Opinion
No. 30572-1-II
Filed: March 8, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Clallam County. Docket No: 03-1-00109-0. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 05/16/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Kenneth Day Williams.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Jodi R. Backlund, Backlund Mistry, 203 4th Ave E Ste 217, Olympia, WA 98501-1187.
Manek R. Mistry, Backlund Mistry, 203 4th Ave E Ste 217, Olympia, WA 98501-1187.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Deborah Snyder Kelly, Attorney at Law, 223 E 4th St Ste 11, Port Angeles, WA 98362-3015.
Neil R. Vanderpol appeals a Clallam County jury conviction for possessing methamphetamine, contending that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized after the police stopped his vehicle. We affirm.
Facts
Testimony at the CrR 3.6 suppression hearing revealed the following: On March 7, 2003, Richard Koharian was working at the Sequim QFC store when Vanderpol entered. Koharian recognized Vanderpol as someone who had come into the store several days earlier and tried to buy 50 pounds of dry ice, a quantity that aroused Koharian's curiosity. He had called the police, who told him dry ice can be used to manufacture methamphetamine, and asked him to call again if the man were to come back for dry ice. Vanderpol had visited the store a second time, and on that occasion Koharian had called police and given them the license number of the man's car. The police asked him to call again if the man reappeared. On March 7, he did just that; Vanderpol entered the store and visited the pharmacy section, then asked Koharian about buying candy thermometers. Koharian called police and told them the same man was at the store, having driven there in a `Ram Charger.' RP (5/22/03) at 11.
Sequim Officers Campbell and Arand received a radio dispatch from Sergeant Madison reporting that Vanderpol, who was named in an outstanding felony arrest warrant from Jefferson County, had driven to the QFC in a Dodge Ram Charger. The sergeant told Campbell he would inquire whether the warrant was still active. Meanwhile, Campbell and Arand drove to the QFC parking lot. They spotted the vehicle, saw a man get into it, and followed while waiting for Madison to confirm the warrant. Campbell believed, from information imparted by other officers, that the driver was Vanderpol. A minute or two later Madison confirmed the warrant, so they stopped the vehicle. Campbell approached and asked the driver for his license. Campbell immediately recognized Vanderpol from a photo accompanying the Jefferson County warrant documents, which had been posted at the police department.
Apparently, Sequim police officers had been passing information about the earlier events back and forth over one to two weeks. The officers tried to identify the person trying to buy dry ice at the QFC store by posting a photograph and a copy of a warrant describing Vanderpol. The photographs showed Vanderpol sporting a goatee, just as Koharian noted about the man who tried to buy the ice on March 7.
Vanderpol identified himself and was arrested on the warrant. Campbell began a search incident to arrest and found, in Vanderpol's jacket pocket, a package of methamphetamine. Campbell continued searching the vehicle and discovered a number of items commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine. The State charged Vanderpol with simple possession and with possession with intent to manufacture.
Vanderpol moved to suppress evidence, arguing that the traffic stop was pretextual and not based on probable cause to believe the driver was doing anything illegal, or was the person, Neil Vanderpol, who was the subject of the Jefferson County warrant. The trial court denied the motion, ruling:
It is the opinion of the Court, that based upon the fellow officer rule . . . there is a sufficient basis to find at least reasonable and articulable suspicion existed that the individual at QFC was Mr. Neil Vanderpol and that, due to the outstanding warrant, . . . the police should exercise their duty to effect an arrest, which they did.
Clerk's Papers at 82. Having been convicted of the possession count, Vanderpol appeals the suppression ruling.
Discussion
This case involves a traffic stop, albeit not for a traffic infraction. A traffic stop is a `seizure' for purposes of constitutional guarantees against unlawful searches and seizures. State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 349, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). Absent a search warrant, a search and seizure is unlawful unless it falls into one or more of several broad categories: consent to search, exigent circumstances, incident to valid arrest, inventory search of vehicle, plain view, Terry investigative stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 349. Vanderpol argues that the traffic stop was pretextual rather than based on a legally sufficient reason. [T]he problem with a pretextual traffic stop is that it is a search or seizure which cannot be constitutionally justified for its true reason (i.e., speculative criminal investigation), but only for some other reason (i.e., to enforce traffic code)[,] which is at once lawfully sufficient but not the real reason.
Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 351.
Most traffic stops are made when the officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred. State v. Chelly, 94 Wn. App. 254, 259, 970 P.2d 376, review denied, 138 Wn.2d 1009 (1999). Here, however, the officers stopped Vanderpol because they thought he was the subject of an outstanding felony warrant. The question is whether their belief was legally sufficient. When the police have a preexisting warrant, the rule precluding pretextual arrests is not a factor. State v. Witherspoon, 82 Wn. App. 634, 638, 919 P.2d 99 (1996), review denied, 130 Wn.2d 1022 (1997).
The police may make an arrest on the basis of reasonable suspicion of grounds for arrest communicated by fellow officers, or from a police bulletin based on probable cause possessed by the issuing agency. State v. Rothenberger, 73 Wn.2d 596, 440 P.2d 184 (1968); State v. O'Cain, 108 Wn. App. 542, 550, 31 P.2d 733 (2001); McKinney v. City of Tukwila, 103 Wn. App. 391, 403-04, 13 P.3d 631 (2000). See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 233, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (valid stop and arrest on basis of `wanted flyer' issued by police in neighboring state, who would themselves have had reasonable suspicion justifying a stop). A police radio report is presumed reliable. State v. Sandholm, 96 Wn. App. 846, 848, 980 P.2d 1292 (1999).
At issue here is a bench warrant emanating from the Jefferson County Superior Court on January 3, 2003, for the arrest of Neil R. Vanderpol on a charge of manufacturing methamphetamine. The warrant and accompanying photo described Vanderpol in detail. It had been posted and discussed in Sequim Police headquarters by Madison and officers on his shift. Vanderpol protests that Campbell and Arand had no way of knowing, before stopping him, that he was Neil Vanderpol, the person for whom the warrant had been issued.
We hold that the stop was not pretextual, because the police had a reasonable suspicion that the driver of the Ram Charger was Vanderpol, who had an outstanding arrest warrant. See Witherspoon, 82 Wn. App. at 638-39. Campbell and Arand received a report that a man who had tried to buy a suspiciously large quantity of dry ice at QFC was there again. The QFC employee, Koharian, had been instructed to report the man's reappearance. Campbell and Arand also had a description of a particular vehicle associated with the man and watched him get into it. From information conveyed by other officers, they believed the driver was Neil Vanderpol. They believed Vanderpol had an outstanding arrest warrant for manufacturing methamphetamine, and they awaited confirmation of the warrant before stopping him. With all this in mind, the police were justified in stopping Vanderpol's vehicle and, after confirming his identity, arresting him on the warrant. Rothenberger, 73 Wn.2d at 599; Witherspoon, 82 Wn. App. at 638.
The ensuing search of his person incident to arrest was proper. State v. Jordan, 92 Wn. App. 25, 29, 960 P.2d 949 (1998), review denied, 137 Wn.2d 1006 (1999).
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MORGAN, A.C.J. and ARMSTRONG, J., concur.