Opinion
No. 5-150 / 04-1215
Filed April 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis Reis, Judge.
The State, upon a grant of discretionary review, appeals from the district court's ruling which granted the defendant's motion to suppress the results of a blood test. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Michael T. Hunter, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Robert Rehkemper of the Berger Law Firm, Urbandale, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
The State, upon a grant of discretionary review, appeals from the district court's ruling which granted the defendant's motion to suppress the results of a blood test. We conclude the court erroneously concluded officers lacked reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was operating while intoxicated, and therefore reverse and remand.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
At approximately 11:00 p.m. on January 19, 2004, Deputy Sheriff Cass Bollman observed a dark-colored sport utilitv vehicle (SUV) traveling forty-two miles per hour in a twenty-five-mile-per-hour zone. Bollman activated his emergency lights and attempted to stop the SUV, but it sped up and passed another vehicle. Bollman gave pursuit and the SUV failed to obey one stop sign and one stop light. The vehicles eventually reached speeds of sixty to seventy miles per hour in a thirty-mile-per-hour zone during the chase which ended when the SUV collided with another vehicle, flew over it, and came to rest on its side after striking a tree. A passenger who was thrown from the SUV was later pronounced dead at the scene.
Bollman approached the SUV and found Pinegar attempting to exit it by kicking out the windshield. Several times Pinegar denied driving the vehicle, but eventually admitted he was the driver. Upon questioning by Lieutenant Powell, Pinegar denied drinking, but responded affirmatively when asked if he had been "doing drugs." Pinegar was then taken to a hospital. Deputy Hake, a drug recognition officer, was dispatched to the hospital to examine Pinegar.
After a preliminary breath test revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .000, Deputy Hake focused on whether Pinegar had used drugs. Hake testified he observed Pinegar's pupils reacting slowly to light, and further testified that Pinegar's blood pressure was slightly above normal range, consistent with use of a central nervous system stimulant or marijuana use. He then asked Pinegar if he had been taking any medication or using drugs. Pinegar admitted he had smoked two "joints" at approximately 3:00 p.m. on January 19th and then smoked one gram of methamphetamine either between 8:00 and 9:00 pm or between 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. that evening. Pinegar stated he smoked the marijuana at his house and smoked the methamphetamine while sitting in a van at his girlfriend's house. Following the interview, Deputy Hake invoked implied consent, Pinegar expressed his consent, and a blood sample was withdrawn from Pinegar. Lab results disclosed evidence of amphetamines, methamphetamine, and THC in his blood.
Hake also testified he observed Pinegar's eyes were bloodshot and watery, his eye-lids were "droopy," and he was unable to cross his eyes when requested to do so.
Hake did not make reference in his written report to elevated blood pressure, slow reacting pupils, convergence, or blood-shot and watery eyes.
Deputy Hake's suppression hearing testimony revealed he was unable to form an opinion on the question of whether Pinegar was under the influence of a drug before implied consent was invoked. The Deputy, trained as a "drug recognition expert," testified he was unable to form an opinion on the issue because he was unable to complete a twelve-step protocol commonly used to make such determinations. Pinegar's condition restricting him to a hospital bed, and treatment modalities employed by medical professionals to treat his injuries precluded utilization of the complete protocol. The Deputy did, however, claim his pre-invocation observations were consistent with Pinegar's admitted ingestion of drugs.
Based on these events, the State charged Pinegar with homicide by vehicle, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(2) (2003), eluding or attempting to elude a pursuing law enforcement vehicle, in violation of section 321.279, and second-degree theft, in violation of sections 714.1 and 714.2(2). Pinegar later filed a motion to suppress alleging, among other things, the officers did not possess the required reasonable grounds to invoke implied consent before obtaining the blood test.
The State alleged the vehicle driven by Pinegar was stolen.
The district court found Deputy Hake's testimony "less than credible" because it included several important observations which were not mentioned in the witness's written report, and because those observations omitted from the written report were inconsistent with the documented findings made by medical professionals. The district court reasoned further that Pinegar's admission of drug use prior to the accident was insufficient standing alone "to support reasonable grounds to believe someone [is] under the influence of narcotics." The district court therefore concluded reasonable grounds did not exist to believe Pinegar was under the influence of a controlled substance and ordered suppression of all evidence obtained as a result of the invocation of implied consent. The State subsequently filed an application for discretionary review of this ruling, which our supreme court granted before transferring the matter to this court.
In particular, the hospital's emergency room records evidencing Pinegar's condition at the time of admission report the patient's blood pressure was within normal limits and his pupils were equal and reactive to light.
Standard of Review.
Our review is for correction of errors at law. State v. Bloomer, 618 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Iowa 2000).
Implied Consent — Reasonable Grounds.
Iowa Code section 321J.6, the implied consent statute, authorizes an officer to request a blood test if the officer has "reasonable grounds" to believe the driver was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2. The reasonable grounds test is met when the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time action was required would have warranted a prudent person's belief that an offense has been committed. State v. Owens, 418 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1988).
A violation of section 321J.2(1)(c) occurs when a person operates a motor vehicle "while any amount of a controlled substance is present in the person, as measured in the person's blood or urine."
Although we are bound by the district court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence, and we give weight to the district court's credibility determinations, we respectfully reach a different legal conclusion. Pinegar was first observed driving forty-two miles per hour in a twenty-five-mile-per-hour zone. He then proceeded to engage Deputy Bollman in a dangerous high-speed chase. This chase resulted in a number of traffic violations, occurred late at night, and ended in a fatal crash. When officers arrived on the scene after the accident, Pinegar initially denied driving the vehicle, but later admitted to Deputy Bollman that he was the driver, and that he had used drugs. Upon later questioning at the hospital, Pinegar admitted to Deputy Hake he smoked two marijuana joints during the afternoon of the incident and smoked one gram of methamphetamine within as little as one hour before the chase and fatal wreck. We conclude these facts taken together, without consideration of Deputy Hake's claimed observations of Pinegar's blood pressure, pupil reactivity, convergence, bloodshot and watery eyes would engender a reasonable belief that Pinegar was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2. See Munson v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 513 N.W.2d 722, 723 (Iowa 1994). Our legal conclusion is strongly influenced by the substance of Pinegar's admissions which were quite specific as to the time, place, and quantity of controlled substances ingested. Pinegar told Deputy Hake he used methamphetamine as recently as 10:00 p.m., within approximately one hour before the crash. He had made a consistent admission when, at the scene of the crash, he told Lieutenant Powell that he had been "doing drugs." Under the totality of the circumstances evidenced by this record, we conclude Deputy Hake had reasonable grounds to believe Pinegar was operating in violation of section 321J.2. Because the district court erred in ruling that all evidence obtained as a result of the invocation of implied consent must be suppressed, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.