Opinion
No. 2-362 / 01-1369.
Filed July 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, SYLVIA A. LEWIS, District Associate Judge, and DAVID REMLEY, Judge.
Michael Shrock appeals from the judgment and sentence following his conviction for driving while barred in violation of Iowa Code sections 321.561 and 903.1(1)(2) (1999). AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Victoria Dominguez, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and HUITINK and HECHT, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On February 20, 2001, Michael Shrock was arrested on an outstanding warrant while meeting with his probation officer. Shrock admitted to the officers that he had driven to his appointment even though his license had been barred the preceding year. Shrock was charged with driving while license barred in violation of Iowa Code sections 321.561 and 903.1(1)(2) (1999). The case proceeded to trial on May 21, 2001, where the following exchange took place.
Mr. Ingram [Shrock's attorney]: Your honor, my client has indicated that at this point he would be found guilty by a jury in light of the evidence. I've advised him at this point that I don't anticipate that he would testify in his case, and so he is what he described as pleading no contest, what I think in the state of Iowa we would have a trial on the minutes and have the court look at the minutes and decide if there's sufficient evidence there to prove these charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
THE COURT: All right, Michael, is that what you want to do?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that's what I would request.
THE COURT: Okay. Michael, you do understand by doing that, you're giving up your right to a jury trial . . .
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
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THE COURT: All right. And it's your decision to submit this matter for a determination by the court on the minutes of testimony and not provide any defense to this charge; am I correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
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THE COURT: Okay. Then I will review the minutes of testimony to determine if there's a factual basis. Is this being presented essentially as an Alford plea?
MR. INGRAM: Essentially, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: (The court reviewed the minutes of testimony). Okay. Based on a review of the minutes of testimony, the court finds by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Michael James Schrock did operate a motor vehicle . . . that at the time . . . his driving privileges were barred . . .
Sentencing was held on July 27, 2001. During sentencing, the court made reference to a guilty plea. Shrock's attorney swiftly clarified for the court, "Your honor, there was no plea. There was a trial on the minutes . . ." In response, the court thanked counsel for his clarification and noted the order finding Shrock "guilty after a trial on the minutes." Schrock was sentenced to two years.
On appeal, Shrock characterizes the proceeding before the district court as a guilty plea. He contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment because the court did not conduct a Rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) colloquy, informing the defendant of the possible sentence for driving while license barred.
II. Standard of Review. We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Brooks, 555 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1996).
III. Merits. Before we address Shrock's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we must first determine whether the proceeding before the district court was a bench trial on the minutes of testimony or a guilty plea proceeding, requiring a Rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) colloquy. "[A] bench trial on stipulated evidence is not the same as a guilty plea proceeding, principally because no matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt, the question of whether to convict or acquit remains with the trier of fact." State v. Huss, 430 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa 1988).
The State asserts the record conclusively demonstrates Shrock was tried on a stipulated record, rather than pleading guilty. We agree. Although the district court misspoke on two instances, we conclude the entire record clearly demonstrates all parties involved with the proceeding understood it to be a trial on the minutes. See State v. Sayer, 566 N.W.2d 193, 195-96 (Iowa 1997) (holding court may look at entire record to determine what type of proceeding was used when faced with conflicting language).
Shrock requested a determination by the court on the minutes of testimony. After reviewing the minutes, the court found Shrock guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. At sentencing, Shrock's attorney corrected the court's mischaracterization by indicating "there was no plea. There was a trial on the minutes . . ." Cf. State v. Nikkel, 597 N.W.2d 486, 487-88 (Iowa 1999) (reversing conviction because record was sufficiently confused whether defendant's conviction resulted from a guilty plea or a bench trial, where counsel failed to clarify the status of the proceedings and sentencing order indicated defendant pleaded guilty). Moreover, the district court's order indicated Shrock was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt "upon reviewing the minutes of testimony." Cf. Sayer, 566 N.W.2d at 195-96 (reversing conviction after court could not definitively ascertain from the record whether defendant pleaded guilty or stipulated to a bench trial on the minutes, where judgment entry filed stated defendant had been adjudicated guilty based on a guilty plea).
Because we have determined Shrock did not plead guilty, but received a bench trial on the minutes of testimony, we conclude his counsel had no obligation to object to the district court's failure to conduct a Rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) colloquy. See State v. Rice, 543 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Iowa 1996) (holding defense counsel has no duty to make a meritless motion). Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.
AFFIRMED.