Opinion
1 CA-CR 20-0620
11-30-2021
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. MARK ELLIOTT STUART, Appellant.
Scottsdale City Attorney's Office, Scottsdale By Kenneth M. Flint Counsel for Appellee Stanley M. Slonaker Attorney at Law, Phoenix By Stanley M. Slonaker Counsel for Appellant
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. LC2020-000239-001 The Honorable Douglas Gerlach, Judge Retired
Scottsdale City Attorney's Office, Scottsdale By Kenneth M. Flint Counsel for Appellee
Stanley M. Slonaker Attorney at Law, Phoenix By Stanley M. Slonaker Counsel for Appellant
Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the court's decision, in which Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
SWANN, JUDGE
¶1 Mark Elliot Stuart appeals from his conviction for failing to obey a peace officer. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Police officers removed Stuart from a Scottsdale City Council meeting after he refused to comply with city officials' requests to refrain from soliciting ballot-initiative signatures during the public comment portion of the meeting. Because Stuart refused to follow the officers' repeated commands, he was convicted in the city court under Scottsdale City Code ("Code") § 19-13, which provides that "[n]o person shall refuse to obey a peace officer engaged in the discharge of his duty, or any other person authorized to aid in quelling any riot, rout or affray."
¶3 Stuart appealed his conviction to the superior court, challenging the constitutionality of Code § 19-13. The superior court rejected Stuart's claims and affirmed his conviction, specifically finding Code § 19-13 constitutional as drafted and applied. Stuart timely appeals to this court.
DISCUSSION
¶4 Stuart contends that Code § 19-13 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
¶5 We held in State v. Kaiser that Code § 19-13 is constitutional. 204 Ariz. 514, 519, ¶ 20 (App. 2003). In Kaiser, we explained that Code § 19-30 is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad because it "provides sufficient objective standards for one charged with its enforcement to know what conduct is unlawful" without "encouraging] arbitrary enforcement," id. at ¶ 16, and it poses no "risk [to] the First Amendment rights of those persons not before the court," id. at ¶ 18. We noted that "[t]he refusal to obey a legitimate order of a sworn peace officer does not implicate the constitutional rights of a person." Id. at ¶ 18. Stuart provides no compelling reason for us to depart from our holding in Kaiser. See State v. Hickman, 205 Ariz. 192, 200, ¶ 37 (2003) (holding that appellate courts will not depart from precedent absent compelling reasons).
¶6 Because we find Code § 19-13 to be constitutionally valid on its face, we will not address Stuart's attempts to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance as applied. "Because this matter originated in municipal court, our jurisdiction is limited to a review of the facial validity of the ordinance. Accordingly, if the regulation is facially valid, we do not proceed to analyze how it was applied to the individual defendant." Kaiser, 204 Ariz. at 516-17, ¶ 4 (internal citation omitted); see also State v. McLamb, 188 Ariz. 1, 4 (App. 1996). To the extent Stuart suggests that we treat his appeal as a petition for special action, we decline. The superior court provided an adequate forum for Stuart to challenge the constitutionality of Code § 19-13, and he has failed to assert a purely legal issue of first impression likely to arise again. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a); Vo v. Superior Court (Romley), 172 Ariz. 195, 198 (App. 1992).
CONCLUSION
¶7 We affirm Stuart's conviction.