Opinion
KNLCV106006881
01-27-2016
Kathleen Stern et ux v. Franklin McEwen dba Lyme Tavern Café et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RULING RE COLLATERAL SOURCE REDUCTION
Timothy D. Bates, J.
The defendants have requested and the plaintiffs object to any collateral source reduction in the economic damages awarded Kathleen Stern. At trial, plaintiffs submitted evidence that Kathleen Stern had incurred $254,135.88 in past medical expenses, faced additional medical expenses of $50,000 for treatment by Dr. Maletz and had sustained a lost earning capacity in the range of $601,529 to $961,153. Based on these claims, the jury awarded her economic damages in the amount of $467,135.88. The jury did not state the basis for the calculation of the economic damages, and the defense did not submit interrogatories requesting an articulation of the source of the award.
The defendants claim that they are entitled to have the economic damages reduced by the amount of the medical insurance reimbursements pursuant to C.G.S. Sec. 52-225a. The purpose of this statute is to protect against double recovery of medical bills, first from the plaintiff's own insurance company and then from the defendant. See Jones v. Kramer, 267 Conn. 336, 838 A.2d 170 (2004). In that case, however, the Supreme Court insisted that before a collateral source reduction can occur, there must be evidence in the record that the collateral source payment specifically covered the economic damages awarded. As Justice Katz, writing for the court, stated, " . . . we conclude that Sec. 52-225a, when viewed in the context of the purposed of tort reform, must be construed to allow only payments specifically corresponding with items of damages included in the jury's verdict to be deducted as collateral sources for the economic damages award." 267 Conn. at 348.
The Supreme Court in that case held that the burden is on the defendant to prove that economic damages awarded were covered by collateral source benefits, advising defense counsel to submit interrogatories to the jury to clarify the nature of the economic damages actually awarded. Id., pp. 349-50. In this case, no such interrogatories were submitted to the jury.
Cases subsequent to Jones have allowed collateral source offsets without the submission of interrogatories if it is clear on the face of the award that the economic damages have been reimbursed. See Perillo v. Jacobs, 2009 WL 1333920, Sup.Ct. JD New Haven (April 8, 2009) . In the case at hand, the jury awarded plaintiff Lee Stern the exact amount of the economic damages claimed, which necessarily included all his medical bills. Accordingly, even though there were no jury interrogatories verifying the reimbursement of the medical bills, there was no need for them as it was obvious from the award that all medical costs had been reimbursed. Therefore, as to Lee Stern, the medical expenses awarded shall be reduced by the collateral sources.
In the case of Kathleen Stern, however, there is no such clarity. For economic damages, she claimed $254,135.88 in past medical expenses, $50,000.00 in future medical expenses, and $601,525-$961,153 in lost earnings, for a total claim of $905,664.88 to $1,265,188.88. And the jury awarded her $467,135.88 without itemization.
The defense argues that because the $135.88 at the end of the award is identical to the last five digits in total medical expense claims, the full medical costs were necessarily awarded, and all medical insurance payments should be deducted as collateral sources, citing Saraceno v. Hartford Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 2004 WL 3049759, Sup.Ct. JD Hartford (11/24/04) ; Ventura v. Town of East Haven WL 1588816, Sup.Ct. JD New Haven (3/13/15); and Furlong v. Merriman, WL 1461112, Sup.Ct. JD New Britain (5/4/06). However, in each of these cases, the economic damages award was equal to the medical damages claimed. In this case there is no obvious way to calculate with any assurance the amount of or specific medical expenses awarded. From the last five figures in the award--$135.88--which are admittedly identical to the last five figures in the medical expense claim, the defense extrapolates that the economic damages award necessarily covers all medical claims.
The court finds this extrapolation speculative and unpersuasive. The claim is very similar to the defendant's contention in Guay v. Darden, WL 2166850, JD Hartford (9/7/04) . In that case the court refused to credit collateral sources on the basis of the defense claim that the last three numbers " 703" in the economic damages calculation established that medical damages had been reimbursed, just because one of the medical bills ended with those three digits. As in that case, the ending figures in this case could be interpreted as a compromise amount, a partial award or a coincidence. The defense has the burden of proof to establish that medical costs were actually reimbursed by the economic damages award and that proof, as required in Jones v. Kramer, supra . must be in the record and must specifically correspond to the amount claimed. In this case, it is not possible with any degree of certainty to determine the amount of reimbursement, if any, the jury allowed for medical costs. Therefore, in the case of Kathleen Stern, the court cannot award a reduction for collateral sources.