Opinion
Record No. 0988-92-3
December 15, 1992
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
(Donald G. Pendleton; Pendleton, Martin, Henderson Garrett, on brief), for appellant.
(Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General; Robert L. Walker, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Barrow, Moon and Bray.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated publication.
Upon review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission. Rule 5A:27. As the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, we recite them only as necessary to explain our decision.
Robin D. Staton appeals from a finding that her current skin condition and resulting disability is not related to her original work-related infectious skin condition which was caused by exposure to an infected patient in February, 1991.
"General principles of workman's compensation law provide that `[i]n an application for review of an award on the ground of change in condition, the burden is on the party alleging such change to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.'" Great Atl. Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 4 Va. App. 459, 464, 359 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1987) (quoting Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 438-39, 339 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1986)).
Furthermore, "it is fundamental that a finding of fact made by the Commission is conclusive and binding upon this court on review. A question raised by conflicting medical opinion is a question of fact." Commonwealth v. Powell, 2 Va. App. 712, 714, 347 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1986) (citations omitted). "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but is subject to the commission's consideration and weighing." Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 11 Va. App. 675, 677, 401 S.E.2d 213, 214 (1991) (citation omitted). Unless we can say, as a matter of law, that Staton's evidence was sufficient to meet her burden of proof, the commission's findings are binding upon us. Tomko v. Michael's Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
Here, the commission was free to accept the opinions of Drs. Stuart Brust and Kenneth Greer that Staton's current condition and disability are not causally related to her employment. These opinions constitute credible evidence to support the commission's finding regarding causation.
It is noted that Dr. Claire Whitmore, Staton's treating physician, stated in her letter dated October 3, 1991, that Staton was treated for her initial infection and it had cleared before she returned to work on April 4, 1991. Furthermore, from April 4, 1991 forward, Staton was not exposed to any patients as she was assigned to a light-duty clerical position. Thus, it would be difficult to find that Staton's present problems have any causal relationship to her initial occupational exposure to Patient #13143.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.