Opinion
No. 4-239 / 03-1572
July 14, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, James D. Scott, Judge.
Defendant appeals from her conviction for second-degree murder. AFFIRMED.
Paul Miller of Miller Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, and Melissa O'Rourke, County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Christie Lee Ann Helen Van Oort appeals from her conviction for second-degree murder in violation of Iowa Code section 707.3 (2003). She contends her counsel was ineffective in several respects. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Christie Van Oort is a Canadian citizen who was approved for conditional residence status in the United States. She was employed by Valley Manor Nursing Home in April 2002 as a nurse's aide. On April 16, 2002, Van Oort was feeding pureed food to eighty-seven year-old resident Dick Post, who suffered from Parkinson's disease. Post's gag reflex was absent, making it difficult for him to swallow. Post received his medications intravenously.
Sometime during the feeding, Van Oort summoned a nurse to attend to Post who was no longer breathing. The nurse did not find evidence of forced feeding or food in Post's mouth or throat. Post, who had executed a no resuscitation order, died.
Van Oort told her co-workers she had killed Post. It was believed Post died of natural causes, and that Van Oort was simply upset Post died during the feeding and she somehow felt responsible for his accidental choking or strangulation. The authorities were not notified of Post's statements at that time.
On October 2, 2002, Van Oort called the National Customer Service Center of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) in New York. Van Oort told INS agent Felicia Peprah-Mensah that she had killed someone and that she couldn't go to sleep because she knew what she had done was wrong. Van Oort told Peprah-Mensah that she was feeding an elderly man named Dick a puree of vegetable soup when she became angry and shoved the food down his throat until he could no longer breathe or swallow. Van Oort said she then ran out of the room, knowing he would die. She stated she ran out of the room because she did not want to get caught. Peprah-Mensah reported this information to her supervisor.
On November 19, 2002, a Supervisory Special Agent of the INS office in Sioux City contacted Sioux County Sheriff Jim Schwiesow's call to Peprah-Mensah. Post's body was disinterred for an autopsy, which revealed aspirated food in the lungs and food lodged in Post's throat. Post's cause of death was determined to be from aspiration and asphyxiation on a large amount of food. Dr. Randall, a forensic pathologist, concluded the amount of food would have been more than any person would have been able to accidentally choke on.
On December 3, 2002, law enforcement officers arrived at Van Oort's home and asked to speak with Van Oort about the events of April 16, 2002. Van Oort agreed to voluntarily go to the Sheriff's Department for an interview. Before the interview began, Van Oort stated she was guilty, she knew what she had done was wrong, and she was going to spend the rest of her life in jail. Van Oort stated she had murdered Post, and that she had planned it before going to Post's room. Van Oort said Post said things to her that would make her angry, and that she was reminded how she did not have a relationship with her own father who had physically, mentally, and emotionally abused her. Van Oort recounted in detail how she had killed Post.
Sioux County Sheriff Jim Schwiesow interviewed Van Oort's husband, who did not appear surprised by the allegations his wife had killed Post. Nathan Van Oort informed Schwiesow that the nursing home had arranged for in-patient psychiatric treatment of his wife on two different occasions.
On January 16, 2003, Van Oort was charged with the first-degree murder of Dick Post. On August 25, 2003, Van Oort pled guilty to second-degree murder. At the time, Van Oort was taking the following medications to treat anxiety and depression: Paxil, Risperdal, Clonazepam, and Seroquel. She had to be transferred from Osceola County jail after making several attempts to commit suicide.
It is undisputed that, in accepting Van Oort's guilty plea, the district court engaged in the proper colloquy. Although she was advised of her right to file a motion in a arrest of judgment to challenge her guilty plea, Van Oort waived time for sentencing and was sentenced at the conclusion of the plea hearing. Van Oort was sentenced to fifty-years imprisonment.
Van Oort now appeals from her guilty plea, alleging it was based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, she alleges counsel was ineffective in (1) failing to conduct a reasonable investigation in her prior and current mental health status, (2) failing to conduct a factual investigation in Post's death and failing to interview employees of Valley Manor Nursing Home, (3) failing to file a motion to suppress a statement she gave during her custodial interrogation, and (4) advising her to waive her rights to file a motion in arrest of judgment.
II. Scope of Review.
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. McBride, 625 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001). Ordinarily, we preserve ineffectiveness claims raised on direct appeal for postconviction relief to allow full development of the facts surrounding counsel's conduct. Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999). Only in rare cases will the trial record alone be sufficient to resolve the claim. Id. "Even a lawyer is entitled to his day in court, especially when his professional reputation is impugned." State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999) (citing State v. Coil, 264 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1978)).
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Van Oort did not file a motion in arrest of judgment to challenge any alleged infirmities in her plea. She also did not seek to withdraw her plea at sentencing. Normally, this failure means error is not preserved with regard to defects in the plea proceeding. See State v. Brooks, 555 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1996). Nevertheless, this omission will not bar a challenge to a guilty plea if the failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a defendant must show (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted therefrom. Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1999). The test of ineffective assistance of counsel focuses on whether counsel's performance was reasonably effective. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). The defendant must show counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness so that counsel failed to fulfill the adversarial role that the Sixth Amendment envisions. Id. A strong presumption exists that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 814. The defendant has the burden of proving both elements of his ineffective assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 145 (Iowa 2001).
Additionally, our courts have ruled that trial strategy, miscalculated tactics, mistake or inexperience do not constitute ineffective assistance. Id. at 143. We may dispose of the defendant's ineffective assistance claims under either prong. Id. In order to prove the prejudice prong, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698.
"To show counsel was ineffective in a guilty plea case, the defendant must show that counsel's advice was not within the normal range of competency demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 1998) (citations omitted). In the context of guilty pleas, a defendant may establish the occurrence of prejudice by showing "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Irving v. State, 533 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 1995) (citations omitted).
Entry of a guilty plea pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)( b) waives all defenses and objections which are not intrinsic to the plea itself. State v. Speed, 616 N.W.2d 158, 159 (Iowa 2000). Our courts have recognized five challenges which are not waived by a plea of guilty. State v. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Iowa 2000). Generally, one such challenge is ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 397-98. However, if the undercurrent of the ineffective assistance claim is an issue designed to question the validity of the conviction, it, too, is waived. Id. at 398. Ineffective assistance claims which do not bear on the "knowing and voluntary nature of a plea" will not survive the entry of a guilty plea. Speed, 616 N.W.2d at 159.
Van Oort contends her counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to suppress her statement to the Sioux County Sheriff's Department during her six-hour custodial interrogation. Because Van Oort's claim does not bear on the knowing and voluntary nature of her plea, we cannot consider it.
Van Oort also contends her counsel was ineffective in waiving the time for sentencing and a motion in arrest of judgment, which precluded her challenge to her guilty plea on appeal. Specifically, Van Oort argues the combination of medicines she was taking at the time of her guilty plea may have affected her ability to knowingly and intelligently enter a plea. We preserve this issue for postconviction relief.
Finally, we consider Van Oort's claim her counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate both her mental health status and the circumstances surrounding Post's death. Specifically, Van Oort alleges her trial counsel failed to interview or consult with any of her treating mental health physicians. She alleges her mental health illnesses may provide a medical explanation for her confessions. She further contends her mental health illnesses may affect whether she could make a distinction between moral responsibility and legal responsibility for Post's death. Finally, Van Oort claims counsels' failure to investigate and interview other Valley Manor Nursing Home employees relates both to the proximate cause of Post's death and her mental illness.
Part of defense counsel's duties to a client is the duty to investigate. Schrier v. State, 347 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Iowa 1984). The extent of the investigation required in each case turns on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. Id. The duty to investigate is not unlimited, and trial counsel is not required to interview every potential witness. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 145 (Iowa 2001). There is no need to investigate a particular matter, for example, if the defendant has given counsel a reason to believe the investigation would be fruitless or unwarranted. Id. Similarly, investigation of a defense may be curtailed or eliminated if the facts are already known to counsel through another source. Id.
As noted above, any ineffective assistance claim designed to question the validity of the conviction is waived. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d at 398. However, counsel's failure to investigate valid defenses impacts the knowing and voluntary nature of Van Oort's plea. For a plea to meet a constitutional challenge, a defendant must enter his or her guilty plea voluntarily with a full understanding of the nature of the charges made in the indictment, his or her available defenses, and the nature and consequences of such plea. State v. Ryan, 493 N.W.2d 82, 82 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992). During the plea colloquy, Van Oort's counsel stated they had no knowledge of any available defenses. Here, even a cursory investigation into Van Oort's mental health may have yielded a valid defense. We preserve this issue for postconviction relief.