessful mediation. Soon thereafter, Straub decided to abandon her action. On April 12, 2005, Straub's counsel contacted the Smiths' attorney via fax, stating that Straub was interested in dismissing the case:
My client has informed me that she no longer wishes to pursue this matter. Our motion to dismiss is attached. If you have no objection, please sign the attached stipulation and return to my office. Otherwise, I will schedule a hearing for the motion. I have notified the court.
Attached to the fax were a motion to dismiss and a proposed stipulation, that called for entry of an order dismissing the case "with prejudice." The Smiths' attorney signed and returned the stipulation. That same day, both the motion to dismiss the case "with prejudice" and the stipulation were filed with the court. Straub's attorney prepared a proposed order of dismissal but did not serve a copy upon the Smiths before submitting it to the district court. Although neither the motion nor the stipulation mentioned attorney fees or costs, the order of dismissal, which was entered on April 15, dismissed the case "with prejudice and without an award of attorney fees or costs to either party."
No issue has been raised regarding the authority of the Smiths' attorney to stipulate to the dismissal.
The Smiths subsequently moved the district court to reconsider its order of dismissal, requesting that the order be revised to reflect an award of costs in their favor and arguing that they did not agree to waive costs and attorney fees when they stipulated to dismissal of the case. After a hearing on the motion, the district court denied the Smiths' motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the Smiths' answer did not contain a request for attorney fees or costs and that they failed to cite any rule or basis supporting their motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the motion for reconsideration and remanded to the district court. This Court, on its own motion, granted review on the briefs.
II.
The question presented is whether the district court erred in ordering the dismissal of the case without attorney fees or costs. Because we affirm the district court, we need not address other issues raised by the parties on appeal.
A.
When reviewing a case from the Court of Appeals, this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals but directly reviews the decision of the lower court. Uranga v. Federated Publications, Inc., 138 Idaho 550, 552, 67 P.3d 29, 31 (2003). When reviewing a district court's order granting a motion to dismiss, this Court applies the same standard of review as that used in summary judgment. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 751, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2006). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court will construe all disputed facts liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences will be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005).
B. i.
As an initial matter, this Court must determine whether the district court's order of dismissal was made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(a)(1) or 41(a)(2). Rule 41(a)(1) provides that "an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court . . . (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action." Rule 41(a)(2) provides that the "action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper." The district court's order of dismissal does not indicate which subsection of Rule 41(a) it utilized to dismiss the case, but rather states that the dismissal was "[b]ased upon the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the defendants' stipulation and good cause appearing."
The parties' actions indicate that the case was disposed of pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii). Although the parties failed to sign the same document stipulating to the dismissal, two documents were filed with the district court on the same day substantiating each parties' willingness to dismiss the case with prejudice. On April 12, 2005, Straub filed a motion to dismiss which moved the court "pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) for an Order dismissing the above-captioned case with prejudice." That same day, the Smiths filed a signed stipulation stating that they stipulated "to the entry of an Order granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss this case with prejudice." These two documents evidence an agreement between the parties to dismiss the case with prejudice. Because this Court looks to substance over form, In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 279, 127 P.3d 178, 182 (2005), and because the district court noted that it was dismissing the case based upon the plaintiff's motion to dismiss and the defendants' signed stipulation, we will treat the dismissal in this case to be by stipulation of the parties pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii).
ii.
The Smiths relinquished their claim for fees and costs when they stipulated to a dismissal of the case. Given that dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) require a voluntary agreement of the parties, they are contractual in nature. See e.g., Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 611, 114 P.3d 974, 981 (2005) ("[a] stipulation is a contract"). Thus, we employ the same analysis we would if we were interpreting a contract, and so we begin "with the language of the contract itself." Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 137 P.3d 409, 413 (2006). For a contract to be enforceable there must be a "distinct understanding common to both parties" as evidenced by a meeting of the minds between the parties. Potts Const. Co. v. N. Kootenai Water Dist., 141 Idaho 678, 681, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (2005). "Proof of a meeting of the minds requires evidence of mutual understanding as to the terms of the agreement and the assent of both parties." Id.
The stipulation in this case provides no evidence of a mutual understanding between the parties to exclude a claim for attorney fees or costs from the purview of the dismissal with prejudice. On April 12, 2005, Straub's counsel sent the Smiths a fax indicating that Straub no longer wished to pursue the case and attached a proposed stipulation of dismissal. Without objection, the Smiths' counsel signed the attached stipulation of dismissal, which provided that the "[d]efendants . . . hereby stipulate to the entry of an Order granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss this case with prejudice." The words "with prejudice" mean "[w]ith loss of all rights; in a way that finally disposes of a party's claim and bars any future action on that claim." Black's Law Dictionary 1596 (7th ed. 1999).
The express terms of the parties' stipulation established a firm agreement to dismiss the case with prejudice. However, a review of the terms fails to disclose any language indicating that the parties wished to exclude the issue of fees and costs from the stipulation of dismissal. Although the Smiths, who admit to signing the stipulation without objection, now aver that they did not wish to dismiss their claim for fees and costs, this Court cannot deduce from silence a mutual assent of the parties to that effect. Cf. Vogt v. Madden, 110 Idaho 6, 9, 713 P.2d 442, 445 (Ct.App. 1986) (acceptance of an offer generally cannot be manifested through silence or inaction). Indeed, "a party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the interpretation of a contract." J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 2006 WL 3409103 at 2 (Idaho 2006). Had the parties wished to reserve the issue of attorney fees from the purview of the stipulation of dismissal, they had ample opportunity to expressly agree to such a provision. See, e.g., Daisy Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 260, 999 P.2d 914, 915 (Ct.App. 2000) (parties agreeing to stipulation of dismissal reserved the issue of attorney fees and costs); Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (parties entering into a settlement agreement expressly reserved the issue of attorney fees and costs for future determination).
This case does not involve a unilateral dismissal with prejudice, such as where the trial court dismisses a party's case pursuant to a motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss. In that instance the party suffering the dismissal loses all rights, but the prevailing party does not suffer any loss of rights, including a right to make a claim for any allowable attorney fees or costs. In the case at hand, where the parties mutually agreed to a dismissal with prejudice, both parties relinquished all rights. The Smiths cannot first agree to relinquish all rights and then come back to make a claim for attorney fees and costs.
Further, this Court has long recognized the strong public policy favoring the settlement of litigation. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 780, 727 P.2d 1187, 1208 (1986). At the time the parties executed the stipulation for dismissal, Straub had a justifiable expectation, given the encompassing language of the stipulation and the absence of any express reservations, that all claims related to the case would be dismissed, including any claims for fees and costs. Public policy dictates that we protect expectations reasonably induced. In consideration of the Smiths' agreement to dismiss the case, Straub agreed to forgo her right to pursue the suit and relinquished her ability to refile her suit in the future. To allow the Smiths to pursue attorney fees after stipulating to a general dismissal of the case would have the effect of discouraging stipulations and defeating Straub's expectations. See K. Hefner, Inc. v. Caremark, Inc., 128 Idaho 726, 732, 918 P.2d 595, 601 (1996) (dismissing plaintiffs without adverse consequences is beneficial because "it would tend to encourage parties who do not `have the stomach' for litigation to seek a dismissal").
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of the Smiths' motion for reconsideration by holding that Inland Group of Cos., v. Obendorff, 131 Idaho 473, 959 P.2d 454 (1998) permits the Smiths to seek attorney fees and costs notwithstanding their stipulation to dismiss the case. Straub v. Smith, 2006 WL 1982878 (Ct.App. 2006). The Court of Appeals' reliance on Obendorff is misplaced. In that case, Perry Obendorff, a special master appointed by the district court, filed a motion for an order to show cause after Inland failed to pay its half of the court-ordered special master costs. Id. at 474, 959 P.2d at 455. Obendorff's motion was filed after the parties to the action (which did not include Obendorff) stipulated to a dismissal of the suit with prejudice. Id. Inland argued that once the case was dismissed, the order appointing Obendorff as special master was dissolved and with it Obendorff's right to his fees. The Court disagreed because there was an outstanding district court order requiring Inland to pay one half of the special master fees, because the special master fees were costs, and because the final dismissal order incorporated the order dealing with fees in that it clearly stated that each side was to bear its own costs. Id. at 475, 959 P.2d at 456. It should be noted that Obendorff was not a party to a contract calling for dismissal of the action with prejudice, as is the case here. In relation to the facts of this case, Obendorff merely stands for the proposition that, had the parties reserved the issue of attorney fees and costs for post-dismissal determination, the district court would have had the jurisdiction to entertain those claims. It does not, however, entitle the Smiths in this case to seek attorney fees in contravention of the terms of the parties' stipulation.
When the district court appointed Obendorff, it ordered that the costs of the special master be borne equally by the parties. Id.
C.
Straub requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), which compels an award attorney fees to the prevailing party in any civil action involving a commercial transaction. A commercial transaction is defined as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." I.C. § 12-120(3). In this case, the underlying transaction between the parties — the sale and purchase of certain commercial rental property — was commercial in nature. As a result, Straub is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
The Smiths request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and the parties' underlying real estate contract. Because the Smiths have not prevailed in this case, their request for attorney fees is denied.
III.
We affirm the district court's denial of costs or attorney fees when it dismissed the case. Straub is awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Chief Justice SCHROEDER and Justice TROUT CONCUR.
Because the majority deprives the Smiths of their statutory rights to court costs and attorney fees by adopting a rationale that is unsupported by law, logic, or justice, I respectfully dissent.
1. In holding that a stipulation to dismiss with prejudice includes a waiver of the right to attorney fees unless expressly excluded, the majority opinion written by Justice Jones is directly contrary to a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Jones two years ago.
In the majority opinion, Justice Jones holds that a stipulation to dismiss an action against the defendants with prejudice constitutes an implied agreement that each party will bear their own costs and attorney fees. By agreeing that Straub's action should be dismissed with prejudice, the Smiths waived their right to recover costs and attorney fees. That holding is directly contrary to the unanimous opinion authored by Justice Jones in Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005).
In the Eighteen Mile Ranch case, "[t]he parties stipulated to dismiss Casey [Nord] from the suit a few days before trial began." Id. at 718, 117 P.3d at 132. The stipulation did not mention costs and attorney fees. The trial court refused to award attorney fees and costs to Casey Nord and the other defendants on the ground that they were not prevailing parties, and they appealed. On appeal, a unanimous Court held that Casey Nord was a prevailing party and was entitled to an award of attorney fees. In that unanimous opinion, Justice Jones wrote as follows:
The individual Nords were also prevailing parties. Darrin left the suit upon a motion for directed verdict. He incurred no liability. For him that was "the most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved." Also, Reed defended himself through the entire trial and escaped all liability — again, achieving the most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved. The same must be said for Casey, who was dismissed a few days before trial. Darrin, Reed, and Casey were clearly prevailing parties.
Id. at 719-20, 117 P.3d at 133-34 (emphasis added). This Court concluded, "The individual Nords and Nord Excavating were prevailing parties below and they adequately supported their request for fees and costs. The district court's order denying their request is therefore reversed and the case is remanded for determination of an appropriate award." Id. at 721, 117 P.3d at 135.
In the Eighteen Mile Ranch case, the parties stipulated just before trial to dismiss the complaint with prejudice as to one defendant. That stipulation did not mention court costs and attorney fees. The trial court refused to award attorney fees on the ground that the defendant was not a prevailing party. This Court held, as a matter of law, that the defendant was a prevailing party and entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. In the instant case, the parties stipulated just before trial to dismiss the complaint with prejudice as to both defendants. Just as in the Eighteen Mile Ranch case, that stipulation did not mention court costs and attorney fees. If the Eighteen Mile Ranch case is applied here, the Smiths are prevailing parties as a matter of law and entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees. There is no logical way to distinguish the Eighteen Mile Ranch case from this case, and Justice Jones does not even try to do so. He simply ignores it. The only explanation for the diametrically opposed holdings in the two cases is that the majority wanted to award attorney fees to Casey Nord in the Eighteen Mile Ranch case but not to the Smiths in this case.
The opinion in the Eighteen Mile Ranch case did not expressly state that the dismissal of Casey Nord was with prejudice. We could not have reversed and ordered the trial court to award her attorney fees unless the dismissal was with prejudice. Jones v. Berezay, 120 Idaho 332, 815 P.2d 1072 (1991).
2. In holding that a right to the award of attorney fees constitutes a "claim for relief," the majority opinion written by Justice Jones is directly contrary to a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Jones two years ago.
As the basis for the majority holding, Justice Jones writes, "The words `with prejudice' mean `[w]ith loss of all rights; in a way that finally disposes of a party's claim and bars any future action on that claim.'" (Citation omitted.) For this quotation to be relevant, a "claim" in a lawsuit must include the statutory right to recover attorney fees as the prevailing party. Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and our prior precedents, it does not.
"A civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court." I.R.C.P. 3(a); accord Sanchez v. State, Dept. of Correction, 143 Idaho 239, 141 P.3d 1108 (2006). The complaint must set forth "a claim for relief" which contains "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1); accord Idaho Dept. of Labor v. Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 91 P.3d 1111 (2004). The right to attorney fees is not a claim that must be alleged in a complaint or answer.
In the Eighteen Mile Ranch case authored by Justice Jones, we addressed this issue as to whether a request for the award of attorney fees must be alleged in a pleading, whether a complaint or an answer. We held that it did not. "Thus, a party need not have listed a specific attorney fee provision in its pleading in order to obtain a fee award under that provision [I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4)] upon prevailing in the litigation." 141 Idaho at 721, 117 P.3d at 135. Indeed, a statute awarding the prevailing party attorney fees does not grant that party a cause of action for attorney fees. Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 152 P.3d 2 (2006); Barbee v. WMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657 (2006).
Straub commenced this action by filing a complaint. The Smiths responded by filing an answer, but did not file a counterclaim. To reach its desired result, the majority would have to construe dismissing the action as dismissing the Smiths' answer with prejudice. However, even that does not get to the dismissal of their right to court costs and attorney fees. The Smiths did not request an award of court costs and attorney fees in their answer. Under the Eighteen Mile Ranch case, they were not required to do so. Dismissal of their answer would result in the loss of their right to court costs and attorney fees only if that right was a claim that had to be alleged in their answer. Such holding would be in direct conflict with our holding in the Eighteen Mile Ranch case.
3. The majority opinion rewrites the parties' stipulation by changing the meaning of the words "with prejudice."
"A stipulation is a contract and its enforceability is determined by contract principles." Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 611, 114 P.3d 974, 981 (2005). "An enforceable contract requires `distinct understanding common to both parties . . .'" Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Idaho 697, 703, 116 P.3d 27, 33 (2005) (quoting Olson v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 105 Idaho 98, 100, 666 P.2d 188, 190 (1983)). "The primary object in interpreting a contract is to discover the intent of the parties, which should, if possible, be ascertained from the language of the document." Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 750, 53 P.3d 330, 333 (2002).
In this case, Straub filed a motion asking the court "for an Order dismissing the above-captioned case with prejudice." The Smiths responded by filing a document stating that they "hereby stipulate to the entry of an Order granting the plaintiff's motion to dismiss this case with prejudice." The stipulation made no mention of court costs and attorney fees, nor did the parties discuss them. For the stipulation to constitute a waiver by the Smiths of their statutory right to recover court costs and attorney fees, the majority would have to construe the words "with prejudice" to mean that neither party is entitled to an award of court costs and attorney fees. In other words, "with prejudice" means "no court costs or attorney fees." That construction of the words "with prejudice" is unique in the law and contrary to our prior cases.
A dismissal of an action "with prejudice" is simply an adjudication on the merits of the plaintiff's claim. King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 42 P.3d 698 (2002); Scott v. Agricultural Prods. Corp., Inc., 102 Idaho 147, 627 P.2d 326 (1981); Sullivan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 880, 792 P.2d 905 (1990). Court costs and attorney fees are collateral issues that do not go to the merits of the action. Inland Group of Cos., Inc. v. Obendorff, 131 Idaho 473, 959 P.2d 454 (1998). Thus, a dismissal with prejudice does not constitute a determination of the right to court costs and attorney fees.
We have in many instances upheld, or even ordered, the award of attorney fees where a case was dismissed with prejudice. For example, in McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 232, 61 P.3d 585, 589 (2002), the district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint "with prejudice" and awarded the defendants "attorney fees and costs." We held on appeal that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees. In Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., 139 Idaho 825, 840, 87 P.2d 934, 949 (2004), we "affirm[ed] the judgment of the district court dismissing this action with prejudice and awarding attorney fees to the Hospital under Idaho Code § 12-120(3)." In Taylor v. Just, 138 Idaho 137, 143, 59 P.3d 308, 314 (2002), we "reverse[d] the judgment of the district court and remand[ed] this case with instructions to enter a judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice and to award the Trustee a reasonable attorney fee." In Nampa Charter School, Inc. v. DeLaPaz, 140 Idaho 23, 26, 89 P.3d 863, 866 (2004), "the district court granted DeLaPaz's 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed NCS's claims with prejudice." It also "awarded DeLaPaz 20% of the attorney fees requested together with costs." We affirmed on appeal.
In the above cases we certainly did not construe the words "with prejudice" to mean "without court costs or attorney fees." We have never before construed the dismissal of a complaint "with prejudice" to mean that the defendant waives or loses a statutory right to recover costs and attorney fees. I am confident that no court in the United States has so construed those words. By changing the meaning of the words "with prejudice," the majority rewrites the parties' stipulation. This Court used to believe that "courts do not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable," Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 143, 106 P.3d 465, 469 (2005). That has now changed.
4. The majority opinion is inconsistent with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 54(e)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides, "In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees . . . to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract." Thus, for a party to be awarded attorney fees, that party must first be a "prevailing party." A party cannot be a prevailing party until there is a final judgment in the action. As Rule 54(d)(1)(B) states, "In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties."
With respect to the final judgment required for there to be a prevailing party, if an action is dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) the defendant has no right to recover attorney fees as the prevailing party. Jones v. Berezay, 120 Idaho 332, 815 P.2d 1072 (1991); accord Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Dept., 139 Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.3d 845, 849 (2003) ("the matter is dismissed without prejudice and the ACSD is not a prevailing party entitled to attorney fees on appeal"). A defendant has a right to recover court costs and attorney fees only after the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Thus, under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure the dismissal of the action with prejudice is a precondition to the defendant's right to recover court costs and attorney fees, not a denial of that right.
5. If the majority opinion is followed, it will result in absurdity.
The majority opinion holds that a defendant waives the right to court costs and attorney fees by agreeing that the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Under that "logic," a defendant cannot agree to a plaintiff's motion to dismiss the action. In fact, to be safe the defendant must oppose such a motion in order to preserve the right to recover court costs and attorney fees. Even standing moot could be interpreted as tacit approval.
A plaintiff who filed a frivolous lawsuit would be well-served to have the defendant move for summary judgment seeking to have the action dismissed. Any such dismissal would be on the merits and therefore with prejudice. The plaintiff could simply readily agree to the defendant's motion, and under the "logic" of the majority opinion the parties will have stipulated that the wrongfully sued defendant has waived his right to court costs and attorney fees.
Under the majority's "logic," a defendant in a civil case will waive his right to court costs and attorney fees by filing any motion seeking the dismissal of the action on the merits. By doing so, the defendant will be asserting that the case should be dismissed with prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice now means with each party to bear their own court costs and attorney fees.
The majority seeks to avoid the absurdity by saying that the words "with prejudice" have one meaning when pronounced by a judge and another meaning when agreed to by the parties. Giving the same words two separate meanings simply highlights the absurdity.
6. The majority opinion produces injustice.
When an opinion is based upon a desired result rather than upon the law, you get an opinion such as this one that conflicts with the prior law, is illogical, and denies a party justice. It is not clear why the majority wants to deprive the Smiths of their statutory rights to court costs and attorney fees. It is clear that the majority has allowed Straub's counsel to pull a fast one.
Every attorney worth his or her salt knows that if you want to dismiss your complaint just before trial and do not want your client to be liable for the defendant's court costs and attorney fees, you had better seek a stipulation stating that each party will bear their own costs and attorney fees. Straub's counsel did not do so in this case. Instead, he obtained a stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice and then submitted to the district court a proposed order adding the provision that the dismissal was "without an award of attorney fees of [sic] costs to either party." Obviously, if the language of the stipulation meant that each party would bear their own court costs and attorney fees, there would have been no need for Straub's counsel to add that provision to the proposed order. It would have been unnecessary surplusage. Straub's counsel obviously believed he needed to add that language to the proposed order in order to obtain the result he wanted. Notably, he submitted the proposed order to the district court but did not send a copy to the Smiths' counsel. The Smiths' counsel did not learn of the added language until after the order had been signed by the district court. For some reason, the majority approves of such shenanigans.
The majority seeks to justify its opinion by stating, "At the time the parties executed the stipulation for dismissal, Straub had a justifiable expectation, giving the encompassing language of the stipulation and the absence of any express reservations, that all claims related to the case would be dismissed, including any claims for fees and costs." There is absolutely nothing in the record to support that conclusion, nor would competent counsel have that expectation. The majority cannot point to any language of the stipulation that mentions court costs and attorney fees or that constitutes a waiver of court costs and attorney fees. In denying the motion for reconsideration, the district court did not find that the parties had understood that the Smiths would bear their own court costs and attorney fees.
The district court ultimately denied them court costs and attorney fees "on the grounds that: (1) the defendants did not request an award of attorney fees or costs in any pleading contrary to Rule 8(a)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) the defendants failed to cite any rule or basis for the Motion for Reconsideration."
7. Conclusion.
A decision that is not based upon the law and the facts results in injustice to one of the parties. Because the majority opinion is based upon a desired result rather than upon the law, we have two opinions authored by the same justice in two years that are diametrically opposed to each other. Hopefully, this Court can revisit the issue.
Justice BURDICK concurs in the result of the dissent.