Opinion
Cr. I.D. No. 93005924DI.
Submitted: May 16, 2008.
Decided: May 21, 2008.
Upon consideration of Defendant's Third Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief.
Summarily DismissedThis 21st day of May, 2008, it appears to the Court that:
1. On October 24, 1994, a jury found Harry L. Samuel ("Samuel") guilty of one count of assault in the first degree, one count of assault in the second degree, two counts of assault in a detention facility, and four counts of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony ("PDWDCF"). On January 6, 1995, the Court sentenced Samuel to 125 years at Level V. On April 10, 1996, the Delaware Supreme Court (1) reversed Samuel's convictions for one count of assault in the first degree and for one count of assault in the second degree, merging them with the two counts of assault in a detention facility; (2) reversed his sentence of 125 years; (3) affirmed his convictions and sentence for the multiple weapons offenses; and (4) remanded Samuel's case to the Superior Court for resentencing.
Samuel v. State, 676 A.2d 906, 1996 WL 191068 (Del. Apr. 10, 1996) (Table).
2. Upon remand, the Superior Court resentenced Samuel to 98 years of incarceration, comprised of (1) a twenty-year sentence for one charge of assault in a detention facility; (2) an eight-year sentence for the other charge of assault in a detention facility; (3) two twenty-year terms for two of the weapons offenses; and (4) two fifteen-year terms for the remaining two weapons offenses. Samuel then filed a second appeal. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment finding that Samuel's new sentence was appropriate and not based on impermissible factors. The Court determined that, because the jury had found Samuel guilty of the underlying assaults, the convictions for Samuel's weapons offenses were proper, even though the offenses were merged with the assault in a detention facility charges.
Samuel v. State, 694 A.2d 48, 1997 WL 317362 (Del. Apr. 16, 1997) (Table).
3. Samuel filed his first pro se motion for postconviction relief on February 24, 2006. This Court denied Samuel's postconviction motion holding (1) that the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Priest v. State would not be applied retroactively; and (2) that Samuel's motion was time barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4) because the Delaware Supreme Court had formerly adjudicated his claim that the sentences for his weapons offenses were proper. On November 9, 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court dismissed Samuel's appeal as moot.
879 A.2d 575 (Del. 2005).
Samuel v. State, 911 A.2d 804, 2006 WL 3230350 (Del. Nov. 9, 2006) (Table).
4. Samuel then filed his second pro se motion for postconviction relief on October 15, 2007. The Superior Court denied this motion as well concluding, inter alia, that: (1) the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Priest v. State did not require his PDWDCF charges to be vacated; (2) the convictions for the weapons offenses did not violate Samuel's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; (3) the PDWDCF charges did not have an improper impact on his assault in a detention facility charges; and (4) Samuel did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Samuel did not appeal this decision.
State v. Samuel, 2007 WL 3288616 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov. 7, 2007).
5. In the instant motion, Samuel again raises the same arguments he raised previously. Specifically, Samuel argues that: (1) under Priest v. State, this Court should vacate two of his PDWDCF sentences because the underlying felonies for these charges were overturned on appeal; (2) this Court should vacate four of his PDWDCF sentences because he was found guilty in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; (3) the PDWDCF charges had an improper impact on his assault in a detention facility charges that, he claims, were subsequently vacated; (4) Priest v. State requires all of his weapons offense convictions to be vacated because of the manner in which he was indicted; and (5) counsel was ineffective for failing to raise these technical points on appeal.
6. Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). If the procedural requirements of Rule 61 are not met, in order to protect the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim. In that case, the Court may summarily dismiss the defendant's claim "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief[.]"
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del.Super.Ct. 1991).
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 28, 1995), aff'd, 697 A.2d 1174 (Del. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1124 (1998) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 554).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4).
7. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: (1) the motion must be filed within one year of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules unless the movant shows prejudice to his rights or cause for relief; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formally adjudicated in any proceeding. The bars to relief under (1), (2), and (3), however, do not apply "to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." Moreover, the procedural bars of (2) and (4) may be overcome if "reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice."
If the final order of conviction occurred before July 1, 2005, the motion must be filed within three years. If the final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005, however, the motion must be filed within one year. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (July 1, 2005) (amending Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (May 1, 1996)).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
Id. R. 61(i)(4).
8. In this case, Samuel's claims are procedurally barred. Rule 61(i)(1) bars his claims because this motion was filed nearly eleven years after his conviction became final. Rules 61(i)(2) and (4) also bar his claims because they have been asserted in previous postconviction motions and have been formerly adjudicated by both this Court and the Supreme Court. Thus, unless Samuel can overcome the procedural bars, the Court cannot consider his motion.
9. After reviewing the motion, the Court concludes that Samuel has failed to overcome the procedural bars. Samuel raises the same claims that he raised in his second postconviction motion. The Court fully addressed each of those claims in its decision on November 7, 2007 and found them to be without merit. Because he has raised no new claims, it plainly appears to this Court that this third motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in his case indicate that Samuel is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, Samuel's motion for postconviction relief is hereby SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
See State v. Samuel, 2007 WL 3288616 (Del.Super.Ct. Nov. 7, 2007).
IT IS SO ORDERED.