Opinion
2 CA-CR 2022-0134
04-28-2023
The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Angel Noland Jr., Appellant.
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Czop Law Firm PLLC, Higley By Steven Czop Counsel for Appellant
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County No. S1100CR201902118 The Honorable Steven J. Fuller, Judge AFFIRMED
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General
Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals
By Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
Czop Law Firm PLLC, Higley
By Steven Czop
Counsel for Appellant
Chief Judge Vasquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Vice Chief Judge Staring concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
VASQUEZ, CHIEF JUDGE:
¶1 Angel Noland appeals from his conviction and sentence for first-degree murder. He argues the evidence was insufficient to support the state's felony-murder theory and the trial court erred by precluding evidence of his character trait for impulsivity. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 "We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdicts." State v. Miles, 211 Ariz. 475, ¶ 2 (App. 2005). In August 2019, P.R. bought Noland, with whom she was not well-acquainted, lunch from a fast-food restaurant in Casa Grande and arranged for him to do some yard work for her. The two left the restaurant shortly after noon and walked into a home improvement store about an hour later. While Noland stood a few feet away, P.R. made a purchase and received $40 in cash back from the transaction, which she placed in a white envelope in her purse.
¶3 Noland and P.R. then went to P.R.'s house. According to Noland, while the two were watching television, P.R. made a comment that angered Noland, and he punched her and then stabbed her over thirty times with two pairs of scissors and two knives, killing her. Later that evening, Noland drove P.R.'s car to a parking lot a few miles away from P.R.'s house and threw her keys toward an alley. Noland then purchased bandages with cash at a convenience store for wounds on his hand that he had sustained during the assault. The next day, Noland purchased food at a fast-food restaurant with cash he said was next to him when he woke up. Noland was arrested and charged with one count of unlawful use of means of transportation and one count of first-degree murder, charged in the alternative as either premeditated murder or felony murder, with second-degree burglary as the predicate offense to felony murder.
¶4 A jury found Noland guilty of both charges. Three jurors found him guilty of premeditated murder, one juror found him guilty of felony murder, and eight jurors found him guilty of both premeditated and felony murder. The trial court sentenced Noland to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longer of which is natural life without the possibility of release. Noland appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
Noland has raised no argument challenging his conviction and sentence for unlawful use of means of transportation, and we therefore affirm them.
Discussion
Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶5 Noland first argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P., on the felony-murder charge. He maintains there was no evidence to support the state's theory that he had committed the predicate felony, second-degree burglary. We review de novo whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 15 (2011).
¶6 "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. ¶ 16 (quoting State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 66 (1990)). We will reverse only if no substantial evidence supports the conviction. State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, ¶ 7 (App. 2005). "[S]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Allen, 253 Ariz. 306, ¶ 70 (2022) (quoting State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, ¶ 65 (2006)). Substantial evidence may include both circumstantial and direct evidence. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 16. "[T]here is no difference between the probative value of direct or circumstantial evidence." State v. Rhymes, 107 Ariz. 12, 15 (App. 1971).
¶7 As relevant here, the state was required to prove that Noland committed or attempted to commit second-degree burglary and in the course of and in furtherance of that offense, he caused P.R.'s death. See A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(2). The state therefore had to prove that Noland entered or remained unlawfully in P.R.'s home "with the intent to commit any theft or any felony therein." See A.R.S. § 13-1507(A). At trial, Noland conceded that he had killed P.R. but argued that the state lacked evidence to prove the second-degree burglary required for felony first-degree murder. He maintains on appeal that the "record contains no direct or circumstantial evidence of [his] intent to commit a burglary or that P.R. died in the course or furtherance of a burglary." We disagree.
¶8 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding Noland's conviction, as we are required to do, the record is sufficient here. See West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 16. Specifically, the evidence at trial showed that Noland watched P.R. put $40 cash in an envelope, went to her house and stabbed her to death, and left the house in her car, which he abandoned later that night. When P.R.'s body was found, there was blood on the envelope in which she had put the cash, but no money was inside. The next day, Noland had over $20 in cash, with no reasonable explanation of where he got it.
¶9 Noland acknowledges that criminal intent is commonly proven by circumstantial evidence. See State v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, ¶ 13 (App. 2015). But he argues that "[n]othing can be determined or inferred" from Noland's watching the transaction or his possession of money. Contrary to Noland's argument, however, the jury reasonably could infer that sometime after watching P.R. receive cash back from a transaction, he formed the intent to take money from her and he killed her in furtherance of that theft. See §§ 13-1105(A)(2), 13-1507(A).
¶10 Noland nevertheless contends that these facts are merely "scintillas of evidence" because there are innocent explanations for them. But potentially innocent explanations for the existence of certain evidence do not necessarily negate a contrary inference of the defendant's guilt. See State v. Smith, 242 Ariz. 98, ¶ 34 (App. 2017). Indeed, the state is not required to disprove "every conceivable hypothesis of innocence when guilt has been established by circumstantial evidence." Id. (quoting State v. Fischer, 219 Ariz. 408, ¶ 43 (App. 2008)). Moreover, were we to credit Noland's argument that there are innocent explanations for his conduct, we would be improperly viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him rather than the jury's verdicts. See West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 16.
¶11 To the extent Noland contends he lacked intent to commit burglary because P.R. invited him into her home, that argument misapprehends the relevant element of burglary, which can be satisfied not only if a person enters unlawfully, but if the person remains on the premises unlawfully. See State v. Altamirano, 166 Ariz. 432, 435 (App. 1990) (although person enters premises lawfully with consent, presence can become unauthorized, unlicensed, or unprivileged if person remains with intent to commit felony). Further, focusing on P.R.'s invitation ignores what Arizona law has "clearly establish[ed]": "even where the physical entry is objectively legitimate, entry will be illegal if the defendant's subjective intent is to commit a felony." State v. Van Dyke, 127 Ariz. 335, 336 (1980).
¶12 Noland argues his position is supported by State v. Lopez, 158 Ariz. 258 (1988). There, the predicate felony for the defendant's first-degree murder charge was armed robbery. Id. at 263. Our supreme court agreed with the defendant that because he had taken the victim's car and wallet after the murder, "[n]othing support[e]d a finding that [the defendant] had an intent to commit a robbery" while using force against the victim. Id. at 263-64. Because the state failed to prove that the force was inflicted in the course of taking the victim's property, it had not met the elements of robbery. Id. at 264. But, unlike robbery, second-degree burglary does not require the use of force in the course of taking property. Compare A.R.S. § 13-1902(A) with § 13-1507(A).
¶13 This case is more like State v. Lacy, 187 Ariz. 340 (1996). There, after seeing his codefendant shoot the victim, the defendant picked up a microwave oven and ran out of the victim's apartment. Id. at 345. The defendant hid the appliance in bushes but retrieved it later that night. Id. Because the defendant admitted he formed an intent to steal while in the apartment when his codefendant shot the victim, he remained unlawfully on the premises. Id. at 349. But even if the jury disbelieved the defendant's statement, it could have "reasonably concluded that he formed the intent to steal before entering" the victim's home. Id. Importantly, our supreme court further reasoned that "[t]he jurors reasonably could have found that the murders made it possible for [the defendant] to steal" and the trial court therefore did not err in denying the defendant's Rule 20 motion on the felony-murder charge. Id. at 350. Similarly, here, the jury could have concluded Noland had formed the intent to take P.R.'s money before entering her home or that killing P.R. made it possible for him to do so.
Preclusion of Evidence
¶14 Noland also argues the trial court erred by denying him "the opportunity to allow his [p]arents to provide observational evidence of his impulsivity." We review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Rose, 231 Ariz. 500, ¶ 59 (2013).
¶15 Evidence of a person's character trait is generally inadmissible to prove an action in conformity with that character, but the defendant may offer evidence of a pertinent character trait. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). When admissible, evidence of a person's character trait may be proven by testimony about the person's reputation or by opinion testimony. Ariz. R. Evid. 405(a). A character trait may be proven by specific instances of the person's conduct if the character trait is an essential element of a defense. Ariz. R. Evid. 405(b).
¶16 Before trial, Noland gave notice that his defense would include lack of premeditation. Before Noland called his first witness at trial, the state moved to preclude certain testimony. It argued the witnesses would go beyond the scope of "permissible testimony regarding character evidence," and asked the trial court to limit observational evidence to "a certain period of time." Noland argued his parents would testify about a change in his impulsivity that occurred in 2017 and would discuss instances in which he left home for several days without notice, signed up for trucking school then dropped out on a whim, and "out of nowhere" left his hometown to walk to California. The court granted the state's motion, reasoning the parents could testify "generally regarding impulsivity, but not give any specific instances of conduct" because the proposed witness testimony would not describe behavior, statements, or expressions "[a]round the time of offenses," as required by Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006).
¶17 Noland contends the trial court's ruling was an abuse of discretion because the cases he cited "establish that a defendant in Arizona can present evidence of specific instances of conduct as observational evidence to rebut premeditation." Noland is correct that a defendant can offer observation evidence of his impulsivity to rebut premeditation. See State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 35-36 (1981); State v. Wright, 214 Ariz. 540, ¶¶ 12, 15 (App. 2007); State v. Buot, 232 Ariz. 432, ¶ 12 (App. 2013). However, he has not explained how the court's ruling prevented him from doing exactly that. The court correctly limited witnesses to testifying about observations of Noland around the time of the offense. And to the extent the court's ruling precluded witnesses from testifying regarding specific instances of conduct, the witnesses nevertheless were permitted to testify about specific instances of Noland's impulsivity. Specifically, Noland's mother testified that in 2017, she noticed that he had become more impulsive and that two years later he left his hometown of Houston without telling her first that he was leaving. Noland's stepfather similarly testified that in 2017, Noland had begun acting more impulsive and left Houston with no notice in 2019. And a licensed psychologist testified that people diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder and bipolar disorder, like Noland, can act erratically and "tend to have impulsivities as part of their way of acting with the world and reacting to situations." Based on Noland's offer of proof, testimony that he had started and then quit trucking school was the only evidence that was precluded. But with no explanation as to when that event occurred, we cannot say the court's ruling was erroneous, particularly because observation evidence is meant to show the defendant's "state of mind at the time of a criminal offense." Wright, 214 Ariz. 540, ¶ 12 (quoting Clark, 548 U.S. at 765 n.34).
The state did not dispute that the psychologist could testify regarding her observations.
Disposition
¶18 We affirm Noland's convictions and sentences. No. 2 CA-CR 2022-0134 April 28, 2023