Opinion
A21-0958
05-17-2022
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. David Marvin Schuster, Appellant.
Faribault County District Court File No. 22-CR-20-176
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Kirk, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
FRANCIS J. CONNOLLY, JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant David Schuster is the owner and licensee of a licensed bar and grill establishment in Winnebago, Minnesota.
2. The establishment is governed by Winnebago, Minn., Code of Ordinances (WCO) § 113.094 (2005), providing in relevant part that:
A. No on-sale establishment shall sell intoxicating liquor or 3.2% malt liquor beer for consumption on a licensed premise . . . after 1:00 a.m. on Sundays . . . .
B. No person shall consume nor shall any on-sale licensee permit any consumption of intoxicating liquor or 3.2% malt liquor in an on-sale licensed premises more than 30 minutes after the time when a sale can legally occur.1
C. No on-sale licensee shall permit any glass, bottle, or other container containing intoxicating liquor or 3.2% malt liquor to remain upon any table, bar, stool, or other place where customers are served, more than 30 minutes after the time when a sale can legally occur.
D. No person, other than the licensee and any employee, shall remain on the on-sale licensed premises more than 30 minutes after the time when a sale can legally occur.(Emphasis added.)
3. At 5:12 p.m. on Sunday, March 22, 2020, a Winnebago police officer noticed some vehicles in the establishment's parking lot, looked through a window, and saw appellant and three friends inside playing cards and drinking a clear liquid from glasses. He waited approximately 90 minutes, then knocked on the door and told appellant that everyone had to leave the establishment. After some argument, they left.
4. Respondent State of Minnesota filed an amended complaint charging appellant with two offenses, including a violation of WCO § 113.094, certified as a petty misdemeanor.
Respondent voluntarily dismissed the other count.
5. No evidence was presented at trial that either appellant or his friends were consuming alcohol.
6. Following a bench trial, appellant was convicted of violating the plain language of the ordinance and fined $110.00. He challenges his conviction, arguing that the evidence is not sufficient to support it. 2
7. Appellate courts review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, and the rules that apply to interpretation of statutes also apply to interpretation of ordinances. State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017). If the language of a statute or ordinance is unambiguous, this court must apply its plain meaning. Id. We see no ambiguity in the language of WCO § 113.094 and therefore apply its plain meaning.
8. There is no evidence that appellant violated WCO § 113.094(A) by selling any liquor after 1:30 a.m. on Sunday; WCO § 113.094(B) by consuming or permitting the consumption of intoxicating liquor or 3.2 malt liquor after 1:30 a.m. on Sunday; WCO § 113.094(C) by permitting a glass, bottle, or other container containing intoxicating liquor to remain upon any table, bar, stool or other place where customers are served after 1:30 a.m. on Sunday; or WCO § 113.094(D) by remaining on the licensed premises after 1:30 a.m. on Sunday.
9. "Remain" is defined as "[t]o continue in the same state or condition" or "[t]o continue to be in the same place." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1485 (5th ed. 2018).
10. The evidence showed only that appellant and his friends were on the licensed premises at about 6:30 p.m. on Sunday evening, not that they had remained there since 1:30 a.m. Sunday morning. Nothing in WCO § 113.094 prohibits a person from being on the licensed premises on a Sunday.
11. If the city council wanted to prohibit anyone from "being" on the premises on Sunday, the ordinance needed to say that. It does not. This court must apply the plain meaning of an ordinance's unambiguous language. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d at 556. 3
12. The district court's interpretation of WCO § 113.094 would mean that even a repairperson performing routine maintenance on a Sunday would subject the licensee to criminal liability, since that repairperson would be neither the licensee nor an employee. Such a result would be absurd. Those who enacted the ordinance, like the legislature, are presumed not to have intended an absurd result. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2020) ("In ascertaining the intention of the legislature the courts may be guided by the following presumptions: (1) the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd . . . .").
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is reversed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 4
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge (dissenting)
In my view, the district court applied the only reasonable interpretation of the ordinance-namely, that, with exceptions not relevant here, persons are permitted on licensed premises only during times when the sale of alcohol is allowed, plus 30 minutes. Unlike the majority, I think a person spending time in a bar at a time that is more than 30 minutes after the end of lawful alcohol sales "remains" on the licensed premises, regardless of whether the person was also on the premises at precisely 30 minutes after lawful sales had to stop. This interpretation accords with the dictionary definition of "remain" cited by the majority. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1485 (5th ed. 2018) (defining "remain" as "to continue in the same state or condition" or "to continue to be in the same place") And to read the ordinance as requiring the person not only to be on the premises but also to have been on the premises at the precise moment of 30 minutes after lawful sales ceased (and, under the majority's interpretation, to have stayed there continuously) adds a requirement that is not present in the unambiguous language of the ordinance-something that courts may not do. See Save Lake Calhoun v. Strommen, 943 N.W.2d 171, 177 (Minn. 2020).
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to clear out bars within 30 minutes after the lawful sale of alcohol ends and to have them remain unoccupied until alcohol sales can resume. The majority expresses concern that this interpretation leads to an absurd result because the ordinance does not make an exception for repairpersons. But the unlikely prospect of an attempted application of the ordinance to a repairperson when a bar is closed does not render the meaning of the ordinance not plain with respect to other persons. 5 Moreover, interpreting the ordinance to apply only to patrons who were present in the bar at 30 minutes after sales stopped yields absurd results. Patrons out drinking in two neighboring bars could simply swap locations at 1:30 a.m. and be free to stay in the bars for as long as they like.
The ordinance could be written in different ways, but that does not make the way it was written unclear. I do not think Winnebago or other municipalities with ordinances using the same language should be compelled to revise their ordinances to achieve their plain purpose. Appellant was not licensed to sell alcohol on Sundays, yet he had guests in his bar on that day. In my view, that conduct violated the ordinance, and I would affirm the district court. 6
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.