Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0322-PR
10-15-2014
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. MANUEL NAHOM SALCIDO-MEGUI, Petitioner.
Manuel Salcido-Megui, Florence In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2009153146001DT
The Honorable Sherry K. Stephens, Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
Manuel Salcido-Megui, Florence
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kelly and Judge Howard concurred. VÁSQUEZ, Judge:
¶1 Manuel Salcido-Megui petitions this court for review of the trial court's order summarily dismissing his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that ruling unless the court clearly has abused its discretion. See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). We find no such abuse here.
¶2 Salcido-Megui was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree burglary, eight counts of kidnapping, theft by extortion, and weapons misconduct and was sentenced to a combination of consecutive and concurrent, presumptive prison terms totaling 99.5 years. On appeal, we vacated one of Salcido-Megui's kidnapping convictions and sentences, but affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences. State v. Salcido-Megui, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0095 (memorandum decision filed Mar. 22, 2012).
We note that in its ruling below, the trial court misstated that we had affirmed Salcido-Megui's convictions and sentences on appeal.
¶3 After Salcido-Megui sought post-conviction relief, appointed counsel filed a notice stating he had reviewed the record but found no issues to raise in a Rule 32 petition. Salcido-Megui then filed a pro se petition raising claims, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He argued trial "counsel should have informed the court [that] discovery materials had just been given to him and [should have filed a motion pursuant to former] Rule 15.8[, Ariz. R. Crim. P]. Petitioner was unaware of such discovery materials." Asserting the "discovery materials were very crucial in trial, and should not have been let in under Rule 15.8," Salcido-Megui generally maintained he "would have made different choice[s], if counsel would have properly investigate[d] and adequately perform[ed] essential duties."
The version of Rule 15.8 in effect at the time Salcido-Megui committed the underlying offenses provided that in a case where the prosecutor imposes a plea deadline but fails to provide the defense with material disclosure at least thirty days before the deadline, the trial court shall, upon motion, determine whether the prosecutor's "failure to provide such disclosure materially impacted the defendant's decision" to accept or reject a plea. 206 Ariz. LXXII (2003). If so, and the prosecutor "declines to reinstate the lapsed plea offer, the presumptive minimum sanction shall be preclusion from admission at trial of any evidence not disclosed at least 30 days prior to the deadline." Id.
¶4 The state initially offered Salcido-Megui a written plea agreement for one count of kidnapping in exchange for the dismissal of the other eleven counts in the indictment; the agreement provided a sentencing range of seven to fifteen years and was available until November 30, 2009. At a settlement conference held in February 2010, the trial court explained to Salcido-Megui that he faced a sentencing range of "47 years to life in prison" at trial, in contrast to the greatly reduced sentencing range in the plea offer that the state had extended. The court emphasized that in light of the evidence against him, including statements he had made "against [his] own interest," the state had made "a fair offer," to which Salcido-Megui responded, "I'm not taking this plea." At a March 2010 status conference, held on the day the extended plea offer was set to expire, the court again reminded Salcido-Megui that he could receive "essentially a life sentence" at trial. Salcido-Megui again rejected the plea.
¶5 On April 13, 2010, the state disclosed DNA discovery materials including a report signed by its forensics expert dated December 29, 2009, stating that Salcido-Megui "cannot be excluded as a possible contributor" to the DNA found on the shotgun used in the underlying offenses. At a status conference held the following week, the state offered a new plea agreement for burglary and kidnapping with a stipulated, 27.5-year sentence. The trial court told Salcido-Megui that he might be sentenced to "over 100 years in prison" if he went to trial, "as opposed to . . . a little bit more than 27 years in prison" under the current plea agreement. Salcido-Megui rejected the plea, and explained "I probably have to pay for what I did, but not for the time they are offering me." He then moved to dismiss his attorney.
Deoxyribonucleic acid.
Although the "Report on the Examination of Physical Evidence" is dated December 29, 2009, and the document entitled "DNA Analysis" is dated January 23, 2010, it is unclear when the state was provided with these documents, nor does Salcido-Megui direct us to any place in the record so providing.
His request was ultimately granted, and a different attorney represented Salcido-Megui at trial.
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¶6 In its order summarily denying post-conviction relief, the trial court stated Salcido-Megui had argued "his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide him with copies of discovery materials . . . [and] he should be allowed to plead guilty consistent with a plea agreement offered to him prior to discovery materials being provided to him." The court then concluded Salcido-Megui had "failed to establish his counsel was ineffective for failing to provide discovery."
¶7 On review, Salcido-Megui argues the trial court improperly characterized his claim as one based on counsel's failure to "provide him with copies of discovery materials." Instead, Salcido-Megui contends, he had argued that, pursuant to Rule 15.8, he was entitled to have the initial plea offer reinstated because of the state's untimely disclosure of the DNA evidence and trial counsel's failure to point this out to the court and request relief under the rule. Although it appears the court did, in fact, misinterpret Salcido-Megui's argument, for the reasons set forth below, we nonetheless find it reached the right result and also deny relief. See State v. Oakley, 180 Ariz. 34, 36, 881 P.2d 366, 368 (App. 1994) (appellate court "will affirm the trial court when it reaches the correct result even though it does so for the wrong reasons").
¶8 "To state a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance fell below objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency prejudiced the defendant." State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, ¶ 21, 146 P.3d 63, 68 (2006). "A colorable claim of post-conviction relief is 'one that, if the allegations are true, might have changed the outcome.'" State v. Jackson, 209 Ariz. 13, ¶ 2, 97 P.3d 113, 114 (App. 2004), quoting State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 63, 859 P.2d 169, 173 (1993).
¶9 Even assuming without deciding that trial counsel was deficient by failing to file a Rule 15.8 motion, Salcido-Megui has not demonstrated the required prejudice. Not only has Salcido-Megui failed to state he would have accepted the state's initial plea offer if he had known about the DNA evidence, he has not provided an affidavit or other evidence to support such a claim. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5. Although Salcido-Megui argued in his petition below he "would have made [a] different choice, if counsel would have properly investigate[d] and adequately perform[ed] essential duties," he did not state, either in his petition below or on review that the DNA evidence would have "materially impacted" his decision to accept or reject the initial plea. See 206 Ariz. LXXII (2003). Nor do his repeated rejections of that offer necessarily suggest he would have accepted it if he had known about the DNA evidence.
¶10 Moreover, as we noted on appeal, Salcido-Megui "confessed his involvement in the crimes, including his decision to kidnap the victim, because he was unemployed and he 'needed the money to pay bills.'" Salcido-Megui, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0095, ¶ 5. Therefore, even if counsel had filed a motion pursuant to Rule 15.8 and the court had precluded the admission of the DNA evidence pursuant to that motion, it does not appear the outcome at trial would have been different.
¶11 Accordingly, although we grant review, we deny relief.