Opinion
66659-2-I
06-04-2012
STATE OF WASHINGTON Respondent, v. JERRY LEE RAMSEUR Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Leach, C.J.
Jerry Ramseur challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his second degree robbery conviction. Because the State presented enough evidence for a rational trier of fact to find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm.
Background
In April 2010, Jennifer Turol was working as a uniformed security guard at a Safeway grocery store. She noticed Jerry Ramseur walking through the store acting suspiciously and she began to trail him. From a distance of between 10 to 20 feet, she saw Ramseur take a package of steaks out of his shopping basket and slip them inside his coat. He set down the basket and attempted to exit the store without paying. Turol confronted him outside the store and asked him to come back inside and show her what he had done with the steaks. Ramseur walked back inside, looking confused. When Turol told him that she knew he still had the steaks, Ramseur walked away from her and headed toward the exit. Turol told him not to leave and attempted to physically block his path. She followed him as he ran out of the building and a struggle ensued. When Turol attempted to take the steaks from Ramseur's coat, he grabbed her wrist. She forced Ramseur to the ground in a loose headlock and tried to handcuff him, but he elbowed her in the stomach and ran away. A jury found Ramseur guilty of robbery in the second degree. Ramseur appeals.
Analysis
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. We defer to the trier of fact on the issue of the persuasiveness of the evidence.
State v. Hayes, 164 Wn.App. 459, 482, 262 P.3d 538 (2011).
State v. Corbett, 158 Wn.App. 576, 587, 242 P.3d 52 (2010).
Corbett, 158 Wn.App. at 587.
A person commits robbery when he "unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his or her presence against his or her will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his or her property or the person or property of anyone." Ramseur's argument on appeal focuses on the facts that Turol did not personally own the steaks, she was at least 10 to 20 feet away from him when he initially concealed the steaks in his jacket, and he did not use force to take them. He contends that we should confine our review to the time that he first took the package and put it in his jacket. We disagree.
The State conceded at oral argument that Ramseur did not take the steaks from Turol's person. Ramseur alleges that he also did not take them while in her presence because she was watching him from some distance away.But, after defining robbery, the statute describes in more detail the conduct it criminalizes. It provides that "force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking."Thus, under Washington's transactional view of robbery, the use of force to retain property or effect an escape constitutes robbery.
At trial, Turol estimated that she was about "the length of the jury box" away, maybe 10 to 20 feet. Defense counsel's follow up question was "[a]bout 10 to 20 feet, 30, 40 feet, maybe?" to which Turol answered, "Okay." Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the State, and relying on Turol's actual testimony, we assume the lesser distance was correct.
RCW 9A.56.190 (emphasis added).
State v. Manchester, 57 Wn.App. 765, 769-770, 790 P.2d 217 (1990).
In State v. Manchester, we upheld a robbery conviction where the defendant stole cigarettes from a grocery store while store officials watched from a distance. The defendant only used force when confronted. In one incident, he pulled a knife on an employee who tried to detain him; another time, he threatened to shoot an employee and displayed an ice pick. We affirmed Manchester's conviction based on his use of force to retain the cigarettes when confronted by store personnel.
57 Wn.App. 765, 770, 790 P.2d 217 (1990).
Manchester, 57 Wn.App. at 766.
Manchester, 57 Wn.App. at 770.
Further, in State v. Handburgh, our Supreme Court held that robbery occurs when a person uses force to retain the property taken, even if the initial taking occurred outside the presence of the property owner. The Handburgh court noted that "[i]mplicit in the Manchester holding is the assumption a taking can be ongoing or continuing so that the later use of force to retain the property taken renders the actions a robbery."
119 Wn.2d 284, 293, 830 P.2d 641(1992).
As in Manchester and Handburgh, Ramseur's actions clearly fall within the statute's definition of robbery. Indeed, Ramseur acknowledges both that the Washington legislature intended to treat his crime as robbery and that case law supports a robbery conviction for someone who takes property from a store, leaves the store, and then uses force to retain the property once confronted. We agree that the evidence supports Ramseur's conviction.
But he argues that even if the law intended to criminalize his action, the "to convict" instruction given to the jury required greater proof—that he used force to first take and conceal the steaks and that he was in Turol's presence at the time. We disagree. Jury instructions are read as a whole in a commonsense manner They are legally sufficient if they permit the parties to argue their theories of the case, do not mislead the jury, and properly inform the jury of the applicable law. A court will not assume a strained reading of an instruction. The court used Washington Pattern Jury Instructions that mirrored the statutory language. Ramseur's argument that the jury instructions required finding something more than the express statutory elements of robbery fails. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury could conclude that Ramseur committed robbery.
As in Manchester, because Ramseur used force to retain the stolen property, we need not decide whether the original taking, while Turol was 10 to 20 feet away, was "in her presence."
State v. Bowerman, 115 Wn.2d 794, 809, 802 P.2d 116 (1990).
State v. Barnes, 153 Wn.2d 378, 382, 103 P.3d 1219 (2005).
State v. Moultrie, 143 Wn.App. 387, 394, 177 P.3d 776 (2008).
11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 37.04, at 672; 37.50, at 674 (3d ed. 2008).
Conclusion
Because sufficient evidence supports Ramseur's conviction, we affirm.