Summary
stating that officers likely would have authority under Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, to stop a car when it would be difficult for the driver to see through a crack in the windshield and that condition could present a hazard to other cars on the road
Summary of this case from Hilton v. StateOpinion
CASE NO. 96-0986
Decision filed January 29, 1997
Appeal of a non-final order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; James I. Cohn, Judge; L.T. Case No. 95-20197CF10AB.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Ettie Feistmann, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Peter D. Lent, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee-Toni Savino.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and David McPherrin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for Appellee-Gustavo O. Chavez.
AFFIRMED.
FARMER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
WARNER, J., dissents with opinion.
Based on Whren v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996), I would hold that the officer had probable cause to stop appellees' vehicle for a violation of section 316.610, Florida Statutes (1995), due to its cracked windshield. The officer testified that it would be difficult to see through a "spider" crack along the windshield, and that condition could be hazardous to other vehicles on the road.
I would reverse the order granting the motion to suppress evidence seized in plain view as a result of the stop.