Opinion
2 CA-CR 2021-0103-PR
01-18-2022
The State of Arizona, Respondent, v. Oliver Michael Pryor, Petitioner.
Oliver M. Pryor, Florence In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20062087001 The Honorable Renee T. Bennett, Judge
Oliver M. Pryor, Florence In Propria Persona 1
Vice Chief Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
STARING, VICE CHIEF JUDGE
¶1 Oliver Pryor seeks review of the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the court treated as a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. For the reasons stated below, we grant review but deny relief.
¶2 After a jury trial, Pryor was convicted of two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child, both dangerous crimes against children, and two counts of furnishing obscene or harmful items to minors. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive and concurrent, presumptive prison terms totaling 42.5 years. This court affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Pryor, No. 2 CA-CR 2008-0375 (Ariz. App. Oct. 21, 2009) (mem. decision).
¶3 Thereafter, Pryor sought post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily dismissed his petition, and this court denied relief on review. State v. Pryor, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0399-PR (Ariz. App. Apr. 7, 2011) (mem. decision). Pryor filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief, but again the trial court summarily dismissed his petition and this court denied relief on review. State v. Pryor, No. 2 CA-CR 2012-0247-PR (Ariz. App. Oct. 12, 2012) (mem. decision).
¶4 In July 2019, Pryor filed a "Petition for State Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief," alleging, in part, that he had been "charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced" for violating a statute that was declared unconstitutional. The trial court treated his petition as one for postconviction relief, determined his claim was encompassed within Rule 32.1(a), and dismissed the petition as untimely. This court denied relief on review. Pryor v. Shinn, No. 2 CA-HC 2019-0006 (Ariz. App. Mar. 9, 2020) (mem. decision).
¶5 In September 2021, Pryor filed a "Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus" in civil case number C20213209. He argued he was being held in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections "by virtue of process 2 from the trial court," which had "exceeded its jurisdiction." He asserted that "[t]he state's indictment against [him] declares that he is charged with being '[i]n violation of A.R.S. § 13-604.01, '" but the statute has been "recognized as unconstitutional by the judicial branch of Arizona's government." He thus reasoned that the judgment against him is "a nullity" because "the indictment in a criminal case is the main means by which a court obtains subject matter jurisdiction."
¶6 The trial court determined the petition "challenges the validity of [Pryor's] conviction in CR20062087" and therefore must be considered under the criminal case as a petition for post-conviction relief. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.3(b). Following reassignment to the criminal bench, the court determined that Pryor's petition "repeats a claim made in his 2019 petition" and that "his claim is again encompassed within Rule 32.1 (a), 'conviction was obtained, or the sentence was imposed, in violation of the United States or Arizona constitutions.'" As such, the court concluded the petition was untimely and the claim precluded. Accordingly, the court summarily dismissed the petition. Pryor thereafter filed a motion for rehearing, which the court also denied. This petition for review followed.
Pryor appealed the decision treating his petition as one for post-conviction relief, reassigning the matter to the criminal bench, and closing the civil case. However, we dismissed the appeal as moot based on the current petition for review of the denial of his petition. Pryor v. Shinn, No. 2 CA-HC 2022-0001 (Ariz. App. Jan. 14, 2022) (order).
¶7 On review, Pryor maintains that, in his petition, he "raised a question regarding the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action in CR20062087." He points out that the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. See, e.g., State v. Municipal Court, 124 Ariz. 543, 545 (App. 1979). He therefore reasons that the court erred in dismissing his petition on "Rule 32's [t]imeliness and [p]reclusion provisions."
¶8 As the trial court pointed out, however, Pryor's current claim was raised in his 2019 petition. And this court previously explained that the claim is untimely and precluded. Pryor, No. 2 CA-HC 2019-0006, ¶¶ 10-11; see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a), 32.2(a), 32.4(b)(3)(A).
¶9 In any event, "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is 'the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the particular proceedings belong.'" State v. Payne, 223 Ariz. 555, ¶ 6 (App. 2009) (quoting 3 In re Marriage of Dorman, 198 Ariz. 298, ¶ 7 (App. 2000)). Pryor's jurisdictional claim is based on a purportedly defective indictment. Even assuming Pryor were correct that his indictment was flawed, a deficient charging instrument does not deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction. See State v. Maldonado, 223 Ariz. 309, ¶ 13 (2010). The trial court therefore did not err in concluding Pryor was not entitled to relief. See State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459, 464 (1984) (appellate court obliged to affirm trial court's ruling if result legally correct for any reason).
¶10 Accordingly, we grant review but deny relief. 4