Opinion
No. 2-159 / 01-1291
Filed September 11, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Mary Jane Sokolovske, Judge.
Stone Container Corporation seeks further judicial review of a workers' compensation ruling. REVERSED.
Thomas Plaza and Judith Higgs of Heidman, Redmond, Fredregill, Patterson, Plaza, Dykstra Prahl, Sioux City, for appellant.
Harold Widdison, Sioux City, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
An employer asks us to overturn an agency decision awarding an injured employee a personal laptop computer and adaptive devices. Because we find a computer does not qualify as an "appliance" under Iowa Code section 85.27 (1999), the agency's decision must be reversed.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . Nineteen-year-old Walker Castle worked for Stone Container Corporation, (Stone) a company that manufactures corrugated cardboard. One day, he fell through a thirty to fifty foot chute used to collect scrap cardboard and landed in an operating bailing machine. The machine crushed his lower body and legs. Ultimately, Castle's legs had to be amputated at the hip, and he was placed in a residential care facility. He asked for and received a laptop computer from Stone, but it lacked the necessary devices for adaptation to his supine working position.
Stone Container Corporation and its insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company, will be referred to collectively as "Stone."
Eventually, the computer's hard drive failed, and Castle requested a new computer with the appropriate adaptive devices. When Stone did not respond to the request, Castle filed an application for alternate care under Iowa Code section 85.27. A deputy workers' compensation commissioner granted the application. The district court affirmed the agency ruling and this appeal followed.
Pursuant to Iowa Code § 86.3, the deputy workers' compensation commissioner issued the final agency decision, with no right of intra-agency appeal.
II. Standard of Review . We review agency action for correction of errors at law pursuant to Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) (Supp. 1999). The workers' compensation commissioner's interpretation of the workers' compensation statutes is entitled to deference, but the final interpretation of law rests with the courts. Teel v. McCord, 394 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Iowa 1986).
Although the original workers' compensation proceeding was commenced prior to the effective date of the 1999 amendments to § 17A.19, Castle's alternate care application, which is considered an original proceeding under § 85.27(4), was filed after the effective date. The district court therefore erred in applying the judicial review standards found in Iowa Code § 17A.19 (1999), as opposed to the revised standards found in the 1999 Code supplement. See Iowa Code § 85.26(3).
III. Iowa Code Section 85.27 . While we cannot begin to appreciate the devastating injuries Castle suffered, we must set aside those passions to review whether the agency correctly interpreted the law. Under Iowa Code section 85.27 (1999), the employer must provide reasonable medical care.
The employer, for all injuries compensable under this chapter or chapter 85A, shall furnish reasonable surgical, medical, dental, osteopathic, chiropractic, podiatric, physical rehabilitation, nursing, ambulance and hospital services and supplies therefore and shall allow reasonably necessary transportation expenses incurred for such services. The employer shall also furnish reasonable and necessary crutches, artificial members and appliances but shall not be required to furnish more than one set of permanent prosthetic devices.
If an employee has a reason to be dissatisfied with the provided care, however, he or she has a right to seek alternate medical care:
[T]he employer is obliged to furnish reasonable services and supplies to treat an injured employee, and has the right to choose the care. . . . If the employee has reason to be dissatisfied with the care offered, the employee should communicate the basis of such dissatisfaction to the employer, in writing if requested, following which the employer and the employee may agree to alternate care reasonably suited to treat the injury. If the employer and employee cannot agree on such alternate care, the commissioner may, upon application and reasonable proofs of the necessity therefore, allow and order other care.
Stone argues granting Castle a computer under the guise of "alternate medical care" would open the door to all manner of amenities, without regard to the statutory purpose of section 85.27. Stone asserts the legislature intended this section to refer generally to medical care, as opposed to occupational or vocational assistance. We agree.
Evidence submitted on Castle's behalf by Mark P. McCarty, the Director of Vocational Services at Opportunities Unlimited, asserted Castle needed the computer to "regain financial independence and a sense of meaning vocationally." Similarly, Brandon Rogers, a Microsoft certified professional at Opportunities Unlimited, urged the necessity of the computer "to fulfill [Castle's] educational plan and [sic] well as complete leisure activities." None of the evidence supported the notion the computer was an "appliance" needed to assist in Castle's medical care. Even in the early correspondence requesting the computer, the stated purpose was as, "a necessity for school work, as well as any training he may pursue for some form of vocation . . . even if it never comes to pass."
We acknowledge that, in rare circumstances, the Iowa Supreme Court has construed "appliance" under section 85.27 to include something other than what would traditionally be considered a medical device. See Quaker Oats Co. v Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143, 155-56 (Iowa 1996) (affirming award for van and home modifications); Manpower Temporary Servs. v. Sioson, 529 N.W.2d 259, 264 (Iowa 1995) (affirming award of specially modified van). However, in those cases the word "appliance" was given a broader construction as the contested devices and alterations had been recommended by health care professionals to enable another appliance, a wheelchair, to fully function. See Ciha, 552 N.W.2d at 156 (allowing home modifications and van conversion to accommodate and as an extension of claimant's wheelchair, an admittedly covered appliance); Sioson, 529 N.W.2d at 264 (reasoning "unusually strong medical evidence of necessity" was presented that van was necessary as an extension of the wheelchair making it "fully useful").
Here, the deputy commissioner specifically awarded the laptop computer, not based on any medical testimony advocating a medical necessity, but rather on the testimony and exhibits of the occupational therapists, which indicated the computer would serve as "a means to an end."
The "end" in this case is to help claimant, by means of occupational therapy, to reach personal independence at home and at work by any reasonable means necessary and available to assist claimant to overcome the hurdles put in place by his injury. . . . Inasmuch as claimant's future rehabilitation therapy includes training or education for vocational purposes, an adequate computer remains necessary to claimant's care, treatment and therapy.
We agree with Stone that under this record, the computer would likely be warranted as a vocational aid under Iowa Code section 85.70, but not as an extension of the term "appliance" under section 85.27. Because we find the agency incorrectly interpreted section 85.27 in awarding claimant the laptop computer, we reverse.
REVERSED.
Miller, J., concurs; Vaitheswaran, J., dissents.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's thoughtful opinion based on my reading of the standard of review. The majority finds that recent amendments to Iowa Code chapter 17A.19 apply to this case. One of those amendments requires us to "give appropriate deference to the view of the agency with respect to particular matters that have been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency." Iowa Code § 17A.19(11)(c). Cf. Manpower Temporary Servs. v. Sioson, 529 N.W.2d 259, 263 (Iowa 1995) (noting we defer to agency's expertise when interpreting statutes pertaining to that agency's work). In this case, Iowa Code section 85.27, governing an employer's duty to provide "alternate care", expressly vests the commissioner with discretion to rule on disputes concerning provision of services or supplies. See Iowa Code § 85.27 (unnumbered paragraph four).
The deputy commissioner concluded that the computer was an "appliance" used to "treat" Castle within the meaning of Iowa Code section 87.27. The deputy reasoned that the term "appliance", as defined by the agency, includes "hearing aids, corrective lenses, orthodontic devices, dentures, orthopedic braces, or any other artificial device used to provide function or for therapeutic purposes." Iowa Admin. Code r. 876-8.5 (emphasis in deputy's decision). Relying on Stedman's Medical Dictionary, the deputy noted that "treat" or "treatment" encompasses "occupational therapy." The deputy stated this type of therapy, in turn, is defined as the "therapeutic use of self-care, work, and recreational activities to increase independent function, enhance development, and prevent disability" and "may include adaptation of tasks or environment to achieve maximum independence and optimum quality of life."
I would defer to the agency's construction of Iowa Code section 85.27. First, the commissioner is authorized by statute to promulgate rules implementing the workers' compensation statute. See Iowa Code § 86.8(1); Al-Khattat v. Engineering Land Surveying Examining Bd., ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2002). Stone Container does not contend that the rule defining "appliance" is contrary to statute or otherwise unreasonable or invalid. Second, the deputy commissioner acted well within his bounds in relying on the definition of "treat" and "treatment" contained in Stedman's Medical Dictionary. See Noble v. Lamoni Products, 512 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Iowa 1994) (affirming workers' compensation commissioner's adoption of several dictionary and medical definitions of "disease").
I also would find substantial evidentiary support for the deputy's determination that a computer and adaptive devices were necessary for Castle's "care, treatment, and therapy." See Sioson, 529 N.W.2d at 263-64 (noting reasonableness determination is a fact question governed by substantial evidence standard of review). Cf. Id., at 264 (noting that, without a van, the claimant was "a prisoner of her severe paralysis"). The deputy found:
The [C]laimant had no need for vocational training or occupational therapy prior to his injury. Nor does the record establish that he had any personal computer equipment for his personal use prior to April 1997. The laptop computer has been used, as a part of claimant's occupational therapy and rehabilitation since October 1997, six months after the injury.
The employer did not point to any evidence in the record that controverted these findings.
For these reasons, I would affirm the agency decision.