Opinion
No. 54170-6-I
Filed: April 25, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No. 02-1-10308-8. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 04/09/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Joan B Allison.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Washington Appellate Project, Attorney at Law, Cobb Building, 1305 4th Avenue, Ste 802, Seattle, WA 98101.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Angela J Kaake, King Co Pros Office, W-554 King County Courthouse, 516 3rd Ave, Seattle, WA 98104-2390.
Prosecuting Atty King County, King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor, W554 King County Courthouse, 516 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
Isaac Strong challenges his convictions for first degree criminal trespass and bail jumping. Regarding the criminal trespass conviction, Strong contends that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that he knowingly entered the property unlawfully. Regarding the bail jumping conviction, Strong contends that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that he knowingly failed to appear before the court for his confirmation of counsel hearing. We conclude that the State provided sufficient evidence for both charges. Strong also alleges in his statement of additional grounds for review that the court failed to provide him with representation, but he does not offer any argument to support his claim. We therefore affirm the judgment and sentence of the trial court.
FACTS
Isaac Strong entered Boeing's fenced premises and was found inside a building. A Boeing employee approached Strong and inquired whether Strong worked at Boeing. Strong answered no. The employee then escorted Strong to security guards, who found Boeing property in his pockets, including lead refill cartridges, pens, and keys. The State charged Strong with second degree burglary in violation of RCW 9A.52.030.
The trial court appointed counsel for Strong. During pretrial proceedings, Strong signed a document setting omnibus and trial dates that specified a penalty for failing to appear before the court on those dates. After a continuance, the court granted Strong's motion for withdrawal of counsel on July 16, 2003, and granted Strong a one-week continuance for trial to begin on July 23, 2003. Strong appeared on the rescheduled trial date and explained that he could not obtain an attorney who would accept his case on short notice. The trial court then granted an additional continuance for trial to begin on September 23, 2003, and set a date for confirmation of counsel on August 8, 2003. Strong signed the order of continuance of criminal trial date, which set forth both dates, but he did not sign the order on criminal motion for the confirmation of counsel hearing. Strong failed to appear at the confirmation of counsel hearing, and the State requested a bench warrant for Strong's arrest. The State then charged Strong with bail jumping.
In the trial for second degree burglary, the jury convicted Strong of the lesser included offense of first degree criminal trespass. After a bench trial, Strong was convicted of bail jumping. He was sentenced to three days in jail for trespassing and fifty days of community service for bail jumping.
ANALYSIS
Strong argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to find him guilty on the bail jumping or criminal trespass charges. A defendant admits the truth of the evidence when claiming that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the crime. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, after viewing it in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221-22, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).
A trier of fact may infer criminal intent from circumstantial evidence or from a defendant's conduct, which is not considered any less reliable than direct evidence. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980). In examining the evidence, the reviewing court will not evaluate credibility determinations made by the trier of fact. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990). The reviewing court need not be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, only that substantial evidence supports the State's case. State v. Galisia, 63 Wn. App. 833, 838, 822 P.2d 303 (1992).
Under RCW 9A.76.170(1) "[a]ny person having been released by court order or admitted to bail with knowledge of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before any court of this state . . ., and who fails to appear . . . as required is guilty of bail jumping." Thus, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) was held for, charged with, or convicted of a particular crime, (2) was released by court order or admitted to bail with the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance, and (3) knowingly failed to appear as required. State v. Pope, 100 Wn. App. 624, 627, 999 P.2d 51 (2000). Strong claims that the State did not show beyond a reasonable doubt the third element — that he knowingly failed to appear for his court date.
By statute, a person acts knowingly when: "(i) he is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by statute defining an offense; or (ii) he has information which would lead a reasonable man in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense." RCW 9A.08.010. When proving whether a defendant knowingly failed to appear as required, the State need only show that the defendant was "aware" that he was required to appear, State v. Ball, 97 Wn. App. 534, 536, 987 P.2d 632 (1999), or that a reasonable person would have been aware of the obligation to appear. State v. Bryant, 89 Wn. App. 857, 871, 950 P.2d 1004 (1998). The State need not prove that the defendant knew that his failure to appear at the court hearing was a crime. State v. Reed, 84 Wn. App. 379, 384, 928 P.2d 469 (1997) ("[I]gnorance of the law is no excuse.").
Strong claims there was no written order or oral ruling to appear in court. In fact, the State submitted both written documentation of the date and a videotape of the colloquy between Strong and the judge. The State presented an order of continuance of the criminal trial date, which Strong signed, that stipulated: "Defendant needs to obtain counsel. Omnibus hearing on September 12, 2003. Confirmation of counsel on Aug. 6, 2003." Exhibit 18. The State also presented testimony from the court's clerk that she personally handed copies of the orders to Strong.
At the hearing, the judge presiding over the pretrial proceeding stated, [W]e can set a confirmation of new counsel hearing. August 6th. And if before that date the State has received a notice of appearance . . . Mr. Strong, attorneys put in what is called a notice of appearance. It's a one-page document saying they're going to represent you . . ., then, this hearing on August 6th can be stricken. I don't see any reason why you would need to come in.
Brief of Appellant, Appendix 1, at 4.
Strong contends that the judge indicated he was not required to appear for the confirmation of counsel hearing. Strong, however, takes the judge's statement out of context. The judge stated that if a notice of appearance was filed, then the hearing could be stricken. Strong was not represented by counsel on the date of the confirmation of counsel hearing. Therefore, a notice of appearance was not filed and the hearing was not stricken. Thus, the defendant was required to appear. During the bench trial, the court reviewed the documents and the videotape at least two times and determined that
The fact that Strong had not obtained counsel is significant. Had Strong been represented by counsel, his confusion about whether he needed to appear or whether his counsel had filed a notice of appearance would be understandable.
any reasonable person would have known that he had to appear because the judge said that the only way you can waive [the hearing] is by having a lawyer here and he didn't have a lawyer. . . . [H]e had an obligation to appear and he knew he had an obligation to appear. And certainly he clearly I believe was — I believe that's the only conclusion one can logically draw from reviewing the videotape.
Report of Proceedings (February 24, 2004) at 49.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we are satisfied that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Strong knowingly failed to appear in court.
In order to convict Strong for first degree criminal trespass, the State must prove "he knowingly enter[ed] or remain[ed] unlawfully in a building." RCW 9A.52.070(1); see also State v. Finley, 97 Wn. App. 129, 136, 982 P.2d 681 (1999). The State requested a "to convict" jury instruction that excluded the words "or remained." Strong argues that although he may have remained on the premises after discovering his presence was unlawful, he did not knowingly enter the premises unlawfully. Witnesses for the State testified that the facility is surrounded by an 8- to 10-foot fence with barbed wire at the top and signs posted along the fence stating authorized admittance required. There are only two gates to enter the facility. One is manned by security personnel and requires a Boeing badge for admittance. The other gate, through which Strong entered the premises, is monitored by a security camera and requires a security guard to open and close the gate. Although Strong claims the gate was open when he entered the grounds, viewed in its entirety, the evidence presented was sufficient to show that Strong was aware that he was not permitted on Boeing's property.
Strong also argues that even if he knowingly entered the premises unlawfully, he did not knowingly enter the building located on the premises unlawfully. Strong claims that although signs were posted along the perimeter of the area, the building he entered did not have an authorized admittance sign posted. He therefore argues that the proper charge is second degree criminal trespass, which required the State to prove he "knowingly enter[ed] or remain[ed] unlawfully in or upon premises of another under circumstances not constituting criminal trespass in the first degree." RCW 9A.52.080(1). We do not find this argument persuasive. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could conclude that if Strong knowingly entered the premises unlawfully, then his entry into any building on those premises was also knowingly unlawful.
Strong relies heavily on State v. Brown, 50 Wn. App. 873, 751 P.2d 331 (1988). This case, however, is distinguishable. In Brown, the defendant was found inside a fenced area, but never entered a building located on the premises. The court therefore concluded that a charge of second degree trespass was appropriate rather than first degree trespass. In this case, not only was Strong found inside the building, but he had employee property taken from inside the building in his pockets. Thus, first degree criminal trespass is the proper charge.
Strong then argues in his statement of additional grounds for review that he was not granted his right to counsel. Strong contends:
My right to representation was denied. The court failed to allow me representation at every critical stage of the proceedings. I did not voluntarily or knowingly give up my right to counsel. I was forced to find new counsel and during that time I was also forced to make [a] decision without the guiding hand of a competent attorney.
The court having allowed the withdrawal of retained counsel, without substitution of new counsel is a violation of rule 3.1(b)(2).
In fact, the court did offer counsel:
Just so I am clear, my recollection is that there was a conflict between Mr. Baker and Mr. Strong and Mr. Strong did confirm he wanted counsel and he wanted to hire his own counsel I think but I nevertheless directed him to go to OPD [Office of the Public Defender] in the event he wasn't able to hire new counsel for any reason, he would have that as a back-up.
Brief of Appellant, Appendix 1, at 3. The court then specifically asked Strong if he still wanted to hire private counsel. Strong responded yes.
Strong does not assert any specific argument for how he was denied his right to counsel. He also cites RCW 2.44.050 — notice of change and substitution — in his statement, but does not specify any argument for how this statute applies to his case.
This court is not obligated to search the record to support claims made in a statement of additional grounds for review. RAP 10.10(c). Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration. State v. Johnson, 119 Wn.2d 167, 171, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's decision.
COLEMAN, SCHINDLER and KENNEDY, JJ.