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Still v. Roberts

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
May 8, 2001
Civil Action No. 00-0150-CB-C (S.D. Ala. May. 8, 2001)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 00-0150-CB-C

May 8, 2001


MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER


This matter is before the Court on motions for summary judgment filed by defendants Mark Roberts and Gilliard Health Care Services, Inc. and on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by defendant Roberts. After reviewing the issues raised in light of the applicable law, the Court finds that the motions for summary judgment are due to be denied, in part, and granted, in part, and that the motion to dismiss is due to be denied.

I. Findings of Fact

The Court sets out the facts, as it must, in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff. Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994. 999 (11th Cir. 1992).

In December 1998, Plaintiff Elizabeth Still, a registered nurse, became Director of Quality Management for Evergreen Hospital ("the Hospital"), which is owned by defendant Gilliard Health Services, Inc. ("Gilliard"). Plaintiffs job was to evaluate patients to determine if they met Blue Cross's requirements for hospitalization. Both Blue Cross and the Alabama Quality Assurance Foundation require such evaluations.

Still had worked for Gilliard since 1993. Prior to becoming Director of Quality Management, Still was director of Gilliard's home health care operation.

In order to evaluate patients, Still was required to make rounds with doctors, to discuss patients' care with doctors to insure that quality standards were maintained, and to relay to the insurer why the hospital stay was medically necessary. Quality Management, also referred to as Case Management, was a new program at the Hospital, and defendant Mark Roberts was the first physician selected by the Hospital to take part in it. Beginning in January 1999, Still accompanied Dr. Roberts on his rounds each week day.

On March 5, 1999, while making rounds with Still, Dr. Roberts told plaintiff to get him some iced tea. Roberts made Still carry the tea for him and would not let her set it on the chart tray. Roberts would not allow Still to set the tea down at all, not even to make notes on patients' charts. Roberts forced Still to hold the cup while he placed his hand over hers and drank out of it. When Still left the tea at the nurses' station shortly before rounds were completed, Roberts made her go back and get it before he would finish rounds. While leaving the last patient's room, Roberts stated that Case Management was only good for carrying tea and that Still should be fired because they didn't need her anyway.

The following week Still talked to Jim Peace, the hospital administrator, about the incident. She told Peace that she felt humiliated and denigrated by Roberts' conduct. Peace refused to intervene and told Still to talk to Roberts and work it out.

Afterward, Still did talk to Roberts about the incident. She told him that he humiliated her and kept her from doing her job because she could not hold his drink and make notes at the same time. Roberts told Still that she was a new breed nurse who was too good to carry a drink for a doctor. Still asked Roberts not to do that again and not to joke and tease her. Roberts did not apologize but instead stated that it had become a "power thing" after she refused to carry his tea and that he had a point to make.

On April 20, 1999, Still was making rounds with Roberts when he became angry about a patient whom Still had flagged for discharge because he did not meet the criteria for remaining in the hospital. Roberts pretended to dictate into his dictaphone (where everyone could hear) that Cynthia Mills, the LPN who worked under Still's supervision, and Still were not compassionate and only cared about the buck. He told Still in front of another nurse to shut her "damn mouth" when they were discussing orders that were written by another physician concerning this patient.

The next day, when Still was making rounds with Roberts, Roberts asked Still what she thought about the same patient going home. She told him the same as yesterday was still true. Roberts looked at the supervisor and said that they would let the patient stay one more day in order to prove his point, even though Still would have to justify to the insurer the reason for the stay. On April 22, Roberts began to give Still the "silent treatment" while making rounds with her. He refused to speak to Still directly, even in her presence and would instead tell others to tell plaintiff what he wanted her to know.

Still talked to Jim Peace on April 22 concerning her problems with Roberts. Peace told Still to decide, as a manager, whether she wanted to tolerate it and, as a person, to do what she had to do. Still told Peace that she could not take it any more, that she was documenting what was happening and that there was a lot of harassment. Peace asked Still what she would do with an employee who had a problem like hers with the hospital's top refering physician.

On April 27, Still talked to Debbie Wilson, the human resources manager, about what was going on and asked if there was something else she could do. Wilson told Still she had taken all the appropriate steps and indicated to Still that perhaps she should sue Dr. Roberts. On April 28, Roberts told the Hospital's director of nursing to tell Still not to make rounds with him per Roberts' orders. Roberts told Jim Peace that he was not going to make rounds with Still because she was accusing him of harassment. Still was not allowed to make rounds with Roberts and was thereby prevented from performing her job.

On May 4, Still talked with Peace regarding his discussions with Roberts. Peace told Still that Roberts wanted nothing to do with Case Management and that Roberts wanted to do away with the program. Peace suggested to Still that the three of them meet to discuss the situation. Peace also told Still that Roberts knew Still was documenting a case against him and asked if Still knew what that would mean to the hospital.

On May 6, Peace informed Still that Roberts refused to meet with Peace and Still. Roberts indicated that he was through with Case Management. Despite not being allowed to make rounds, Still continued to do her job as best she could under the circumstances. She gathered patients' charts, reviewed them and put her notes on "post-it" notes on the charts.

On May 12, Still heard that Roberts was in Peace's office angry about the Case Management flags on his charts. Peace later called Still and told her not to place any more Case Management notes on Roberts' charts. A few days later, Still met with Peace again to discuss Roberts' treatment of her. At this meeting Still told Peace that she had been to see an attorney about the problems and that she believed the actions may be sexual harassment. Peace told Still not to speak those words outside his office and that she was being too quick to act. He told her that she would be blackballed as a professional if she pressed charges against Roberts and that no one ever won a case against a doctor. Peace told Still that he would speak to Roberts again.

On June 7, 1999, Still turned in her resignation to Peace. She told him that she could no longer tolerate Roberts' harassment, that Roberts was questioning everything she did and that she had been forced to stop performing her duties. Peace asked Still to reconsider and to wait until the following week. Peace was going out of town and would not be back in the office until then. On June 9, Still delivered a letter to the hospital rescinding her resignation. She also talked to a coworker about telling the truth if asked about Roberts' harassment. Peace called Still and told her to go home because he had heard about her conversation.

On June 16, Still and Peace met again to discuss the possibility of Still returning to work. Still informed Peace that she intended to pursue the harassment issues. Still's employment with the hospital was then terminated.

There is much dispute regarding the events surrounding the termination of Still's employment with the Hospital. Gilliard claims that Peace actually accepted Still's resignation before he saw her letter rescinding her resignation. Therefore, according to Gilliard, Still and Peace were simply negotiated the terms of Still's reemployment on June 16. Still, of course, claims that she effectively rescinded her resignation several days prior to Peace's attempt to accept her resignation. For purposes of summary judgment, Gilliard admits that the Court must accept Still's version of these events.

In addition to the incidents related above, Still has presented evidence of other instances of Roberts' objectionable behavior, most of which were not made known to Gilliard prior to the filing of this lawsuit. During the time Still has worked in Case Management Roberts has made numerous comments of a sexual nature in the hospital. For example, Roberts has said that females are nothing but handmaids and has given all the female nurses nicknames which reflected some aspect of their anatomy, such as "bubble butt," "chunky," "string bean." His nickname for Still was "bossy ass." In addition, Roberts has made comments of a sexual nature about patients. About a patient who had a strong body odor, Roberts commented that she smelled like a part of the female anatomy [for which Roberts used a slang term] to him and that she "probably had never washed that thing." Roberts told a nurse, whom he knew was incapable of having children, that she was one day going to be an old, wrinkled-up, childless woman one day, like the patient he was discussing. Roberts' nickname for another female employee of the hospital was "BOP" which stood for "Big Old" and a part of the female anatomy. When this employee was a patient, Roberts used the nickname on a prescription he sent to the pharmacy and when the pharmacist called for clarification, Roberts told him to call the patient. In addition, Roberts used the nickname in front of the woman and Still and told the woman to tell Still what the "P" stood for.

In 1996, while Still was working for home health, Dr. Roberts made a comment to her to the effect that "if you were screwing three men and I was the best, what would you do?" The gist of this remark was that Roberts was the hospital's most important physician so the hospital was going to do everything it could to please him. Still reported this comment to Peace, but no action was taken.

Still subsequently filed a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. After receiving her right-to-sue letter, Still filed the instant lawsuit against Gilliard and Roberts.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

In her amended complaint, Still asserts claims against Gilliard for sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 52000 ("Title VII). Although Still also has asserted various state law claims against Gilliard, she concedes in her summary judgment response that she cannot maintain a cause of action as to those claims. Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of Gilliard as to Still's state law claims against it.

Still has asserted only state law claims against Dr. Roberts — outrage, invasion of privacy, and intentional interference with business relations. In response to Roberts' motion for summary judgment, Still has conceded her claims for outrage and invasion of privacy; therefore, Roberts is entitled to summary judgment as to those claims. However, Still maintains that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to her state law cause of action for intentional interference with business relations. After briefing on summary judgment was completed, Roberts filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that this Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over the intentional interference claim because it is not part of the same case or controversy as plaintiff's Title VII claims against Gilliard.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears "the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party has satisfied his responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. "If the nonmoving party fails to make `a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). "In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

IV. Analysis A. Sexual Harassment Claim Against Gilliard

This Court has original jurisdiction over the Title VII claims asserted against Gilliard pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 1331 and has supplemental jurisdiction over all state law claims against both Gilliard and Roberts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 5 1367(a).

In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), the Supreme Court held that sexual harassment so "severe or pervasive" as to "`alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment' "is prohibited under Title VII. Id. at 67 (citations omitted). Harassment of a non-sexual nature is also actionable so long as the objectionable conduct "would not [have] occur[red] but for the employee's gender . . . [and] is sufficiently severe or pervasive . . ., [to alter] the terms and conditions of employment." Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 533, 565 (6th Cir. 1999) (emphasis deleted).

To establish that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex in violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome harassment (3) the harassment was based on her sex or gender; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms of employment; and (5) a basis for holding the employer liable. Mendoza v. Borden. Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1244 (1 li" Cir. 1999) (en banc). Gilliard contends that plaintiff cannot prove the third, fourth or fifth elements of a hostile work environment claim.

First, Gilliard argues that plaintiff cannot prove that the harassment was based on her sex because there was nothing sexual about Roberts' conduct. However, conduct need not be sexual in nature to be based on sex or gender. See Williams 157 F.3d at 565. Plaintiff has presented evidence that Roberts used derogatory nicknames for women, that he made crude and demeaning remarks about female employees in general, that he treated plaintiff in a demeaning manner by insisting that she carry his iced tea on rounds and that after she told him that she felt denigrated by the "iced tea" incident Roberts' behavior toward plaintiff worsened to the extent that he stopped speaking to her directly and eventually refused to work with her. From this conduct a jury could infer that Roberts conduct was based on plaintiff's gender.

Although there may be other explanations for some of Roberts' conduct, e.g. his stated dislike for the case management system, plaintiff's evidence presents a jury question as to whether gender or some other reason was the motivating factor behind Roberts' actions.

Next, Gilliard argues that the conduct about which plaintiff complains was not sufficiently severe and pervasive. To establish that conduct is sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment, a plaintiff must prove both and objective and a subjective component. Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246.

The employee must "subjectively perceive the harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment, and this subjective perception must be objectively reasonable. The environment must be one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and that the victim subjectively perceives to be abusive. Furthermore the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position considering all the circumstances.
Id. In considering the objective component of this analysis, the Court must take into account the following factors: "(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's job performance." Id. Defendant argues that plaintiff's evidence fails to establish the objective component of a hostile work environment claim because the conduct was neither frequent nor severe. The Court must consider the conduct "in context, not as isolated acts" and must look at "the totality of the circumstances." Id.

Roberts conduct falls into the following categories: (1) use of derogatory nicknames for and crude statements regarding female employees; (2) use of a sexual analogy to illustrate his importance to the hospital; (3) incidents of demeaning treatment of the plaintiff, i.e., the iced tea and patient discharge incidents and his subsequent refusal to work with plaintiff. Pointing to the iced tea incident and the patient discharge incident, Gilliard argues that only two incidents in a six-year period does not amount to frequent conduct and also argues that Roberts' conduct was not severe. Gilliard's argument ignores the first two categories of plaintiff's evidence and misstates the time frame. Plaintiff did not begin working directly with Roberts until January 1999. The incidents between Roberts and plaintiff occurred in March and April 1999, and by the end of April 1999 Roberts refused to work with plaintiff. Consequently, there were two incidents in a two-month period, after which there was no opportunity for further occurrences because Roberts refused to work with plaintiff. Gilliard argues that the conduct was not severe because all it amounted to was plaintiff being required to carry a glass of tea and plaintiff being told to care more about patients. Gilliard's characterization of the evidence is, to put it mildly, exceedingly self-serving. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Still was placed in a demeaning position, her authority was directly undermined and she was prevented from performing her job duties by a man who, based on his prior statements and actions toward female employees, generally held women in low esteem. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that the conduct was so infrequent or so lacking in severity that no reasonable jury could conclude that there was a hostile work environment.

Although Roberts' actions toward plaintiff, standing alone, could be considered genderneutral, such conduct may be considered, along with other gender-related conduct, as evidence of a hostile work environment.See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 533, 565-66 (6th Cir. 1999) ("myriad instances in which [plaintiff] was ostracized, when others were not, combined with gender-specific epithets used, such as `slut' and `fing women,' create an inference sufficient to survive summary judgment, that [plaintiff's] gender was the motivating impulse for her co-workers' behavior."); O'Shea v. Yellow Technology v. Services, Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1102 (10th Cir. 1999) (sexually explicitly conduct "so poisoned the entire body of conduct toward [the] [p]laintiff that a jury reasonably could view all of the allegedly harassing conduct occurring after [the harasser] began working for [the] [d]efendant as the product of sex and gender hostility.")

Gilliard's argument also fails to address the two remaining considerations with respect to the hostile work environment determination — whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating and whether it unreasonably interferes with plaintiff's job performance. Both the iced tea incident and the patient discharge incident could be construed as humiliating to plaintiff. Not only was plaintiff forced to carry Roberts' drink, she was not allowed to set it down, even to write notes on charts as she was required to do, and Roberts refused to finish rounds until plaintiff retrieved the tea from the nurse's station where she had left it. Perhaps more humiliating was Roberts' refusal to speak to her directly and addressing plaintiff through others in her presence after she disagreed with him about a patient's discharge status. The latter incident, in particular, interfered with plaintiff's job performance. Plaintiff's job involved helping to insure that a patient's diagnosis justified continued hospitalization. Roberts ordered that a patient remain hospitalized, despite the lack of justification, apparently in order to prove a point to plaintiff.

Finally, Gilliard contends that plaintiff cannot prevail, at least as to part of her claim, on the final element of a hostile work environment claim — a basis for holding the employer liable. An employer may be liable for sexual or gender-based harassment by a co-worker if it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. Breda v. Wolf Camera Video, 222 F.3d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 2000). Gilliard argues that it cannot be held liable for Roberts' sexually derogatory comments about female employees because it did not learn about such comments until this action was commenced. The fact that some incidents were unreported may be relevant in considering whether the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the overall hostile work environment but the failure to report a particular incident does not insulate the employer from liability for that conduct. Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 64 (2nd Cir. 1998). Moreover, Gilliard's argument would separate the hostile work environment into discrete instances of conduct when it is the totality of the circumstances upon which liability is affixed. See Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246.

In its argument regarding the pervasiveness and severity of Roberts' conduct, Gilliard argues that it took prompt and immediate corrective action once plaintiff spoke to Peace about Roberts' treatment of her. While this argument is more properly directed toward defendant's liability, as opposed to the existence of a hostile work environment, it would fail in any event because the facts do not support this contention. In fact, plaintiff's evidence is that Peace did nothing in response to her complaints about Roberts. It was only when Roberts contacted Peace that Peace discussed the incidents with him. Listening to the alleged harasser's complaints about the victim can hardly be considered "corrective" action.

In sum, plaintiff has defeated Gilliard's three-pronged summary judgment attack on her hostile work environment claim by presenting evidence from which a jury could conclude: (1) that Roberts' conduct was based on her sex or gender; (2) Roberts' conduct created an objectively hostile work environment and (3) Gilliard may be held liable, based on its knowledge of Roberts' conduct.

B. Retaliatory Discharge Claim Against Gilliard

Title VII makes it unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any employee because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice [under Title VII]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. The method of proving a retaliation claim based on circumstantial evidence is similar to the method for establishing a claim for discriminatory treatment and "is governed by the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)." Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993). In Goldsmith the Eleventh Circuit explained the specific analytical framework applicable to a retaliation claim:

In order to prevail the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing (1) statutorily protected expression, (2) adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action. Once a prima facie case has been established, the defendant may come forward with legitimate reasons for the employment action to negate the inference of retaliation. If the defendant offers legitimate reasons for the employment action, the plaintiff then bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant are pretextual.
Id. (citations omitted).

Gilliard's summary judgment argument is directed only at plaintiff's ability to prove a prima facie case. Specifically, Gilliard argues that plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proof as to the first and third elements. The first element, "protected activity" under Title VII, includes opposition to any unlawful employment practice. Clover v. Total Svs. Serv., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999). An employee is protected from retaliation for opposing unlawful employment practices, such as sexual harassment, as long as she has a good faith, reasonable belief that the conduct complained of was discriminatory. Id. Gilliard argues that plaintiff harbored no such belief because she only complained that the conduct was harassment and did not mention sexual harassment. In response, plaintiff points to evidence that she did, in fact, tell Mr. Peace that she believed Roberts conduct amounted to sexual harassment. Moreover, a jury could infer that plaintiff's belief was reasonable and in good faith in view of plaintiffs evidence regarding Roberts' gender and sexual-based comments.

Actually, in the legal argument section of its brief Gilliard argues that plaintiff resigned and, therefore, cannot prove that she suffered an adverse employment action; however, in its statement of facts Gilliard concedes that the issue of resignation versus termination is in dispute. In any event, plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that her employment was terminated.

"To establish [a] casual connection [between the adverse employment action and plaintiff's protected expression], a plaintiff need only show "that the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated."' Id. at 1353 (quoting Simmons v. Camden County Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)). Temporal proximity between the two events is sufficient evidence of a causal connection. Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1163 (11th Cir. 1993). Here, plaintiff complained of sexual harassment and while engaged in ongoing negotiations over how Gilliard would handle her complaints, she was terminated. Defendant argues that there is no causal connection because Gilliard did not know that plaintiffs claim was based on anything other than ordinary, run-of-the-mill harassment, as opposed to harassment based on sex, until after plaintiff was terminated when Gilliard learned about the Roberts' sexual and gender-related remarks. Once again, Gilliard's evidence is disputed. Furthermore, plaintiff is not required to prove the extent of defendant's knowledge to establish a causal connection. Instead, as set forth above, she need only prove that her protected activity and her termination were close in time, and she has clearly met this burden.

Plaintiff has, therefore, presented evidence to support a prima facie case that she was terminated because she complained to her employer about sexual harassment. Consequently, Giliard is not entitled to summary judgment as to plaintiffs retaliation claim.

C. Intentional Interference with Business Relations Claim Against Roberts

Now that plaintiff has conceded her remaining claims against him, Roberts argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claim for intentional interference with business relations. Roberts alternatively contends that he is entitled to summary judgment. In order to address either of Roberts' arguments, it is important to understand the elements of proof necessary to prevail on an intentional interference claim and plaintiff's theory of proof. The elements of a cause of action for intentional interference with business relations are:

(1) The existence of a contract or business relation;

(2) Defendant's knowledge of the contract or business relation;
(3) Intentional interference by the defendant with the contract or business relation;
(4) Absence of justification for the defendant's interference; and
(5) Damage to the plaintiff as a result of defendant's interference.
Folmar Assoc. v. Holberg, 776 So.2d 112, 114 (Ala. 2000). Plaintiff asserts that Roberts interfered with her business relationship with the hospital by harassing her on the job and interfering with her ability to perform her job duties, leading her to complain to the hospital which ultimately resulted in her termination.

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiff would have the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over its state law claim against Roberts. "[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1367. "In deciding whether a state law claim is part of the same case or controversy as a federal issue, [courts] look to whether the claims arise from the same facts or involve similar occurrences or witnesses." Hudson v. Delta Airlines. Inc., 90 F.3d 451, (11th Cir. 1996).

Roberts' argument that plaintiff's intentional interference claim does not arise from the same facts as plaintiff's Title VII claims is based on Roberts' own contortion of the facts supporting plaintiff's claim against him. Roberts asserts that plaintiff's claim against him is that she was constructively discharged as a result of Roberts' refusal to deal with her. Therefore, Roberts argues that evidence related to gender and retaliation, which are necessary to plaintiff's Title VII claims, are inconsequential to plaintiff's state law claim against him. Plaintiff's characterization of her own claims are quite different. Plaintiff asserts that Roberts' genderbased harassment led her to complain to the hospital administrator who fired her because of those complaints. According to plaintiff, it was the harassment that constituted the interference. Therefore, the federal and state law claims arise from the same facts.

This case is distinguishable from Roberts v. Lakeview Community Hospital, 985 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D. Ala. 1997), a case proffered by defendant as "nearly identical." In that case, Judge Albritton found supplemental jurisdiction lacking over plaintiff's state law assault and battery claim against a doctor because the assault and battery claim did not arise from the same facts as plaintiff's gender-based Title VII claim against the hospital based upon her subsequent demotion. In deciding that there was an insufficient nexus between the alleged assault and battery and the demotion, Judge Albritton pointed out that whether plaintiff committed an assault and battery made no difference in the jury's ultimate decision regarding whether the demotion was genderbased. In contrast, in this case, the issues of intentionally interference and gender-based harassment are, at a minimum, intertwined, since the same conduct is alleged to be the root of both claims.

2. Merits of Plaintiff's Intentional Interference Claim

Roberts argues that plaintiff cannot prove the first two elements of an intentional interference claim because she had no contract with the hospital. However, as plaintiff points out, a cause of action for intentional interference encompasses interference with non-contractual business relations, including the employer-employee relationship. Hickman v. Winston County Hospital Board, 508 So.2d 237 (Ala. 1987). Roberts argues vehemently that plaintiff cannot prove that he intentional interfered with plaintiff's relationship with the hospital because, at most, all he did was refuse to deal with plaintiff. In response, plaintiff points out that her claim is based on his harassment of her, not his refusal to deal with her after she complained. Roberts argues that plaintiff cannot prove lack of justification because he was justified in refusing to accept the case management system. Again, Roberts' argument is based on his misconstruction of the plaintiff's case. Whether Roberts was justified in refusing to accept the case management system is irrelevant. Plaintiff's evidence is that Roberts intentionally harassed her based on her gender, conduct for which plaintiff argues there can be no justification. Finally, notwithstanding Roberts' argument to the contrary, plaintiff has presented evidence from which a jury could infer that plaintiff's termination was the result of Roberts' harassment.

V. Conclusion

Plaintiff has presented evidence of a genuine issue of material fact as to her claim against defendant Gilliard for retaliatory discharge. As to all other claims against it, Gilliard is entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, Gilliard's motion for summary judgment is denied, in part, and granted, in part.

Plaintiff has also presented evidence sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact to her claims against defendant Mark Roberts for intentional interference with business relations. Plaintiff has conceded her remaining claims against Roberts. Therefore, Roberts' motion for summary judgment is denied, in part, and granted, in part.

Finally, the Court has concluded that it has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claim for intentional interference with business relations against defendant Roberts. Accordingly Roberts motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied.


Summaries of

Still v. Roberts

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division
May 8, 2001
Civil Action No. 00-0150-CB-C (S.D. Ala. May. 8, 2001)
Case details for

Still v. Roberts

Case Details

Full title:ELIZABETH STILL, Plaintiff, v. DR. MARK ROBERTS and GILLIARD HEALTH CARE…

Court:United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division

Date published: May 8, 2001

Citations

Civil Action No. 00-0150-CB-C (S.D. Ala. May. 8, 2001)