Opinion
No. 54484-5-I
Filed: March 14, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No. 03-1-04427-6. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 06/11/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Palmer Robinson.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Salah a Kornas, Attorney at Law, 600 1st Ave Ste 514, Seattle, WA 98104-2253.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Prosecuting Atty King County, King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor, W554 King County Courthouse, 516 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
John Francis II McHale, King County Prosecuting Attorney, 500 4th Ave Ste 900, Seattle, WA 98104-2316.
Surety Bankers Insurance Company and Henry's Bail Bonds appeal the denial of their motion to vacate forfeiture of a bond posted to secure a defendant's appearance at trial. Although Surety Bankers contends the court incorrectly denied the motion as a matter of law rather than discretion, the record shows that the court assumed it had discretion and reasonably declined to vacate the forfeiture because Surety Bankers made no contribution to the recovery of the defendant, who was apprehended only after he was arrested for a new crime. We affirm.
The appellants advance identical arguments and will be referred to in the balance of the opinion as Surety Bankers.
In February 2003, Alfred Tidmore was arrested and charged with delivery of cocaine. Bail was set at $12,000. Tidmore was released after he obtained a surety bond from Surety Bankers. The court later issued a bench warrant for Tidmore's arrest when he failed to appear for trial. The State filed a notice of forfeiture of the bond and the court signed an order of forfeiture in January 2004. The order was stayed by its own terms for 60 days and became effective on March 8 when Tidmore still had not been apprehended. Surety Bankers paid the judgment on March 19.
On March 24, Tidmore was arrested after a shooting incident that resulted in his being charged with two counts of first degree assault. Surety Bankers played no role in Tidmore's apprehension, but nevertheless moved for refund of the forfeited bail. The State opposed the motion and the court denied the request. Surety Bankers appeals.
Chapter 10.19 RCW sets forth the statutory rights of bondsmen. Under RCW 10.19.100, if a defendant fails to appear and the bond is ordered forfeited, the bondsman may stay execution for 60 days. If the defendant appears in court during that time, under RCW 10.19.105, the court `may vacate the judgment upon such terms as may be just and equitable, otherwise execution shall forthwith issue as well against the sureties in the new bond as against the judgment debtors.' If the defendant does not appear within 60 days but returns to custody within 12 months of the forfeiture and `if the surety was directly responsible for producing the person in court or directly responsible for apprehension of the person by law enforcement' then the amount of the bond less costs incurred by law enforcement will be remitted. RCW 10.19.140.
Surety Bankers acknowledges it did not satisfy the requisites of the statute, but contends that the trial court erred by failing to exercise its discretion to vacate a bail forfeiture under its `inherent common law equitable power.' Brief of Appellants, at 2. The State asks us to affirm on the basis that the trial court possesses no such authority. We decline to reach that question, however, because it is apparent from the record that the trial court assumed it had discretion and exercised it on tenable grounds in denying Surety Bankers' requested relief.
The State's argument that chapter 10.19 RCW forecloses the exercise of judicial discretion in this setting presents a debatable issue. But the briefing before the court lacks sufficient analysis of the legislative history of RCW 10.19.140 or consideration of judicial construction of similar statutes to justify reaching the issue when it is not necessary to resolve this appeal.
The trial court's ruling must be viewed in the context of the arguments before it. In its motion to the trial court, Surety Bankers acknowledged that it did not satisfy the statutory requirements, but cited State v. Hampton, 107 Wn.2d 403, 409, 728 P.2d 1049 (1986), State v. Mullen, 66 Wn.2d 255, 401 P.2d 991 (1965), and State v. Jakschitz, 76 Wn. 253, 256, 136 P. 132 (1913) for the proposition that the trial court possessed equitable authority to grant a bondsman relief even when the statutory requirements were not met. The State, in response, advanced as its only argument that the court should deny the request as a matter of law on the grounds that chapter 10.19 RCW, as amended in 1986 by the addition of RCW 10.19.140, foreclosed any exercise of discretion in that regard.
While not expressly using the word `discretion' in its written order, the trial court addressed and distinguished Surety Bankers' cited cases on their facts. Contrary to Surety Bankers' contention, this demonstrates that the court ruled as a matter of discretion because no such analysis was necessary to adopt the State's position. Moreover, among the facts the court noted with particularity was that Tidmore `was taken into custody as the result of his actions in allegedly committing another crime.' That the court found this fact significant necessarily implies it exercised judicial discretion because application of the statutes is not affected by how authorities capture a defendant if the surety did not produce him.
The decision of whether to vacate a bail forfeiture will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Bralley, 70 Wn. App. 646, 651, 855 P.2d 1174 (1993). No one fact or set of facts is dispositive, and the trial court is accorded broad discretion:
The test, in determining the question whether the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the forfeiture of a bail bond, `is not alone one of time whether prompt or otherwise; nor good faith, or the lack of it; nor compensation, or lack of it, to the bondsmen or surety; nor whether there are organized, undisclosed principals in procuring the business of furnishing bail' but `is the judicial discretion of the trial judge, who, in formulating and arriving at his judgment, may look to all such things, if in the case, and others, if there are any, with the understanding, . . . that in `the absence of evidence of flagrant abuse the appellate court will not interfere.''
State v. Molina, 8 Wn. App. 551, 507 P.2d 909 (1973) (quoting State v. Van Wagner, 16 Wn.2d 54, 62-63, 132 P.2d 359 (1942) (emphasis in Molina)). That Surety Bankers played no role in Tidmore's arrest and he was apprehended only after an arrest for a new alleged offense furnished a sufficient basis for the court's exercise of discretion.
In reply, Surety Bankers faults the trial court's written ruling for failing to address expressly its claims of good faith in unsuccessfully attempting to return Tidmore to custody. But Molina rejected the claim that a showing of good faith requires vacation in the absence of prejudice to the State. Molina, 8 Wn. App. at 553. Surety Bankers has cited no authority that the trial court is required to restate all of the arguments of the parties to act within its broad discretion. And the trial court stated its reasons with sufficient clarity to determine there was no abuse of discretion. See Hampton, 107 Wn.2d at 409.
We affirm.
COLEMAN, ELLINGTON and APPELWICK, JJ.