Opinion
No. C4-00-1821.
Filed August 28, 2001.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 99063607.
Mike Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, and
Amy Klobuchar, Hennepin County Attorney, David C. Brown, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, (for respondent)
Lawrence W. Pry, Office of the State Public Defender, (for appellant)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Elliott Pierson challenges the district court's denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to two counts of second-degree aggravated robbery and one count of third-degree controlled substance crime. Pierson alleges that his pleas were not voluntary because they were induced by the district court's reference to going to trial as "rolling the dice." Pierson argues that the district court's comments suggested to him that he would not receive a fair trial before an impartial judge. Because we conclude that Pierson's pleas were voluntary and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pierson's motion to withdraw his pleas, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Elliott Pierson was charged with two counts of third-degree controlled substance crime in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subds. 1(1) 3(a) (1998), and two counts of first-degree aggravated robbery of two convenience stores in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (1998). In both robberies, Pierson allegedly entered the store with a gun and threatened to shoot store personnel if they did not turn over the cash register monies to him. Pierson initially pleaded not guilty to all counts.
During the Rasmussen hearing, the state and Pierson engaged in off-the-record plea negotiations. The state initially offered, but Pierson rejected, a guilty plea to one count of first-degree aggravated robbery with a guidelines sentence of 98 months. Later the state offered to permit Pierson to plead guilty to two counts of second-degree aggravated robbery for a guidelines sentence of 74 months and to not charge Pierson with a pending allegation of criminal sexual conduct. Pierson, after consultation with his attorney and dialogue with the court, rejected this offer as well, preferring to plead to simple robbery. At this point the following dialogue took place, which is at the heart of Pierson's motion:
COURT: Well, Mr. Pierson, have you had enough time to talk to [defense counsel] about this?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: And you understand that the State's offering you something which is about half of what your exposure is if you're convicted of these two robberies?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: So, in other words, ah, you're rolling the dice here, and if you're convicted of these charges, it will be about 150 months probably.
DEFENDANT: I don't understand.
After Pierson conferred off the record with his attorney, the Court continued:
COURT: The difference is 74 months with this deal or 150 if you're convicted of the charges. In other words, real time on this, you do about 50 months in. Real time, if you're convicted of these charges, you do a hundred. So, it's twice as much time. Plus, he's not going to charge you with this other criminal sexual charge that's up in their office for charging. Do you understand all those things?
DEFENDANT: Yeah, I was — I — I was under the impression of something else.
COURT: What?
DEFENDANT: I was under the impression it was something else. I was under the impression of something else.
COURT: You were. So that wasn't what you thought the deal was?
DEFENDANT: No, I understand the deal, but I didn't — what you're saying, 150 months, is that what you're saying I'd get?
COURT: A hundred 50 months is the sentence you would get if you were convicted of both of these Agg Robberies at trial with a jury. Okay? Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yeah.
Pierson again conferred with his attorney after which the district court asked him if he had had enough time to speak with his attorney. Pierson indicated that he had and that his decision was to go to trial.
The Rasmussen hearing continued the following day and after renewed plea negotiations, Pierson agreed to plead guilty to two counts of second-degree aggravated robbery and one count of third-degree controlled substance crime. The plea agreement called for sentences of a total of 74 months on the robbery charges, a concurrent sentence of up to 57 months on the drug charge, and the state's promise not to charge Pierson in three other aggravated robbery cases or a pending criminal sexual conduct case.
On June 27, 2000, Pierson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming that his pleas were not voluntary because they were induced by the district court's reference to going to trial as "rolling the dice." Pierson argued that the district court's comments suggested to him that he would not receive a fair trial before an impartial judge. The district court denied Pierson's plea withdrawal motion and imposed and executed the agreed-upon sentences. Pierson appeals.
DECISION
There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after it is entered. Shorter v. State, 511 N.W.2d 743, 746 (Minn. 1994). Instead, Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.05 sets forth two bases for withdrawal. Under subdivision 1, if a defendant demonstrates that "withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice," the district court shall permit withdrawal before or after sentencing. Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.05, subd. 1 (2001). Manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary and intelligent (i.e., knowingly and understandingly made). Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997).
Under subdivision 2, even if a manifest injustice does not exist, the district court may permit a defendant to withdraw a plea before sentencing if doing so is "fair and just." Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.05, subd. 2 (2001). The district court must take into consideration whether granting a motion to withdraw will prejudice the prosecution. Id. It is the defendant's burden to establish that there is a "fair and just" reason for the district court to permit withdrawal of his plea. State v. Kaiser, 469 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 1991). The district court's decision to accept a motion to withdraw a guilty plea based on whether "it is fair and just to do so" is a discretionary decision that may only be reversed on appeal if the district court abused its discretion. Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989).
A. "Manifest Injustice" Analysis 1. Plea Must be Accurate
An accurate plea protects the defendant from pleading guilty to a charge more serious than he or she could be convicted of were the defendant to go to trial. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). A proper factual basis must be established for a guilty plea to be accurate. Beaman v. State, 301 Minn. 180, 221 N.W.2d 698 (1974). It is the responsibility of the sentencing judge to ensure that an adequate factual basis has been established in the record. State v. Milton, 295 N.W.2d 94, 95 (Minn. 1980) (citing State v. Hoaglund, 307 Minn. 322, 240 N.W.2d 4 (1976)). This is preferably established through the defendant's own testimony, but can be established by a showing of the state's proposed evidence. Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 686 (Minn. 1979).
Here, both the defendant's own testimony and a showing of the state's proposed evidence serve to establish a factual basis for Pierson's guilty plea. At the Rasmussen hearing, the state introduced evidence from a surveillance tape of the February 2000, robbery and presented testimony about a line-up identification of Pierson made by a robbery victim. In addition, Pierson testified that he entered two convenience stores, implied that he had a weapon, and left the store with money. Pierson also testified to offering crack cocaine to an undercover police officer. We therefore conclude that Pierson's plea was accurate.
2. Plea Must Be Voluntary
The voluntariness requirement insures that the guilty plea is not in response to improper pressures or inducements. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989) (citation omitted). "The voluntariness of [a] plea can be determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it." State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469 (1970)). The district court's finding of whether a plea was voluntarily made is a question of fact which will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Id. Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if there is reasonable evidence to support them. Id. (citing Adler v. State, 284 Minn. 31, 169 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1969)).
Pierson argues that his pleas were not voluntary because they were induced by the district court's comments made the day before regarding going to trial as "rolling the dice." The record does not support Pierson's claim. The record as a whole reflects the district court's comments were an effort to make certain that Pierson understood the difference in prison time between the plea agreement being offered by the state and the possible sentence if Pierson were to be convicted by a jury. Despite the district court's comments, Pierson rejected the plea offer at that time, creating doubt to the coercive nature of the district court's remark.
Pierson argues that by stating the sentence would be 150 months if convicted of two first-degree aggravated robberies, the district court had already decided to impose the sentences consecutively, rather than concurrently. However, clarifying for a defendant the maximum sentence that could be imposed does not make a plea involuntary. See Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 578-79 (Minn. 1998) (defendant is entitled to be informed of direct consequences of guilty plea). Indeed, it is the duty of the district court to ascertain that the defendant understands the full range of punishment to which he is exposed. Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.01, 10(a), (b); s ee State v. Tuttle, 504 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn.App. 1993) (court has duty to elucidate terms of negotiated agreement).
Pierson also argues that the district court impermissibly injected itself into the plea negotiations by recommending that Pierson accept the state's proposal even if he was not guilty. See State v. Johnson, 279 Minn. 209, 216, 156 N.W.2d 218, 223 (1968) (wherein supreme court expressly disapproved of district court participation in plea bargaining). Pierson's argument is not supported by the record. The district court's discussion with Pierson does not reflect that the court was recommending that Pierson accept the state's offer regardless of his innocence. Rather, it appears the district court was attempting to make certain Pierson understood the terms of the plea being offered.
The district court found that Pierson voluntarily entered a guilty plea based upon Pierson's active involvement in the negotiation process, his experience with the court system, and the opportunity to have additional time both on and off the record to talk to the court about what was happening in the proceedings. The district court's finding on this issue is supported by the record and is not clearly erroneous.
3. Plea Must Be Intelligent
The requirement that the plea be intelligent is designed to insure that the defendant understands the charges, the rights being waived, and the consequences of the guilty plea. Brown, 449 N.W.2d at 182.
The record establishes that Pierson discussed his case and negotiated terms of the plea bargain with his attorney before entering a guilty plea. This alone raises the presumption that he was fully informed of his rights. State v. Lorentz, 276 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Minn. 1979). The record also shows that Pierson specifically acknowledged that by pleading guilty he was waiving his right to trial.
Furthermore, Pierson's criminal history makes it likely that he was aware of the consequences of a guilty plea. He had previously entered a guilty plea and had been the subject of a jury trial. "A reviewing court may weigh a defendant's experience with the criminal justice system when evaluating whether his plea was knowing and intelligent." State v. Doughman, 340 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn.App. 1983), review denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 1984) (citing U.S. ex rel. McGrath v. La Vallee, 348 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1965)). In Doughman, this court found that a record of questioning the defendant prior to the entry of his guilty plea provided an adequate basis for evaluating whether the plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered, "particularly when supplemented by testimony on [defendant's] discussions with counsel and by [defendant's] criminal history." Id. at 353.
The record indicates that Pierson's attorney conducted a thorough Rule 15.01 inquiry before the district court accepted Pierson's guilty pleas. The record also reflects that throughout the hearings, the district court repeatedly inquired of Pierson whether he had adequate time to discuss his case with his attorney. We therefore conclude that Pierson's plea was intelligently entered and find that the district court's decision that withdrawal of Pierson's guilty pleas was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice was not error.
B. "Fair and Just" Analysis
It is the defendant's burden to prove that a "fair and just" reason exists for wanting to withdraw his plea. Kim, at 266. In determining whether a defendant's reason is "fair and just," the district court is to give due consideration not just to the reasons advanced by the defendant but to "any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the prosecution by reason of action taken in reliance upon the defendant's plea." Minn.R.Crim.P. 15.05, subd 2.
While the district court did not specifically find that the state would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of Pierson's guilty pleas, it duly noted the potential prejudice caused by a delay in trial.
Pierson argues that the district court's comments made at the Rasmussen hearing give rise to a "fair and just" reason to grant his motion. Pierson also argues that the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty pleas because the state did not articulate sufficient prejudice to outweigh arguments that withdrawal of his guilty pleas would be fair and just. This, however, shifts the burden from the defendant to the state, which the rules do not permit. See id. (stating that court can consider "any prejudice").
The district court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing "will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the trial court abused its discretion." Kim, 434 N.W.2d at 266. Here, after balancing all of the relevant factors, the district court concluded that Pierson did not demonstrate a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea. The record clearly supports the district court's decision, and we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion.
Affirmed.