Opinion
No. 36616-9-II.
April 22, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Thurston County, No. 07-8-00341-9, Paula Casey, J., entered June 28, 2007.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished opinion per Bridgewater, J., concurred in by Houghton, C.J., and Hunt, J.
Dale Thomas Olmstead, a minor, appeals his adjudication for assault in the fourth degree — domestic violence. We hold that there was insufficient evidence to disprove Dale's self-defense claim. We vacate and remand.
Dale was born on April 9, 1991. To avoid confusion, we refer to the appellant by his first name.
Facts
On April 17, 2007, Dale and his mother, Diana Olmstead, began arguing after he refused to finish his chores before going to a friend's house. When his mother insisted he finish his chores, Dale began to call his mother offensive names. Ms. Olmstead then followed her son up the stairs, grabbed his shirt or arm, and told him to leave the house. Dale refused to leave before packing some items, despite his mother's insistence that he needed to leave without them.
At this point, Ms. Olmstead grabbed Dale's arm or shirt and again told him to leave. Ms. Olmstead then "[took] a swing" at her son, attempting to punch him in the head. RP (June 28, 2007) at 20. Ms. Olmstead missed, and Dale then briefly pushed her up against a closet or wall. While Dale held her, Ms. Olmstead continued to try to hit and kick at her son. Once Dale released his mother, the pair continued to scuffle as he left the bedroom, and fell down the stairs together. Ms. Olmstead then called 911.
The witnesses state at different times that Dale pushed Ms. Olmstead against either a wall or closet.
The State charged Dale with fourth degree assault — domestic violence for holding Ms. Olmstead against the wall. At trial, Ms. Olmstead testified that she did not know who started pushing first. Ms. Olmstead testified that she is 5 feet 3 inches and weighs 110 pounds, while her son is 6 feet tall and weighs 190 pounds. She also testified that while her son had her pinned, she could not reach him because he has longer arms. Ms. Olmstead admitted that she made first contact with her son.
Deputy Allen Clark testified that he responded to the 911 call and questioned Dale, who admitted to pushing his mother against the wall. Deputy Clark also stated that he observed a scratch mark on the right side of Dale's face, but did not observe any marks on Ms. Olmstead. Dale told Deputy Clark that he did not believe his mother intentionally scratched him. Additionally, Dale told Deputy Clark that his mother attempted to "knee him in the groin." RP (June 28, 2007) at 37. Dale did not testify.
The trial court adjudicated Dale as charged and sentenced him within the standard range. Dale appeals.
Analysis
Dale challenges the trial court's finding that insufficient evidence supported his claim of self-defense, and argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. Because the trial court's finding of fact 1.6 is not supported by sufficient evidence in the record, we vacate Dale's adjudication and remand.
Finding of fact 1.6 states: "That there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support a theory of self[-]defense." CP at 22.
Conclusion of law 2.2 states: "That the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the charge of Assault in the Fourth Degree/Domestic Violence." CP at 22.
Conclusion of law 2.3 states: "That the Respondent is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of Assault in the Fourth Degree/Domestic Violence pursuant to RCW 9A.36.041 and RCW 10.99.020." CP at 22.
We review findings of fact in a juvenile matter for substantial evidence. State v. B.J.S., 140 Wn. App. 91, 97, 169 P.3d 34 (2007); State v. Alvarez, 105 Wn. App. 215, 220, 19 P.3d 485 (2001). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. State v. Levy, 156 Wn.2d 709, 733, 132 P.3d 1076 (2006). Findings of fact must support conclusions of law. B.J.S., 140 Wn. App. at 97.
"In determining whether the requisite quantum of proof exists, the reviewing court need not be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but only that substantial evidence supports the State's case." State v. Jones, 93 Wn. App. 166, 176, 968 P.2d 888 (1998), review denied, 138 Wn.2d 1003 (1999). Substantial evidence is "evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding." Levy, 156 Wn.2d at 733 (quoting State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214, 970 P.2d 722 (1999)).
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004). An appellant claiming insufficiency of the evidence "admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom." Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874 (quoting State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)). We view both circumstantial and direct evidence as equally reliable, and we defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and the persuasiveness of the evidence. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874-75.
The trial court found that "there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support a theory of self[-]defense." CP at 22. In its oral ruling, the trial court stated that it did not "believe that self-defense was properly raised in this case because we had no testimony from Dale regarding the motivations of his behavior, if he was trying to escape being hurt or what was happening." RP (June 28, 2007) at 48. Additionally, the State argues that Dale did not put on any credible evidence of self-defense. But, Dale did not have to testify as to his motivations and could rely on his mother's testimony to prove that he acted in self-defense.
A person is guilty of fourth degree assault if, under circumstances not amounting to first, second, or third degree assault, he assaults another. RCW 9A.36.041. A person acts in self-defense when he reasonably believes that he is about to be injured and when the force is not more than is necessary. RCW 9A.16.020(3).
To raise a claim of self-defense, the defendant must first offer credible evidence tending to prove self-defense. State v. Graves, 97 Wn. App. 55, 61, 982 P.2d 627 (1999) (citation omitted). A defendant must produce evidence showing that he or she had a good faith belief in the necessity of force and that the belief was objectively reasonable. Graves, 97 Wn. App. at 62 (quoting State v. Dyson, 90 Wn. App. 433, 438-39, 952 P.2d 1097 (1997)). The degree of force used in self-defense is limited to what a reasonably prudent person would find necessary under the conditions as they appeared to the defendant. State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d 469, 474, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997). The fact finder must "stand in the shoes" of the defendant and determine whether the individual defendant had a reasonable, subjective fear of imminent harm. State v. LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d 896, 899, 913 P.2d 369 (1996).
The evidence of self-defense did not need to come from Dale's testimony. In order to raise the issue of self-defense, "there need only be some evidence admitted in the case from whatever source" which tends to prove that the defendant acted in self-defense. State v. Summers, 120 Wn.2d 801, 819, 846 P.2d 490 (1993) (quoting State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 500, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983)). Further, a criminal defendant is not required to testify during his own criminal trial. U.S. Const. amend. V; Wash. Const. art. I, § 9; RCW 10.52.040.
During the defense's cross-examination of Ms. Olmstead, she testified to all the elements of self-defense Dale would have to show: (1) that she initiated the physical altercation; (2) that she intentionally swung at Dale with a closed fist; and (3) that he saw her swing at him. The fact finder could reasonably infer, then, that Ms. Olmstead was the aggressor and her son feared imminent harm. Additionally, Dale had no other witnesses to present because only he and his mother witnessed the event, and Ms. Olmstead had already testified for the State.
The trial court further erred in finding that it did not have to consider whether the mother used reasonable force in attempting to strike her son with her fist, and that Dale had "no right to touch [his mother's] person in order to control [her] behavior." RP (June 28, 2007) at 47-48.
A child may act in self-defense even though the parent is engaging in an act of parental discipline. Graves, 97 Wn. App. at 62-63. In Graves, the court permitted the juvenile defendant to claim he acted in self-defense even though the trial court had found that his father acted reasonably in disciplining him. Graves, 97 Wn. App. at 62-63. Dale's right to argue self-defense is even stronger than was the defendant's in Graves because his mother used unreasonable force in attempting to discipline him. While a parent may use reasonable force to discipline a child, striking a child with a closed fist is presumptively unreasonable. RCW 9A.16.100. Ms. Olmstead testified that she swung at Dale, intended to hit him, and that he saw her fist coming at his head. Ms. Olmstead attempted to use unreasonable force in disciplining her son. That Ms. Olmstead did not make contact with her son is irrelevant. A party does not have to wait until an assailant strikes before he or she can act in self-defense. RCW 9A.16.020(3) (a party may use reasonable force when about to be injured by another party) (emphasis added). Thus, the court erred in finding that Dale had to testify in his own defense and that Dale could not properly raise a claim of self-defense.
Finally, there is insufficient evidence to support Dale's adjudication because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense. Once the defendant offers some evidence tending to show self-defense, the State then has the burden of proving the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 473. The State in response argues that Dale could not have acted in self-defense because he could not reasonably fear harm from his "much smaller mother." Br. of Resp't at 5.
The State's argument misinterprets the level of injury a defendant must fear before he may act in self-defense. A defendant acting in self-defense must fear only imminent harm, not great bodily harm. State v. Woods, 138 Wn. App. 191, 201, 156 P.3d 309 (2007). While Ms. Olmstead might not have been able to inflict substantial harm, she still could have harmed Dale had she punched him. Because Dale saw his mother attempt to punch him, he could have reasonably feared imminent harm.
In addition, the State did not disprove Dale's claim of self-defense. The State did not introduce any evidence showing that Dale used an unreasonable amount of force. Ms. Olmstead testified that her son held her against the wall only briefly, keeping her arms and legs out of reach of his body, and did so after she attempted to punch him. Additionally, the State failed to produce evidence tending to show that Dale was the first aggressor. Ms. Olmstead admitted that she began the physical altercation, began to push him, and swung at his head with her fist. The State failed to carry its burden of proof.
The trial court's finding that Dale did not raise a self-defense claim is not supported by substantial evidence. Also, the trial court's conclusion that the State proved self-defense is not supported by the findings because the State failed to disprove self-defense. Accordingly, we vacate Dale's adjudication and remand.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HOUGHTON, C.J., and HUNT, J., concur.