Opinion
2015 KA 0699
04-15-2016
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. WARREN CORNELIUS WILLIAMS
Warren L. Montgomery Matthew Caplan Covington, LA Counsel for Appellee, State of Louisiana Cynthia K. Meyer New Orleans, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, Warren Cornelius Williams
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany, State of Louisiana
Trial Court Number 547362
Honorable Richard A. Swartz, Judge Presiding
Warren L. Montgomery
Matthew Caplan
Covington, LA Counsel for Appellee,
State of Louisiana Cynthia K. Meyer
New Orleans, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,
Warren Cornelius Williams BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., WELCH, AND DRAKE, JJ. WHIPPLE, C.J.
The defendant, Warren C. Williams, was charged by bill of information on count one with aggravated flight from an officer, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:108.1(C), and count two with aggravated obstruction of a highway of commerce, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:96, and pled not guilty on both counts. After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty on count one of the responsive offense of flight from an officer, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:108.1(A), and guilty as charged on count two. On count one, the trial court imposed a term of six-months imprisonment. On count two, the trial court adjudicated the defendant a second-felony habitual offender and sentenced the defendant to a term of fifteen-years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. See LSA-R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a). The defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on count two. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.
According to the minutes, upon giving the defendant credit for time served, a six-month sentence imposed on count one was deemed satisfied. On count two, the trial court initially adjudicated the defendant a fourth-felony habitual offender, and imposed an enhanced sentence of forty-years imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. The predicate offenses used by the State consisted of 1998 and 2002 convictions of possession of cocaine, and a 2007 conviction of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The trial court denied the defendant's original motion to reconsider sentence. After the appeal was granted in this case, the defendant filed another motion to reconsider sentence. This court remanded the case for a ruling on the motion. On remand, the State amended the habitual offender bill of information to delete the 1998 and 2002 predicate convictions. The trial court adjudicated the defendant a second-felony offender on count two, vacated the previously imposed sentence on count two, and resentenced the defendant on count two as stated above.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 14, 2014, at approximately 7:00 p.m., the defendant fled during a routine traffic stop for a speeding violation. Trooper Matthew Richard of the Louisiana State Police, Troop L, was conducting a stationary radar enforcement on I-12 in St. Tammany Parish when he first observed a dark-colored pick-up truck, traveling eastbound at an apparent high rate of speed. Trooper Richard was positioned in the median just east of Highway 1088 and used a radar device to determine that the vehicle was traveling at a rate of 86 miles per hour, in a 70 miles per hour speed limit zone. After confirming the vehicle's speed, Trooper Richard activated his blue lights and conducted a traffic stop on the right shoulder of eastbound I-12. Trooper Richard ordered the driver, identified as the defendant, to exit the vehicle and provide his driver's license. The defendant informed the officer that he did not have a driver's license, but that he had a state identification card, which he provided to the officer. When the defendant opened his passenger compartment to look for his insurance and registration documentation, Trooper Richard smelled the odor of marijuana. Trooper Richard performed a pat-down frisk at the front of the patrol unit before entering his unit to run the license plate number and subject's name and date of birth through the NCIC system.
As Trooper Richard was entering the defendant's information into the system, the defendant retreated to his vehicle, which was located approximately ten to fifteen feet from the patrol unit. Upon reentering his vehicle, the defendant began traveling east on I-12. Trooper Richard put his unit in drive, activated the sirens (in addition to the lights, which were still activated from the initial stop), used his radio to call for assistance, and pursued the defendant as he traveled on the interstate highway. Trooper Richard's patrol unit was traveling in the left lane as he chased the defendant's vehicle. Trooper Richard observed the defendant's vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed, as it veered off the highway and began traveling on the shoulder of I-12 at an extremely high rate of speed. During this time, Trooper Richard traveled at a rate as high as 120 miles per hour at some points in an effort to decrease the gap that the defendant created between his vehicle and the patrol unit.
The defendant exited the interstate highway and began traveling on Highway 434, still traveling at high rates of speed. The defendant finally lost control of his vehicle and crashed into a ditch at the intersection of Highway 434 and Berry Todd Road. After a foot pursuit along the wood line of the intersection, Deputy Ryan Moring of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriffs Office, who simultaneously arrived at the scene of the crash, was able to locate and apprehend the defendant.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues that the jury was inconsistent in finding that the State did not prove he committed aggravated flight from a police officer, but concluding that the State did prove that he committed aggravated obstruction of a highway. The defendant contends that in rendering the verdict on count one, the jury found that human life was not endangered when he fled. Thus, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of aggravated obstruction of a highway on count two. As guidance, the defendant utilizes the enumerated acts which shall be considered circumstances wherein human life is endangered pursuant to LSA-R.S. 14:108.1(D). Contending that each circumstance in the list is inapplicable in this case, the defendant specifically concludes that the evidence presented by the State does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he performed any act on a highway where human life was endangered.
In part, LSA-R.S. 14:108.1(D) specifically provides:
Circumstances wherein human life is endangered shall be any situation where the operator of the fleeing vehicle or watercraft commits at least two of the following acts:
(1) Leaves the roadway or forces another vehicle to leave the roadway.
(2) Collides with another vehicle or watercraft.
(3) Exceeds the posted speed limit by at least twenty-five miles per hour.
(4) Travels against the flow of traffic or in the case of watercraft, operates the watercraft in a careless manner in violation of R.S. 34:851.4 or in a reckless manner in violation of R.S. 14:99.
(5) Fails to obey a stop sign or a yield sign.
(6) Fails to obey a traffic control signal device.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979). See also LSA-C.CrP. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So. 2d 654, 660. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, LSA-R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So. 2d 141, 144.
Aggravated obstruction of a highway of commerce is, in pertinent part, the intentional or criminally negligent placing of anything or performance of any act on a road, highway, or thoroughfare, wherein it is foreseeable that human life might be endangered. LSA-R.S. 14:96(A). Aggravated obstruction of a highway of commerce may be committed by general intent or criminal negligence. See LSA-R.S. 14:96(A); LSA-R.S. 14:10; and LSA-R.S. 14:11. General criminal intent is "present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act." LSA-R.S. 14:10(2). Criminal negligence "exists when, although neither specific nor general criminal intent is present, there is such disregard of the interest of others that the offender's conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances." LSA-R.S. 14:12.
Thus, LSA-R.S. 14:96 prohibits the intentional or criminally negligent performance of any act on a highway which creates a foreseeable risk to human life. State v. Cox, 2008-0492 (La. 1/21/09), 5 So. 3d 869, 872. As noted in Cox, the reporter's comment to LSA-R.S. 14:96 refers to the reporter's comment for LSA-R.S. 14:97 (simple obstruction of a highway of commerce) which, in turn, states: "Not only obstruction but also any act which will impede travel and commerce comes within the purview of these articles." See State v. Cox, 5 So. 3d at 873, n.6. "Foreseeable" means that which would ordinarily would be anticipated by a human being of average, reasonable intelligence and perception. LSA-R.S. 14:2(5). This Court has concluded that driving "erratically" on an interstate highway constitutes a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:96. State v. Lavergne, 2008-0044 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/2/08), 991 So. 2d 86, 90, writ denied, 2008-1459 (La. 2/20/09), 1 So. 3d 494.
Trooper Richard testified as to the vehicle pursuit that took place after the defendant fled in the midst of the traffic stop. Specifically, as Trooper Richard pursued the defendant on I-12, at one point, there was "almost a collision" between the defendant's vehicle and an 18-wheeler truck traveling ahead of them as the two vehicles vied for a lane change. As the defendant began traveling on the shoulder of I-12, another vehicle pulled further into the grassy area, beyond the shoulder. The defendant was traveling at a rate over a hundred miles per hour (approximately 115 to 120 miles per hour) as he was driving on the shoulder of the interstate. Still traveling in the left lane, Trooper Richard slowed down his unit to allow other vehicles to change lanes, and the defendant was able to gain a significant amount of distance from the patrol unit. He observed that his unit was reaching rates of speed well over 100 miles per hour, sometimes up to 120 miles per hour, yet the gap between the patrol unit and the defendant's vehicle was increasing.
At one point, as they approached Highway 434, the defendant locked his tires as his vehicle nearly spun out of control. When the defendant approached the end of the off-ramp, rather than merging right to go south on Highway 434, he entered the wrong lane of travel to drive around a vehicle that was stopped at a stop sign. The defendant further disregarded the stop sign as he made a right turn. The defendant's vehicle and the patrol unit, in active pursuit traveling south on Highway 434 towards Lacombe, again increased to a high rate of speed. As they continued in the right lane and proceeded through several curves, Trooper Richard slowed down due to the existing driveways and intersecting streets, which allowed the defendant to increase the gap between his vehicle and the unit. When the patrol unit came around the last curve, he observed the defendant's vehicle spin out of control from the right lane over the left lane, crashing into the ditch at the intersection of Highway 434 and Berry Todd Road (approximately 1.5 miles from where they entered the highway off the interstate, and approximately four miles from the point of the initial stop). Trooper Richard testified that they were in a 55-miles-per-hour speed zone on Highway 434.
The recording from the patrol unit dash camera of the traffic stop and vehicle pursuit was admitted and shown to the jury. The video, in keeping with Trooper Richard's testimony, shows the defendant pull over at the point of the initial stop. Trooper Richard can be heard asking the defendant about marijuana in his vehicle as the defendant retrieves his identification and looks for his documentation. The defendant ran back to his truck after the trooper patted him down and reentered his vehicle. Trooper Richard can be heard using his radio to report the eastbound "hot pursuit" that began approximately two miles from Lacombe. The video captured the entire pursuit, as accurately described by Trooper Richard, including the encounter with the 18-wheeler before the defendant began traveling on the shoulder of the highway, the passing of several other vehicles by the police unit in pursing the defendant, and the moving of vehicles which entered the shoulder at the wood line to allow the unit to pass while pursing the defendant on Highway 434 after exiting the interstate. Deputies of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office joined the pursuit on Highway 434.
The officers testified that after they exited their units, they could hear movement in the wood line next to the intersection. Trooper Richard ordered the defendant to come back out of the woods with both of his hands visible. There was no verbal response as the sound of the defendant's footsteps continued. The officers followed the sound of the footsteps alongside the tree line. Trooper Richard avoided entering the woods due to the decrease in sunlight and fear of the defendant being armed. Deputy Moring tracked the defendant's steps from the highway as the defendant continued southbound in the wood line. Deputy Moring observed the defendant moving underneath a residence in the area. The deputy assumed the residence was occupied, because the lights were on. With his gun drawn, he chased the defendant and ordered him to come out from underneath the house. As the defendant came out, the deputy ordered him to place his hands behind his back, and the defendant was handcuffed and taken into custody.
On appeal, the defendant compares the facts of the instant case to the facts in Cox. The defendant argues that the cases are significantly distinguishable because there was no testimony that the defendant herein drove into oncoming traffic, or targeted a vehicle, or drove through a residential neighborhood at a speed of 100 miles per hour. Cox involved a high speed police pursuit. During the chase, Cox left his lane of travel while negotiating a curve and struck an oncoming vehicle. The driver of the other vehicle died as a result of the injuries received in the crash. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the conviction for aggravated obstruction of a highway based on a finding that Cox did not place anything in the highway. See State v. Cox, 2007-0774 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1/30/08), 974 So. 2d 891, 896. In reversing the Third Circuit Court of Appeal and reinstating the conviction and sentence, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the defendant surely performed an act which created a foreseeable risk to human life by driving into the opposite lane of travel at an estimated speed of 85 miles per hour and driving so as to intentionally target the victim's vehicle. See State v. Cox, 5 So. 3d at 873. We find any distinction among the factual circumstances of the two cases insignificant as to the defendant's guilt in this case.
Herein, the evidence shows that the defendant ignored speed limits, as he erratically passed several vehicles, and thereby created the possibility of collisions. He entered and drove for some distance along the shoulder of the interstate, before exiting onto a highway with intersections, entering into the wrong lane of travel, and ultimately crossing both lanes out of control, as he crashed into a ditch. It was clearly foreseeable that human life might be endangered due to the defendant's actions. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So. 2d 55, 61 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 514 So. 2d 126 (La. 1987). We find no such hypothesis exists in the instant case. The guilty-as-charged verdict rendered in this case on count two, aggravated obstruction of a highway, indicates that the jury found that the defendant performed an act which created a foreseeable risk to human life. This finding in no way conflicts with the jury finding the defendant guilty of the responsive offense of flight from an officer on count one, as opposed to the charged offense of aggravated flight from an officer. Aggravated flight from an officer requires a finding that human life is actually endangered as opposed to the lower burden required on count two of showing that it was merely "foreseeable that human life might be endangered." LSA-R.S. 14:108.1(C); LSA-R.S. 14:96(A) (emphasis added). We note that despite the verdict on count one of guilty of the lesser offense, the evidence presented in this case also supports a finding of the elements of aggravated flight from an officer, including the commission of at least two of the acts enumerated in LSA-R.S. 14:108.1(D). However, it is well settled that a jury may return a "compromise" verdict of a lesser offense which is supported by the evidence, even if the evidence also supports a verdict of the charged offense. See State ex rel. Elaire v. Blackburn, 424 So. 2d 246, 251 (La. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 959, 103 S. Ct. 2432, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1318 (1983). The verdicts herein can be viewed as reflecting a compromise among the jurors.
In reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See Ordodi, 946 So. 2d at 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 (per curiam). After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of aggravated obstruction of a highway of commerce were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the assignment of error lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, the defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.