Opinion
No. 61457-6-I.
March 9, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-8-02883-0, Carol A. Schapira, J., entered February 27, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W.C. challenges the validity of the investigatory stop that led to his arrest and conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. A police officer stopped W.C.'s car based on his suspicion that W.C. had lied to the officer about his identity during earlier questioning — a crime — because the information W.C. provided, when entered into the officer's mobile computer, yielded no driver's license record. We conclude that the Terry stop was based on a reasonable suspicion that W.C. had engaged in criminal activity. Accordingly, we affirm.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
I
At 11:44 p.m. on August 9, 2007, Seattle Police Department Officer Cameron Probst encountered W.C. in a city park. Officer Probst initially saw W.C. sitting with two friends in a parked car bearing Washington license plates on the edge of the park. The park had closed at 10:00 p.m., but people were still playing basketball inside the park. As the basketball players dispersed upon seeing Officer Probst, W.C. and his two friends left their car and sat down on the park lawn. Officer Probst approached them and requested their names and identification. None had any identification. W.C. claimed that he was 16 years old and that he had left his driver's license at home. Officer Probst entered the information garnered from the three individuals into his mobile computer to search the Washington Department of Licensing electronic database. The computer was operating slowly, however, and did not immediately return any search results. Officer Probst released W.C. and his two friends. W.C. said he and his friends would return home and drove away from the park.
Moments later, Officer Probst's computer completed the search. It returned no record of any of the three individuals. Suspicious that W.C. had lied to him, Officer Probst pursued W.C. in his police car and directed W.C. to stop. Pursuant to the stop, Officer Probst learned that the car was stolen and arrested W.C.
W.C. was charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The trial court denied W.C.'s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, concluding that Officer Probst had reasonably suspected that W.C. had lied to him. The trial court also concluded that the stop was valid because Officer Probst had reason to believe that W.C. was driving without a valid license, even though the court did not find that Officer Probst so suspected. After a trial on stipulated facts, the court found W.C. guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle.
II
W.C. challenges the Terry stop that led to his arrest, arguing that the absence of a Department of Licensing computer entry did not create a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity. He also contends that the trial court's conclusion that the stop was lawful is erroneous because the trial court based its conclusion on a reason not articulated by Officer Probst. We disagree.
W.C. does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact as being unsupported by the evidence. Therefore, we treat the trial court's findings as verities on appeal. State v. Ross, 106 Wn. App. 876, 880, 26 P.3d 298 (2001). Whether the trial court reached the correct legal conclusion from these findings is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Chang, 147 Wn. App. 490, 495, 195 P.3d 1008 (2008).
A police officer may conduct a warrantless investigatory stop of an individual if he "`has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity.'" State v. Lee, ___Wn. App.___, 199 P.3d 445, 447 (2008) (quoting State v. Walker, 66 Wn. App. 622, 626, 834 P.2d 41 (1992)). "A reasonable suspicion is the `substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred or is about to occur.'" Lee, 199 P.3d at 447 (quoting State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 6, 726 P.2d 445 (1986)). The reasonableness of a police officer's suspicion "`is determined by the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the inception of the stop.'" Lee, 199 P.3d at 447 (quoting State v. Rowe, 63 Wn. App. 750, 753, 822 P.2d 290 (1991)). In assessing the totality of the circumstances, an officer may "draw on [his] own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to [him] that `might well elude an untrained person.'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981)). "A determination that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. See also Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d at 6 (explaining that activity consistent with both criminal and noncriminal activity may justify a brief detention). "[T]he determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).
Here, Officer Probst testified that he suspected W.C. had lied about his identity during his first encounter with the officer. W.C. does not challenge the propriety of Officer Probst questioning him about entering the closed park. It is unlawful for a person to knowingly make a false or misleading statement about his identity to a police officer if the officer is likely to rely on that statement to discharge his or her official powers or duties. RCW 9A.76.175; State v. Godsey, 131 Wn. App. 278, 291, 127 P.3d 11 (2006). Officer Probst used the information that W.C. provided to conduct a records search. Given that W.C. claimed that he was 16 years old and had left his driver's license at home and drove away from a Seattle park in a car with Washington license plates supposedly to return home, common sense indicates a likelihood that W.C. would have a Washington driver's license record. Nothing suggests that W.C. would have likely had a license issued by a sovereign other than Washington. When the records search yielded no results for W.C., it was therefore reasonable for Officer Probst to suspect that W.C. had provided false information in response to his questions — a crime under RCW 9A.76.175. That Officer Probst did not rule out the possibility that W.C. might have had a driver's license from another jurisdiction did not preclude him from reasonably suspecting that W.C. had lied about his identity under these circumstances.
RCW 9A.76.175 provides, in full:
A person who knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. "Material statement" means a written or oral statement reasonably likely to be relied upon by a public servant in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties.
Therefore, we conclude that Officer Probst reasonably suspected that W.C. had engaged in criminal activity.
W.C.'s contention that the trial court erroneously upheld the stop based on the unarticulated reason that Officer Probst suspected that W.C. did not have a valid driver's license is of no moment. Contrary to W.C.'s characterization of the trial court's conclusions of law, the trial court expressly observed that "Officer Probst had reasonable concern the respondent had not provided correct information." Even if the trial court's legal conclusions lacked evidentiary support, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. State v. Michielli, 132 Wn.2d 229, 242-43, 937 P.2d 587 (1997). Here, there is ample evidentiary support for the conclusion that Officer Probst reasonably suspected that W.C. had provided false information and that he stopped him for that reason.
Further, W.C. mistakenly relies on State v. Gatewood, 163 Wn.2d 534, 182 P.3d 426 (2008), and State v. Moore, 161 Wn. 2d 880, 169 P.3d 469 (2007), for the proposition that we must reverse the trial court's ruling because it contained a legal conclusion based on an unarticulated reason for stopping W.C. In Gatewood, the court concluded that the stop leading to Gatewood's arrest for possession of a firearm and controlled substances was invalid because the arresting officers could not have reasonably suspected that criminal activity was afoot based on the facts they articulated. 163 Wn.2d at 541. Unlike the facts in Gatewood, Officer Probst's suspicion that W.C. had provided false information was reasonable under the circumstances. In Moore, the court invalidated an arrest for Moore's failure to identify himself pursuant to a traffic infraction — a putative seatbelt violation — because the record did not support the State's contention that the officers had actually investigated Moore for a seatbelt violation. 161 Wn.2d at 886. In contrast to the situation in Moore, Officer Probst testified that he stopped W.C. because he suspected that W.C. had lied to him. Because Officer Probst reasonably suspected that W.C. had provided false information and stopped him for this reason, the Terry stop that led to W.C.'s arrest and conviction was valid.
Affirmed.