Opinion
2 CA-CR 2023-0048-PR
04-11-2023
The State of Arizona, Respondent, v. Anthony Lee Terranova, Petitioner.
Anthony Lee Terranova, Yuma In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court.
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR1996095002 The Honorable Mark H. Brain, Judge
Anthony Lee Terranova, Yuma In Propria Persona
Vice Chief Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Sklar and Judge O'Neil concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
STARING, Vice Chief Judge:
¶1 Anthony Terranova seeks review of the trial court's summary dismissal of his notice of and petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that order absent an abuse of discretion. See State v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7 (2015). Terranova has shown no such abuse here.
¶2 After a jury trial in 1998, Terranova was convicted of first-degree murder and third-degree burglary, both dangerous offenses. The trial court sentenced him to an aggravated prison term of eight years for the burglary to be followed by natural life in prison for the murder. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Terranova, No. 1 CA-CR 98-0805 (Ariz. App. Sept. 2, 1999) (mem. decision). Terranova filed his first Rule 32 petition in 2001, which the court summarily dismissed. We subsequently denied relief on his petition for review of the court's dismissal of his Rule 32 petition, filed in 2016. State v. Terranova, No. 1 CA-CR 16-0404 PRPC (Ariz. App. Oct. 3, 2017) (mem. decision). Terranova filed another petition in 2019, which the court summarily dismissed. He did not seek review of that ruling.
¶3 In 2022, Terranova filed his most recent Rule 32 petition, asserting claims under Rule 32.1(a) and (c). He argued his convictions and sentences violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, he was improperly sentenced to aggravated terms "by the judge rather than the jury," and the imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent sentences, violated A.R.S. § 13-116.
¶4 In November 2022, the trial court summarily dismissed Terranova's petition. The court determined that, except for Terranova's claim based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), his claims under Rule 32.1(a) were precluded because he could have raised them on appeal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3). The court also rejected his Rule 32.1(c) claims, noting that Terranova had not "explain[ed] when he discovered the issues, nor . . . cite[d] authority precluding a natural life sentence for first-degree murder or an 8-year sentence for third-degree burglary." See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b), 32.4(b)(3)(B). The court also addressed and rejected Terranova's claims on the merits. It ultimately concluded that Terranova had not adequately explained the reasons for the untimely assertion of his claims. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b), 32.4(b)(3)(D). This petition for review followed.
Insofar as Terranova attempts to explain for the first time on review why he is filing these claims more than twenty-three years after he was sentenced, we do not consider his explanation, which he did not present to the trial court in the Rule 32 proceeding. See State v. Ramirez, 126 Ariz. 464, 468 (App. 1980) (appellate court does not consider issues raised for the first time in petition for review).
¶5 On review, Terranova repeats the claims he raised in his Rule 32 petition, asserting that they are not precluded and asking that he be resentenced. He again argues his double jeopardy rights were violated because the charges were duplicitous. Citing Nordstrom v. Cruikshank, 213 Ariz. 434 (App. 2006), Terranova also argues he was improperly sentenced based on factual findings made by the judge, rather than the jury, and contends that because this was his first conviction, he should have received the presumptive sentence. He also maintains the court incorrectly concluded "[n]o additional findings are needed for a Court to impose natural life or life with the possibility of release for first degree murder." Finally, Terranova argues his sentences should be concurrent because the offenses were committed on the same occasion.
To the extent Terranova also compares his sentences to those of defendants in other cases for the first time on review, we do not consider that argument. See Ramirez, 126 Ariz. at 468.
¶6 We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. See Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, ¶ 7. Indeed, the court clearly identified Terranova's claims and correctly resolved them in a thorough, well-reasoned minute entry, which we adopt. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274 (App. 1993) (when trial court has correctly ruled on issues raised "in a fashion that will allow any court in the future to understand the resolution[, n]o useful purpose would be served by this court rehashing the trial court's correct ruling in a written decision").
¶7 Accordingly, we grant review but deny relief.