Opinion
No. 4-551 / 03-1734.
September 29, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, L. Vern Robinson, Judge.
William Richard Sanders appeals from his conviction following his guilty plea. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall, Assistant Attorney General, Harold Denton, County Attorney, and Russell Keast, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Hecht, J., and Brown, S.J.
Senior Judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2003).
The defendant appeals from his conviction following his guilty plea. We affirm.
I. Background.
Defendant, Willard Richard Sanders III, and Sharon Thompson became friends. This eventually resulted in consensual sex, but Thompson later told Sanders she no longer wished to be involved sexually with him.
Thompson claims that after that, while asleep in her home on October 28, 2001, Sanders sexually abused her against her will. Sanders admitted sexual activity with Thompson at that time, but claimed she consented to it.
Sanders was charged with sexual abuse in the third degree. His trial on that felony charge ended in a hung jury when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Sanders then entered a written Alford plea of guilty to the included offense of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, a violation of Iowa Code section 709.11 (2001), an aggravated misdemeanor. He was sentenced on that offense and now appeals.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 171 (1970) (court may accept guilty plea without admission of guilt, but defendant must voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of sentence).
II. Standard of review.
Compliance with the requirements for a valid guilty plea is reviewed for errors at law. State v. Meron, 675 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Iowa 2004).
III. Discussion.
Substantial compliance with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)( b) fulfills the constitutional requirements for a valid guilty plea. See State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Iowa 2002). The rule is intended to insure a guilty plea is "made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis." Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)( b). In this case, Sanders claims the trial court erred in failing to ascertain his plea was voluntary and intelligent because the trial court failed to (1) advise him of the necessity of filing a motion in arrest of judgment in order to challenge his guilty plea; (2) inform him of the nature and elements of the offense, and (3) determine there was a factual basis for the offense. He also asserts his counsel was ineffective by permitting him to plead guilty for each of the above reasons.
As noted, Sanders tendered a written guilty plea. This was accepted by the district court without personally addressing Sanders. This procedure is authorized by rule 2.8(2)( b) in cases where a defendant is pleading guilty to a serious or, as here, an aggravated misdemeanor. However, to insure the plea is voluntary and intelligent, the court must still determine that the defendant is aware of the information required by rule 2.8(2)( b). Meron, 675 N.W.2d at 543.
A. Motion in arrest of judgment.
As one factor in his claim his plea was not voluntary and intelligent, Sanders argues he was not advised of his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment, nor of the consequences of not filing such a motion, both required by rule 2.8(2)( d). The written plea of guilty did not purport to waive Sanders' rights in this regard.
It is clear that the failure to comply with the rule regarding motions in arrest of judgment relieved Sanders of the obligation to raise any claimed defects in the plea process before his conviction. State v. Hook, 623 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Iowa 2001). However, the impact of rule 2.8(2)( d) is limited to the requirement of error preservation; noncompliance does not affect the validity of the guilty plea. See State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 151 (Iowa 2003); State v. Miller, 590 N.W.2d 724, 725 (Iowa 1999). This is apparent from the wording of the rule itself:
d. Challenging pleas of guilty. The court shall inform the defendant that any challenges to a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment and that failure to so raise such challenges shall preclude the right to assert them on appeal.
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)( d) (emphasis added).
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)( a) provides the basis for rule 2.8(2)( d). It states: "A defendant's failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the defendant's right to assert such challenge on appeal."
Because Sanders did not waive the requirements of rule 2.8(2)( d) he is not precluded from pursuing the claimed errors on the part of the trial court in his direct appeal, Loye, 670 N.W.2d at 151, but whether his plea should be set aside will turn on our analysis of his remaining assertions of error.
B. Nature of the charge.
Sanders claims his guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent because the court did not advise him concerning, and consequently he was unaware of, the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty. Rule 2.8(2)( b)(1) requires the court to determine Sanders understands, "[t]he nature of the charge to which the plea is offered."
This, however, does not require an explanation of each element of the crime be provided the defendant. Substantial compliance with this requirement is met if it is "apparent in the circumstances the defendant understood the nature of the charge." Loye, 670 N.W.2d at 151 (quoting State v. Smith, 300 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 1981)). In fact, in some cases the name of the crime itself may be sufficient to impart an understanding of the nature of the charge to a defendant. State v. Brown, 376 N.W.2d 910, 911-12 (Iowa 1985); State v. Yarborough, 536 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
In evaluating whether, under the totalality of the circumstances in this case, Sanders was aware of the nature of the crime to which he pleaded guilty, we are mindful he went through a full-blown jury trial arising from the same events, in which he was accused of sexual abuse in the third degree by performing a sex act by force or against the will of the victim. Initially, we think we may assume he was aware of the nature of the charge involved in the trial.
In this appeal, Sanders does not specify which element or elements of the charge of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse he did not understand However, we note that the court instructed the jury in his trial as to the meaning of assault and we therefore assume Sanders understood that term. Likewise, the jury was also instructed as to the meaning of sexual abuse in the trial. We believe these elements therefore needed no further explanation in connection with his guilty plea.
The elements of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse are (1) an assault on the victim, and (2) the assault was committed with the specific intent to commit a sex act by force or against the will of the victim. I Iowa Crim. Jury Instructions 900.6 (1995).
Although the crime to which he pleaded guilty is a lesser included offense of the type of third-degree sexual abuse involved in his trial, see State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 38 (Iowa 2001); State v. McNitt, 451 N.W.2d 824, 825 (Iowa 1990), it was not submitted to the jury. Consequently, the general criminal intent instruction, see I Iowa Crim. Jury Instructions 200.1 (1988), was given, not one defining specific intent. Assault with intent to commit sexual abuse is a specific intent crime. McNitt, 451 N.W.2d at 824. But if it is apparent under all the circumstances a defendant is aware of the nature of the charge, the intent element need not be specifically explained. Michels v. Brewer, 211 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1973). We believe, in the present context, the name of the crime sufficiently conveyed to Sanders that he must have intended, that is, had in his mind, he was going to commit a sex act on the victim at the time of the assault.
In short, we conclude the name of the crime itself satisfies the requirement that Sanders understand the nature of the charge in this case, including the element of intent. See State v. Victor, 310 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 1981) (crime of willful injury sufficiently self explanatory); State v. Oberbreckling, 235 N.W.2d 121, 122 (Iowa 1975) (minutes of testimony which adequately described how crime of sodomy was committed satisfied nature-of-charge requirement); State v. Watts, 225 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Iowa 1975) (crime of attempting to break and enter sufficiently descriptive).
We are satisfied that the plain-English name given by the legislature to this offense, together with the circumstance of Sander's previous trial, justifies the district court's finding in its acceptance of Sanders guilty plea that the plea "is voluntarily entered with an understanding of the charge."
C. Factual basis.
As noted, Sanders entered an Alford plea to the offense. Thus, he did not admit he did the acts underlying the charge, but acknowledged in his written plea he understood "that based on the evidence contained in this case that a jury may find him guilty of the original charge and that he wishes to take advantage of the plea bargain contained herein." An Alford plea requires the court be satisfied as to a factual basis based on information before it other than Sanders' statements. State v. Hightower, 587 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). To this end, the minutes of testimony may be considered. Id. The minutes disclose an admission by Sanders that while Thompson was asleep, he fondled her genitals and had sexual intercourse with her, and that Thompson denied she consented. These facts support the elements of the crime to which Sanders pleaded guilty.
The purpose of requiring a factual basis is to assure a defendant is in fact guilty of the crime underlying the guilty plea. State v. Sanders, 309 N.W.2d 144, 145 (Iowa Ct.App. 1981). That concern is met here. The district court found the minutes of testimony established a factual basis, and that finding is amply supported by the record.
IV. Summary and disposition.
On defendant's direct appeal, we conclude the district court satisfied the mandate of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)( b) and did not err in accepting the defendant's plea of guilty to the crime of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, a violation of Iowa Code section 709.11, an aggravated misdemeanor. Therefore, we need not consider his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which raised the same issues as those on direct appeal.
The judgment and sentence imposed by the district court on Willard Richard Sanders, III, is affirmed.