Opinion
No. 26713-0-III.
May 14, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Grant County, No. 04-8-00667-6, John M. Antosz, J., entered December 10, 2007.
Reversed by unpublished opinion per Schultheis, C.J., concurred in by Sweeney and Brown, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Candice Poyner (C.P.) appeals from a juvenile court order revoking an order of deferred disposition for taking a motor vehicle in the second degree. She contends the juvenile court erred in finding that an outstanding warrant did not toll the deferral period and that the juvenile court therefore lacked authority to extend the deferral period. We agree with C.P. and reverse.
FACTS
On March 8, 2005, C.P. pleaded guilty in juvenile court to taking a motor vehicle without permission in the second degree. The court entered a deferred disposition pursuant to RCW 13.40.127, which subjected C.P. to 12 months of community supervision. Her conditions of supervision included counseling if requested by probation, regular school attendance, 50 hours of community service, and a $100 penalty assessment. The order stated that the period of community supervision was from March 8, 2005 to February 27, 2006. A disposition hearing was scheduled for February 27, 2006.
Nine days before the disposition period ended, C.P. moved to Florida to live with her father. Jurisdiction and supervision were transferred to Florida under an interstate compact. On February 27, 2006, C.P. failed to show for the disposition hearing. The court subsequently issued an arrest warrant.
On July 2, 2007, while visiting her mother in Grant County, C.P. voluntarily appeared before the juvenile court for a first appearance after execution of the warrant. On this date, C.P. had not yet completed her community service hours or paid the penalty assessment. The court ordered that community supervision be extended until November 5, 2007, and waived C.P.'s presence at that hearing if she provided proof that she completed the community service hours. The State did not object to this extension.
By November 5, C.P. had completed all of the conditions of the disposition order. Nevertheless, the State moved to revoke the deferred disposition. At the December 10, 2007, revocation hearing, the State argued that the court lacked jurisdiction on July 2 to extend the deferred disposition to November 5, pointing out that RCW 13.40.127 allows a maximum of two years to complete a deferred disposition. C.P. responded that the court had the authority to extend jurisdiction because the arrest warrant tolled the period between February 27, 2006 and July 2, 2007. C.P.'s position was that supervision ended on November 5, 2007, and because she completed the conditions of supervision prior to that date, the adjudication should be vacated and the case dismissed.
The juvenile court revoked the deferred disposition, finding (1) the deferral period was not tolled by the warrant; (2) the deferral period ended on March 8, 2007, and therefore the court lacked authority on July 2, 2007 to extend C.P.'s deferral for a period beyond that date; and (3) C.P. did not comply with the terms of the deferred disposition within the statutorily allowed time of two years. Accordingly, the court entered a final order of adjudication and disposition.
C.P. appealed. Our commissioner referred the case to us pursuant to RAP 17.2(b).
ANALYSIS
The procedure for a deferred disposition in juvenile court is set forth in RCW 13.40.127. A juvenile court may grant a juvenile offender a deferred disposition for a period not to exceed one year from the date the juvenile is found guilty. RCW 13.40.127(2). The court may continue the case for an additional year pursuant to a showing of good cause. RCW 13.40.127(8). When the juvenile court enters an order deferring disposition, the juvenile shall be placed on community supervision. RCW 13.40.127(5). If the juvenile fails to comply with the terms of the community supervision, the court revokes the deferral and enters an order of disposition. RCW 13.40.127(7).
Here, the court found that the deferral period was not tolled while C.P. was on warrant status, and therefore she failed to comply with the terms of her supervision within the statutorily allowed time of two years. C.P. assigns error to these findings. Relying on State v. V.J., 132 Wn. App. 380, 132 P.3d 763 (2006), she argues that the period between February 27, 2006 and July 2, 2007, was tolled because she was on warrant status. Based on the tolling of the probationary period, C.P. asserts that she complied with the court ordered requirements within the allotted time. Our review of her claim is de novo. V.J., 132 Wn. App. at 382; State v. Y.I., 94 Wn. App. 919, 922, 973 P.2d 503 (1999).
In V.J., a juvenile was sentenced to 12 months of community supervision. During the community supervision period, the juvenile left an in-patient treatment facility and a bench warrant was issued. V.J., 132 Wn. App. at 382. The warrant was served 71 days after community supervision ended. Id. The juvenile court found that the juvenile had violated the terms of her community supervision and imposed detention. Id. The juvenile sought revision of the juvenile court's order, arguing that the court was without jurisdiction because the time frame for community supervision had expired. The court ruled that the juvenile court has inherent power to toll the period of juvenile probation.
Division One of this court affirmed the juvenile court's decision, holding that "the juvenile court has authority to toll community supervision when the juvenile is on warrant status." Id. at 387. To support its position, the court noted the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system, stating:
To give full effect to the legislative purpose, therefore, the juvenile court must have a full year of supervision. We hold that if the juvenile is on warrant status, and is thus not subject to the court's supervision, tolling applies to the supervision period.
Id. at 385.
V.J. is dispositive here. The court issued an arrest warrant on February 27, 2006. It was not served until July 2, 2007 when C.P. voluntarily returned to court. Under V.J., the community supervision period between February 27, 2006 and July 2, 2007 was tolled. Accordingly, the court had the authority on July 2 to extend the community supervision period another four months to allow C.P. to complete the conditions of community supervision. See RCW 13.40.127(8) (allowing the court to continue the case for an additional year at any time following deferral of disposition).
Our holding comports with the goals of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW, which provides:
It is the intent of the legislature that a system capable of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the needs of youthful offenders and their victims . . . be established. It is the further intent of the legislature that youth, in turn, be held accountable for their offenses and that communities, families, and the juvenile courts carry out their functions consistent with this intent. To effectuate these polices, the legislature declares the following to be equally important purposes of this chapter. . . . .
(c) Make the juvenile offender accountable for his or her criminal behavior;
(d) Provide for punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and criminal history of the juvenile offender;
. . . .
(f) Provide necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juvenile offenders.
Here, the tolling and subsequent four-month extension of the supervision period allowed C.P. to successfully complete her remaining supervision requirements — performance of community service hours and payment of the penalty assessment. Allowing the juvenile court adequate time to supervise C.P. served the JJA's twin goals of rehabilitation and accountability.
Finally, we note that the State's motion to revoke the deferred disposition was untimely. We have held that "the court's jurisdiction to enforce its disposition order terminates when the community supervision period expires, unless a violation proceeding is then pending before the court." State v. May, 80 Wn. App. 711, 716-17, 911 P.2d 399 (1996). Therefore, a juvenile court loses jurisdiction to enforce a disposition order "if the State fails to institute violation proceedings before the expiration of the deferral period." State v. Todd, 103 Wn. App. 783, 790, 14 P.3d 850 (2000). Here, the State did not move to revoke the deferred disposition until November 5, 2007, well after the expiration of the deferral period. Accordingly, even if the State is correct that tolling does not apply here, its motion to revoke the deferred disposition came long after the maximum two-year supervision period allowed under the statute. It follows that the court did not have jurisdiction to revoke the deferred disposition on December 10, 2007.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court erred in revoking C.P.'s deferred disposition. We therefore reverse for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
SWEENEY, J. and BROWN, J., concur.