Opinion
2 CA-CR 2023-0156
12-19-2024
The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ryan Arthur Rose, Appellant.
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Mariette S. Ambri, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee James Fullin, Pima County Legal Defender By Robb P. Holmes, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20214542001 The Honorable James E. Marner, Judge AFFIRMED
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General
Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals
By Mariette S. Ambri, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
James Fullin, Pima County Legal Defender
By Robb P. Holmes, Assistant Legal Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
Judge Kelly authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge O'Neil and Judge Vasquez concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
KELLY, JUDGE:
¶1 Ryan Rose appeals his convictions and sentences for aggravated assault and unlawful imprisonment. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 "We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdicts, resolving all reasonable inferences against" Rose. State v. Copeland, 253 Ariz. 104, ¶ 2 (App. 2022). In October 2021, Rose and his then-girlfriend, R.B., lived together in an apartment. That month, the two of them walked to a nearby set of tunnels under a bridge where Rose encountered a woman and asked for her phone number. This prompted an argument with R.B. which continued as the two walked back to their apartment complex. Once there, Rose "grabbed [R.B.] by the throat and threw [her] on the ground." He later placed his hands over R.B.'s face and mouth to the point that R.B. "couldn't breathe," and he pushed and dragged her to their apartment. Another resident witnessed Rose "grabb[ing] [R.B] by the neck" and "yanking on her." He informed his grandmother, who called 9-1-1.
¶3 Officers arrived at the apartment and observed injuries to R.B.'s "face and neck area." Rose was taken to the hospital after informing officers that he had "ingested an unknown pill" and was feeling unwell. He later reported that he had taken methamphetamine and "M30" pills, which he claimed had come from R.B.'s closet. Rose was charged with aggravated assault and kidnapping, both domestic-violence offenses.
¶4 After a three-day trial, a jury found Rose guilty of aggravated assault and unlawful imprisonment-a lesser included offense of kidnapping. The trial court sentenced him to a concurrent three-year prison term. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, 13-4033(A)(1).
Discussion
¶5 On appeal, Rose asserts the trial court erred by granting the state's motion in limine to preclude mention at trial of any drug use or possession by R.B., which he contends improperly limited his cross-examination and thereby violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. He also argues that the court erred by permitting a nurse to testify as an expert witness regarding strangulation.
Motion in Limine
¶6 We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, giving deference to the trial court's determination of relevance and unfair prejudice. State v. Smith, 215 Ariz. 221, ¶ 48 (2007). However, we review de novo "challenges to admissibility based on the Confrontation Clause." State v. Ortiz, 238 Ariz. 329, ¶ 27 (App. 2015) (quoting State v. Bennett, 216 Ariz. 15, ¶ 4 (App. 2007)).
¶7 Prior to trial, the state sought to preclude Rose's statements "regarding the drugs being found in R.B.'s closet" and asked the trial court to preclude "any mention of the victim's alleged drug use." The state argued any such evidence was not relevant and "should be precluded as self-serving hearsay." Rose opposed the motion and argued that "drug abuse is all over this case" and was "absolutely essential" to his defense. The court granted the motion, precluding any testimony or evidence that Rose had attributed possession of drugs to R.B. or regarding her alleged drug use.
¶8 During R.B.'s trial testimony, the jury submitted several written questions, including: "Were either of you using drugs?" and "If so, what kind of drugs?" Following a bench conference, the trial court agreed to ask R.B. these questions over the state's objection. R.B. answered, "Yes," and "Meth," to the respective questions. The court then offered Rose an opportunity to ask any follow-up questions to R.B. as to these answers, which he declined to do.
¶9 Rose contends on appeal that the trial court's pretrial ruling violated his Confrontation Clause rights. He argues that cross-examination of R.B. regarding her drug use was relevant as it "pertained to her ability to perceive, her motive and the circumstances" underlying their altercation. He further maintains that R.B.'s drug use was the main cause of the confrontation and was therefore necessary to his defense.
¶10 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause "is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity" to cross-examine a witness. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 22 (1985). "[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Id. at 20. "The trial court exercises considerable discretion in determining the proper extent of cross-examination, and we will not disturb the court's ruling absent a clear showing of prejudice." State v. Doody, 187 Ariz. 363, 374 (App. 1996).
¶11 Rose maintains the trial court erred by granting the state's motion in limine, but evidence of drug use was nonetheless admitted during the trial. The court directed R.B. to answer the jury's questions pertaining to drug use on the day of the assault, and then provided Rose with the opportunity to ask additional follow-up questions, which he declined to do. Under these facts, the court's pretrial ruling as to the admissibility of testimony regarding alleged possession and use of drugs neither hindered Rose's cross-examination at trial nor caused him prejudice. See id. Accordingly, any error in the court's grant of the motion in limine was harmless. See State v. Leteve, 237 Ariz. 516, ¶¶ 25-26 (2015). Furthermore, because Rose was offered the opportunity to examine R.B. regarding her drug usage, we find no Confrontation Clause violation. See Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 22.
Nurse's Testimony
¶12 "We review a court's denial of a motion to preclude evidence for an abuse of discretion." State v. Delgado, 232 Ariz. 182, ¶ 9 (App. 2013). Rose was charged with aggravated assault pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-1204(B). Under that section, a person commits aggravated assault, domestic violence, if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes physical injury to another person by "intentionally or knowingly imped[ing] the normal breathing or circulation of blood of another person by applying pressure to the throat or neck or by obstructing the nose and mouth either manually or through the use of an instrument," § 13-1204(B)(1), and he "reside[s] in the same household" as the victim, A.R.S. § 13-3601(A)(1).
¶13 Prior to trial, the state disclosed that it intended to call a sexual assault nurse examiner to testify as a "cold" expert regarding the signs and symptoms of strangulation. The state further provided that the expert would offer testimony concerning the "mechanics of strangulation," as well as the anatomy of the neck and the "physiology/pathophysiology during and after strangulation." Rose moved to preclude the expert's testimony, arguing that it violated Rule 702, Ariz. R. Evid., would not assist the jury, and would fail to "reliably apply the principles and methods to the facts of the case." He further asserted that the testimony would "create a real possibility of prejudice" and that because the case offered "relatively simple" facts, it was also unnecessary. The trial court denied Rose's motion to preclude, noting that the state would be required to "lay the necessary foundation to ensure" the expert possessed the requisite expertise and that Rose could expose the testimony's potential deficiencies on crossexamination. At trial, the expert testified that due to the neck vessels' level of exposure on the body, the amount of pressure needed to block or obstruct them "is not very much." She noted that the jugular vein, being the easiest to block, requires only four pounds of pressure "to close off." The expert further testified that while bruising and redness can result from strangulation, injuries are not present "half the time" because of this sensitivity.
A cold expert educates "the factfinder about general principles, without ever attempting to apply these principles to the specific facts of the case." State v. Salazar-Mercado, 234 Ariz. 590, ¶ 9 (2014) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702, Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 amend.).
¶14 Rose maintains on appeal that the expert's testimony was not helpful to the jury under Rule 702 because she testified to accepting her prior patients' explanations for their injuries as opposed to investigating them and her testimony was accordingly not based on "sufficient facts or data." He further argues the trial court should have precluded her testimony under Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid., because it served to confuse and potentially mislead the jury and had minimal probative value.
¶15 Rule 702, Ariz. R. Evid., provides:
This rule was amended effective January 1, 2024. We cite the version that was in effect at the time of Rose's trial.
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if . . .
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Under the rule, an expert's "specialized knowledge" may be derived from "relevant experience treating patients." Delgado, 232 Ariz. 182, ¶ 14. "If an expert meets the 'liberal minimum qualifications,' her level of expertise goes to credibility and weight, not admissibility." Id. ¶ 12 (quoting Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 809 (3d Cir. 1997)). Rule 702 "provides that a trial judge serves as a 'gatekeeper' who makes a preliminary assessment as to whether the proposed expert testimony is relevant and reliable." State ex rel. Montgomery v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 289, ¶ 19 (App. 2014) (quoting Ariz. R. Evid. 702 cmt. to 2012 amend.). The rule's "overall purpose" is to "ensure that a fact-finder is presented with reliable and relevant evidence, not flawless evidence." State v. Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, ¶ 14 (2015) (quoting State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 87 (2008)).
¶16 Rule 403, Ariz. R. Evid., provides:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
In evaluating a Rule 403 determination, we "must look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect." State v. Castro, 163 Ariz. 465, 473 (App. 1989) (emphasis added in Castro) (quoting United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983)). "Because '[t]he trial court is in the best position to balance the probative value of challenged evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice,'" it is afforded broad discretion in this decision. State v. Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, ¶ 39 (App. 2007) (quoting State v. Harrison, 195 Ariz. 28, ¶ 21 (App. 1998)).
¶17 The state's expert had been a registered nurse since 2009 and had been certified as a sexual assault nurse examiner since 2018. She had taken part in approximately one hundred strangulation cases and had attended multiple forensic nursing conferences. Moreover, the state possessed the burden of proving that Rose impeded R.B.'s "normal breathing or circulation of blood" by "applying pressure to the throat or neck or by obstructing the nose and mouth either manually or through the use of an instrument." § 13-1204(B)(1). As a result, this expert's testimony was the type that would assist the jury, and she possessed the kind of "specialized knowledge" that would aid a jury in determining whether the elements of § 13-1204(B) had been met under these facts. Ariz. R. Evid. 702(a); see also Delgado, 232 Ariz. 182, ¶ 14 (holding juror did not have same ability to evaluate patient injuries and histories in strangulation cases as medical professional with experience treating victims). In addition, Rule 702 permits a medical professional to rely on imperfect, self-reported patient information in offering testimony, see Delgado, 232 Ariz. 182, ¶ 15, and this evidence is not required to be "flawless" but "reliable and relevant," Bernstein, 237 Ariz. 226, ¶ 14 (quoting Langhill, 157 N.H. at 87). Moreover, the trial court properly noted that Rose's opportunity to crossexamine the nurse represented appropriate means of exposing any potential shortcomings regarding her testimony. See Miller, 234 Ariz. 289, ¶ 20; Delgado, 232 Ariz. 182, ¶ 15.
¶18 The trial court was also in the best position to weigh the testimony's probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. See Connor, 215 Ariz. 553, ¶ 39. Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, and in a manner that maximizes its probative value while minimizing its potential for prejudice, see Castro, 163 Ariz. at 473, Rose has not met his burden on appeal of demonstrating that the probative value of the expert's testimony was substantially outweighed by any danger listed in Rule 403. Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rose's motion to preclude it. See Delgado, 232 Ariz. 182, ¶ 9.
Disposition
¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Rose's convictions and sentences.