Opinion
No. 3-364 / 01-1843
Filed October 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forPolkCounty, Robert D. Wilson, Judge.
Robert Trumbo appeals from his convictions and sentences for assault while participating in a felony and willful injury, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.3 and 708.4(2) (2001). AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Michelle Chenoweth, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Robert Trumbo appeals from his convictions for assault while participating in a felony and willful injury, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.3 and 708.4(2) (2001). The convictions were based on actions occurring on the morning of June 24, 2001. A reasonable juror could find the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt from the record in this case. Patricia White and her husband Mike heard a loud crash at their Des Moines residence around 5:30 a.m. They looked outside to see a man, later identified as Robert Trumbo, sitting in their front yard, after apparently crashing his vehicle into the White's family vehicle. Patricia went outside and confronted Trumbo, warning him not to leave the scene of the accident. Trumbo responded by approaching Patricia and punching her in the face. Michael then came onto the scene and observed the altercation. After he pushed Trumbo off the porch, the Whites attempted to retreat into their house. Trumbo followed and hit the door as Michael was shutting it, catching Michael's hand between the door and the frame, and causing it to bleed profusely. When police later arrived on the scene, they discovered a strong smell of alcohol and marijuana coming from Trumbo's vehicle. They later observed him running from a patch of woods across the street and arrested him.
On appeal, Trumbo first contends the evidence is insufficient to prove he could form the specific intent to commit either of the offenses. Alternatively, he claims that if this issue is not properly preserved for review, counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise it. Because we conclude counsel failed to preserve this issue, we address it under an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). In order to prevail on his claim that he has been denied effective assistance of counsel, Trumbo must show his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and the failure prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984), Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142. In determining whether there was substantial evidence, we view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2001). Substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We must consider all the record evidence, not just the evidence supporting guilt. Id.
The court instructed the jury that "specific intent" means "not only being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind." See Iowa Jury Instruction 200.2; see also State v. Neuzil, 589 N.W.2d 708, 712 (Iowa 1999). We conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding Trumbo was able to form, and did in fact possess, the specific intent to commit the offenses of assault while participating in a felony and willful injury.
There was evidence Trumbo had consumed alcohol and various drugs prior to the incident. However, there is also substantial evidence that Trumbo was indeed able to form specific intent. For example, in his confrontation with Patricia, he acknowledged the circumstances and setting of his actions when he stated "Look Lady, it's six o'clock in the morning. I hit a car. Get out of my face." Moreover, his actions exhibit an awareness of wrongdoing, and a conscious attempt to distance himself from his actions. When officers arrived on the scene, they observed him running away from the scene and heading across the street. Trumbo responded appropriately when officers ordered him to the ground with his hands behind his back. In addition, when confronting Patricia White on her porch, he responded to her threat to loose her dogs on him with a challenge to do just that. We believe a reasonable juror could consider these responses as an understanding of what was happening, and thus that Trumbo possessed and exercised the faculties to form specific intent. We therefore reject his claim counsel was ineffective in failing to argue the sufficiency of evidence of specific intent.
Trumbo also contends the court erred in refusing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal on the willful injury charge which was brought in Count II. He claims error occurred when he was convicted of a crime for which he was not properly charged. We review this claim for errors of law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4.
In the trial information the State accused Trumbo of committing:
Count 2: WILLFUL INJURYand charges that the defendant did knowingly and intentionally assault Patricia White with the intent to cause serious injury and actually caused bodily injury in violation of Section 708.6 of the Code of Iowa (A Class D Felony).
Iowa Code section 708.6 actually defines the crime of terrorism, rather than willful injury, which is proscribed in section 708.4(2). At the close of the State's evidence, Trumbo asked the court to dismiss this count, arguing the State had charged him under the wrong section. The State pointed out that the language of the charge did, in fact, track that of the willful injury provision and asked to amend the trial information to reflect the correct code section. The court summarily overruled the motion to dismiss, but did not enter an order in response to the State's request to amend.
We conclude the court properly overruled Trumbo's motion for judgment of acquittal. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.4(7)( d) provides:
No indictment is invalid or insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or other proceedings thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in a matter of form which does not prejudice a substantial right of the defendant.
We conclude Trumbo was not prejudiced by the allegation of the wrong Code section. The language of Count II in the trial information expressly alleges a willful injury charge. Moreover, the minutes of testimony and the trial information clearly indicate the State's intention to seek a conviction for willful injury rather than terrorism. Thus, there could have been no surprise to Trumbo or his counsel in preparing for trial. See, e.g., State v. Davison, 245 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Iowa 1976) (noting the purpose of a trial information is to afford the defendant an opportunity to prepare a defense). Because we find Trumbo was not prejudiced by the erroneous allegation of a Code section in the information, we conclude his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this issue is also without merit. AFFIRMED.
With this decision, we do not condone sloppy or cavalier preparation of charging documents. We merely conclude that under the specific facts of this case where the proper charge is exceedingly clear from the text of trial information and the other documents, that Mr. Trumbo suffered no prejudice.