Opinion
2022-UP-261 Appellate Case 2019-001778
06-15-2022
The State, Respondent, v. Shaun Rogers, Jr., Appellant.
Tommy Arthur Thomas, of Irmo, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of Spartanburg, all for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted May 1, 2022
Appeal From Cherokee County J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge
Tommy Arthur Thomas, of Irmo, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Barry Joe Barnette, of Spartanburg, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM
Shaun Rogers, Jr., appeals his convictions for first-degree burglary and attempted armed robbery and his concurrent sentences of twenty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Rogers argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a directed verdict because there was no evidence Rogers had knowledge of his co-defendant's intent to engage in criminal conduct and, therefore, he was merely present at the scene.
We hold the trial court did not err in denying Rogers's directed verdict motion because there was substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury could conclude Rogers actively participated in the burglary and attempted armed robbery. Therefore, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009) ("In criminal cases, [appellate courts] will review errors of law only ....[and are] bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous."); State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584 (2010) ("Under accomplice liability theory, 'a person must personally commit the crime or be present at the scene of the crime and intentionally, or through a common design, aid, abet, or assist in the commission of that crime through some overt act.'" (quoting State v. Langley, 334 S.C. 643, 648-49, 515 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1999))); State v. Leonard, 292 S.C. 133, 137, 355 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1987) ("Mere presence at the scene is not sufficient to establish guilt as an aider or abettor."); Mattison, 388 S.C. at 480, 697 S.E.2d at 584 ("However, 'presence at the scene of a crime by pre-arrangement to aid, encourage, or abet in the perpetration of the crime constitutes guilt as a [principal].'" (quoting State v. Hill, 268 S.C. 390, 395-96, 234 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1977))); State v. Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 101, 610 S.E.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 2005) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. ("On appeal from the denial of a directed verdict in a criminal case, an appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State."); State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 237, 781 S.E.2d 352, 354 (2016) ("[A]lthough the jury must consider alternative hypotheses, the court must concern itself solely with the existence or non-existence of evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer guilt."); Zeigler, 364 S.C. at 103, 610 S.E.2d at 863 ("The appellate court may reverse the trial judge's denial of a motion for a directed verdict only if there is no evidence to support the judge's ruling.").
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.