Opinion
No. 27096-3-III.
March 24, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spo-kane County, No. 07-1-04818-0, Gregory D. Sypolt, J., entered April 24, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Brown, J., concurred in by Schultheis, C.J., and Sweeney, J.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Michael L. Pierce appeals his residential burglary conviction, contending the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case based on the corpus delicti rule. We disagree, and affirm.
FACTS
Around 6:30 P.M. on November 7, 2007, Perry Hunter returned to his parent's Spokane area home, leaving the garage door open. Soon after, his mother, Deana Hunter, looked out her bedroom window and noticed an individual walking into the garage. She walked outside to investigate and saw three men. She screamed, causing the three men to scatter. Mr. Hunter chased and caught one of the men, but released him when the man told him he had a gun. The man and another individual got into a white Chevrolet Tahoe, about four houses down from the Hunter house. Mr. Hunter reported the Tahoe's license plate to his mother who called the police. Mr. Hunter followed until the police arrived.
Police arrested Mr. Pierce after he jumped from the Tahoe and tried to hide and also arrested the other two suspects who were found in the Tahoe that night. Neither Ms. Hunter nor Mr. Hunter could positively identify Mr. Pierce as one of the men in or around the garage. The State charged Mr. Pierce with residential burglary.
At trial, the Hunters testified they could not positively identify Mr. Pierce as one of the individuals in or around the garage. The State called Officer Greg Thieschafer to testify. He related that he responded at Nine Mile Road and Francis Street, approximately three miles from the Hunter home, to investigate a possible burglary. He saw that Mr. Pierce had been arrested along with two other suspects.
Officer Thieschafer testified that Mr. Pierce waived his right to remain silent, and made incriminating statements, including his association with the other two men and that he had stood outside the Hunter home and acted as a lookout.
Mr. Pierce requested dismissal under the corpus delicti rule, arguing Mr. Pierce's statements were without corroborating evidence. The court denied his motion to dismiss, concluding evidence that Mr. Pierce was arrested when Officer Thieschafer arrived was sufficient evidence to move the matter forward.
The jury found Mr. Pierce guilty as charged. He appealed.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Pierce's corpus delicti motion and concluding sufficient corroborating evidence was present.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Rohrich, 149 Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision was manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Id.
The corpus delicti rule prohibits admission of a defendant's confession absent independent prima facie evidence that the crime was committed. State v. Aten, 130 Wn.2d 640, 656, 927 P.2d 210 (1996). The independent evidence need not be sufficient to support a conviction, but it must be sufficient to support a logical and reasonable inference that the crime occurred. Id. In assessing the sufficiency of the State's corpus delicti evidence, we review the independent evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State. Id. at 658. A trial or appellate court considering whether the State has met this burden must take the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State. "Thus, an appellate court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court (i.e., reviews `de novo')." State v. Pineda, 99 Wn. App. 65, 77-78, 992 P.2d 525 (2000). If the independent evidence is consistent with an inference of either innocence or guilt, the independent evidence does not sufficiently establish the corpus delicti of a crime. Id.
Here, Ms. Hunter and Mr. Hunter testified three men were in or around their garage without permission. Ms. Hunter heard a car door in the garage slam and later found a screwdriver near the garage entrance. When she saw the strange men, Ms. Hunter screamed. The men ran when discovered and were immediately pursued by Mr. Hunter, who followed the men to their Tahoe. Mr. Hunter reported his discovery and followed the Tahoe until the police stopped it. Officer Thieschafer responded as backup and saw Mr. Pierce and two other men in custody just three miles from the Hunter home. The three men were inferentially associated with one another. The Hunters identified two of the three men associated with the crime. Viewing this evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State, the State provided independent prima facie evidence that a crime was committed, satisfying the Aten standard.
Relying on State v. Hamrick, 19 Wn. App. 417, 418-20, 576 P.2d 912 (1978), Mr. Pierce argues the mere evidence that an officer observed an arrested suspect is not sufficient corroborating evidence of a confession. Hamrick, however, is distinguishable. There, the charge was driving under the influence — a crime where the corpus delicti requires evidence that the defendant operated or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while he was under the influence. Id. at 419. Residential burglary does not involve the issue of identity. See RCW 9A.52.025(1) ("A person is guilty of residential burglary if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, the person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle."). In fact, "the corpus delicti of most crimes does not involve the issue of identity." Hamrick, 19 Wn. App. at 419.
Because independent prima facie corroborating evidence shows a crime was committed, Mr. Pierce's confession was properly admitted. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Mr. Pierce's motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
SCHULTHEIS, C.J. and SWEENEY, J., concur.