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Stecko v. RLI Ins. Co.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
Oct 21, 2014
121 A.D.3d 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)

Opinion

2014-10-21

Christopher STECKO, et al., Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. RLI INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant–Appellant, Three Generations Contracting, Inc., etc., et al., Defendants.

Dreifuss, Bonacci & Parker PC, Florham Park, NJ (David C. Dreifuss of the bar of the State of New Jersey, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), for appellant. Virginia & Ambinder, LLP, New York (James E. Murphy of counsel), for respondents.



Dreifuss, Bonacci & Parker PC, Florham Park, NJ (David C. Dreifuss of the bar of the State of New Jersey, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), for appellant. Virginia & Ambinder, LLP, New York (James E. Murphy of counsel), for respondents.
TOM, J.P., RENWICK, MOSKOWITZ, RICHTER, KAPNICK, JJ.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Manuel J. Mendez, J.), entered on or about July 12, 2013, which granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The motion court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in holding that plaintiffs satisfied the prerequisites for class certification ( seeCPLR 901[a] ). Plaintiffs' affidavits stating that they recalled working with at least fifty other workers established that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable (CPLR 901[a][1]; see Galdamez v. Biordi Constr. Corp., 50 A.D.3d 357, 855 N.Y.S.2d 104 [1st Dept.2008] ). The commonality prerequisite is met since all members of the class allege that defendant Three Generations Contracting, Inc. failed to pay the required prevailing wage and supplemental benefits owed to them (Orgill v. Ingersoll–Rand Co., 110 A.D.3d 573, 574, 973 N.Y.S.2d 205 [1st Dept.2013] ). We reject defendant RLI Insurance Company's contention that the wages owed to the different trades would be too highly individualized ( see Pludeman v. Northern Leasing Sys., Inc., 74 A.D.3d 420, 421–422, 904 N.Y.S.2d 372 [1st Dept.2010] ). The fact that “different trades are paid on a different wage scale and thus have different levels of damages does not defeat certification” (Kudinov v. Kel–Tech Constr. Inc., 65 A.D.3d 481, 482, 884 N.Y.S.2d 413 [1st Dept.2009]; see Dabrowski v. Abax Inc., 84 A.D.3d 633, 634, 923 N.Y.S.2d 505 [1st Dept.2011], Nawrocki v. Proto Constr. & Dev. Corp., 82 A.D.3d 534, 536, 919 N.Y.S.2d 11 [1st Dept.2011] ).

Similarly, plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of all class members since they each arise from Three Generations' alleged failure to pay prevailing wages and supplemental benefits ( seeCPLR 901[a][3]; see Friar v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 78 A.D.2d 83, 99, 434 N.Y.S.2d 698 [2d Dept.1980] ).

The record supports a finding that plaintiffs and their counsel can adequately represent the class ( seeCPLR 901[a][4]; Dabrowski, 84 A.D.3d at 634, 923 N.Y.S.2d 505). We find no merit to RLI's contention that plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have sufficient knowledge of the claims to serve as class representatives, since the named plaintiffs possess more than the required “general awareness of the claims” at issue ( see Brandon v. Chefetz, 106 A.D.2d 162, 170, 485 N.Y.S.2d 55 [1st Dept.1985] ).

We note that, as we have previously held, a class action is the “superior vehicle” for resolving wage disputes “since the damages allegedly suffered by an individual class member are likely to be insignificant, and the costs of prosecuting individual actions would result in the class members having no realistic day in court” (Nawrocki, 82 A.D.3d at 536, 919 N.Y.S.2d 11; see also Dabrowski, 84 A.D.3d at 635, 923 N.Y.S.2d 505).

Plaintiffs have also satisfied the additional factors set forth in CPLR 902 for class certification.

We note that the motion court was not required to apply the “rigorous analysis” standard utilized by the federal courts in addressing class certification motions under Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, given this Court's recognition that CPLR 901(a) “should be broadly construed” and that “the Legislature intended article 9 to be a liberal substitute for the narrow class action legislation which preceded it” (city of new york v. maul, 14 n.Y.3d 499, 509, 903 n.y.s.2d 304, 929 N.E.2d 366 [2010] ).

We have considered RLI's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.


Summaries of

Stecko v. RLI Ins. Co.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
Oct 21, 2014
121 A.D.3d 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)
Case details for

Stecko v. RLI Ins. Co.

Case Details

Full title:Christopher STECKO, et al., Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. RLI INSURANCE…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Date published: Oct 21, 2014

Citations

121 A.D.3d 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)
121 A.D.3d 542
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 7103

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