Opinion
NO. 2012 KA 1388
03-22-2013
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. TIMOTHY RANDAZZO
Ricky L. Babin District Attorney Donald D. Candell Assistant District Attorney Gonzales, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee State of Louisiana John A. Gutierrez Prairieville, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Timothy Randazzo
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the
23rd Judicial District Court
In and for the Parish of Ascension
State of Louisiana
Case No. 25911
The Honorable John L. Peytavin, Judge Pro Tempore Presiding
Ricky L. Babin
District Attorney
Donald D. Candell
Assistant District Attorney
Gonzales, Louisiana
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
State of Louisiana
John A. Gutierrez
Prairieville, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Timothy Randazzo
BEFORE: GUIDRY, CRAIN, AND THERIOT, JJ.
THERIOT , J.
Defendant, Timothy Randazzo, and his wife were charged by grand jury indictment with one count each of aggravated rape, a violation of La. R.S. 14:42 (count one), and molestation of a juvenile, a violation of La. R.S. 14:81.2 (count two). Defendant initially pled not guilty. Subsequently, the state amended count one of defendant's bill of indictment to charge him with one count of attempted aggravated rape, a violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:42, and to nol-pros the charge on count two. Defendant then withdrew his former plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty as charged. After ordering a presentence investigation ("PSI"), the trial court sentenced defendant to fifty years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant moved for reconsideration of sentence, but the trial court denied that motion. On appeal, defendant urges one assignment of error challenging the sentence imposed.
Defendant's wife is Paige Randazzo, but she is not party to the instant appeal.
Defendant's wife was also charged with one count of accessory after the fact to aggravated rape, a violation of La. R.S. 14:25 and 14:42.
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FACTS
Because defendant pled guilty, the facts of his offense were not fully developed at trial. At the time he pled guilty, defendant stipulated to the following factual basis for his plea: "On or about June 1st, 2008 through August 3rd, 2009, in the parish of Ascension, Timothy Randazzo attempted to commit Aggravated Rape of A.G., a juvenile, whose date of birth is September 7, 1997."
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
On appeal, defendant now argues that his sentence of fifty years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, is constitutionally excessive. Specifically, he argues that this maximum sentence is not appropriate for his offense because he is not in the class of the most egregious and blameworthy offenders.
Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may fall within statutory limits, it may nevertheless violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). Generally, a sentence is considered constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La. 1993). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of justice. State v. Reed, 409 So.2d 266, 267 (La. 1982). A trial judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982); State v. Savario, 97-2614 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/6/98), 721 So.2d 1084, 1089, writ denied, 98-3032 (La. 4/1/99), 741 So.2d 1280.
Article 894.1 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth items that must be considered by the trial court before imposing sentence. The trial court need not recite the entire checklist of Article 894.1, but the record must reflect that it adequately considered the guidelines. State v. Herrin, 562 So.2d 1, 11 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 565 So.2d 942 (La. 1990). In light of the criteria expressed by Article 894.1, a review for individual excessiveness should consider the circumstances of the crime and the trial court's stated reasons and factual basis for its sentencing decision. State v. Watkins, 532 So.2d 1182, 1186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988). Remand for full compliance with Article 894.1 is unnecessary when a sufficient factual basis for the sentence is shown. Lanclos, 419 So.2d at 478.
Defendant pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated rape. Accordingly, the sentencing range for defendant's conviction in this case is imprisonment at hard labor for not less that ten nor more than fifty years, without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a) & 14:42(D)(2)(b). The trial court sentenced defendant to the maximum term of fifty years imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In his brief, defendant asserts that this sentence is constitutionally excessive in light of his youth, his lack of prior criminal history, and the claim that he did not use violence in committing the instant offense.
The fact that defendant's fifty-year sentence was the maximum possible for the instant offense does not in itself raise a presumption that defendant's sentence was excessive. Maximum sentences may only be imposed for the most serious offenses and the worst offenders, or when the offender poses an unusual risk to the public safety due to his past conduct of repeated criminality. See State v. Miller, 96-2040 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/7/97), 703 So.2d 698, 70 L writ denied, 98-0039 (La. 5/15/98), 719 So.2d 459.
In his written reasons for sentence, the trial judge explained the factors that he had taken into account prior to imposing defendant's sentence. First, he stated that defendant ordered the minor victim to perform oral sex on him at least one time between June 1, 2008 and August 3, 2009, and that the victim also reported three separate occasions where defendant attempted to engage in sexual intercourse with her, but was unable to do so. Thus, the trial judge acknowledged that defendant actually pled guilty to a lesser offense than the state could have proven he actually committed. The trial judge also recognized that the minor victim will likely require extensive counseling for an extended period of time. Finally, the trial judge found the most troubling consideration to be the fact that defendant made personal statements during his PSI where he failed to take any responsibility or to display any remorse for his actions. In mitigation, the trial judge recognized that defendant maintains a good relationship with his mother and that defendant has only a ninth-grade education and lacks a GED.
The trial judge also specifically addressed several Article 894.1 factors and stated that he believed that there is an undue risk that during any period of suspended sentence or probation, defendant would commit another crime. Further, he found defendant to be in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution, and that a lesser sentence than the one imposed would deprecate the seriousness of defendant's crime. Finally, the trial judge reasoned that, based on the youth of the victim, defendant knew or should have known that she was particularly vulnerable, and he again reiterated defendant's lack of responsibility or remorse for the offense.
On the record before us and considering the trial court's written reasons, the PSI, and the actual facts of defendant's offense, we find that the trial court did not err or abuse its sentencing discretion in this case. Defendant's sentence of fifty years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, is not excessive.
This assignment of error is without merit.
DECREE
The defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.