Opinion
1 CA-CR 23-0519
10-29-2024
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. DARRELL JAMARCUS NIX, Appellant.
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Phillip A. Tomas Counsel for Appellee Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Laila Ikram Counsel for Appellant
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2022-129158-001 The Honorable Kerstin G. LeMaire, Judge
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Phillip A. Tomas Counsel for Appellee
Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Laila Ikram Counsel for Appellant
Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
THUMMA, JUDGE
¶1 Defendant Darrell Jamarcus Nix appeals his conviction and resulting probation grant for resisting arrest. Nix argues the superior court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to present sufficient evidence regarding his required mental state. Because Nix has shown no error, his conviction and probation grant are affirmed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Before sunrise one morning in August 2022, several Phoenix police officers were dispatched to Central Avenue and McDowell Road, because an individual had climbed on top of a pole at the light rail station. The sergeant in charge directed the other officers to tape off the scene as a safety precaution. Uniformed officers told civilians in the area that they needed to leave the station area and move to the other side of the street.
¶3 Nix was present at the station, and several officers directed him to leave. He initially complied, but two minutes later returned to the station. Police officers again directed Nix to leave the station and move to the other side of the street. He refused. Nix then started arguing with the officers that others had been allowed to stay on the station's platform.
¶4 After Nix refused to comply and began arguing, the sergeant grabbed his arm and began escorting him across the street. Another officer touched Nix on the arm to get him across the street, and Nix slapped that officer's hand away, saying "[d]on't touch me." The sergeant then tried to grab his right arm again. Nix slapped the sergeant's arm away, punched him in the chest, and stepped back into a defensive stance, again saying "[d]on't touch me." At that point, the sergeant told Nix he was "under arrest."
¶5 The sergeant would later testify that Nix then "continued to move his hands up and down and drop[ped] his level, like a boxer would do in a boxing match." After a physical struggle, the sergeant and two other officers brought Nix to the ground. Nix then "scooted his hips out and tried to stand back up." One officer attempted to stun Nix with a taser, but Nix continued moving. Another officer then fired his taser at Nix. When that officer threatened to tase Nix again if he did not stop moving, he finally complied and was arrested.
¶6 Nix was charged with resisting arrest, a Class 6 felony. After competency evaluations, Nix was found competent to stand trial. At trial, after the State's case in chief, Nix unsuccessfully moved for a judgment of acquittal. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20 (2024). After considering evidence and arguments, the jury found Nix guilty of resisting arrest. The court later suspended the sentence and placed Nix on supervised probation for one year.
Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
¶7 This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and 13-4033(A)(2024).
DISCUSSION
¶8 Nix argues the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, claiming the State failed to present sufficient evidence regarding his required mental state. This court reviews a claim of sufficiency of the evidence de novo. State v. Dansdill, 246 Ariz. 593, 600 ¶ 19 (App. 2019) (citation omitted).
¶9 A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted "if there is no substantial evidence to support a conviction." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1). Substantial evidence is proof that "reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jones, 125 Ariz. 417, 419 (1980) (citations omitted). Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally in addressing such a motion. See State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 289 (1996). This court views the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 212 ¶ 87 (2004) (citing cases), testing the sufficiency of the evidence "against the statutorily required elements of the offense," State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, 505 ¶ 8 (App. 2005).
¶10 Relying on State v. Womack, Nix argues that "resisting arrest requires a showing of intent to commit resisting arrest by the accused." See 174 Ariz. 108, 112-14 (App. 1992) (holding flight from an attempted traffic stop does not constitute resisting arrest where no arrest was being attempted and no physical resistance was used to resist). Nix argues the State failed to prove he had any intent to prevent, or attempt to prevent, the officers from arresting him. His reliance on Womack, however, fails. Womack concluded that the defendant could not be convicted of resisting arrest absent an indication that pursuing officers had relayed to Womack their intent to arrest him. Id. at 114. Here, by contrast, the sergeant told Nix he was under arrest.
¶11 Using instructions Nix does not challenge, the court instructed the jury that the crime of resisting arrest requires proof that (1) "[a] peace officer, acting under official authority, sought to arrest either the defendant or some other person," (2) "[t]he defendant knew, or had reason to know, that the person seeking to make the arrest was a peace officer acting under color of such peace officer's official authority," (3) "[t]he defendant intentionally prevented, or attempted to prevent, the peace officer from making the arrest" and (4) "[t]he means used by the defendant to prevent the arrest involved either the use or threat to use physical force or any other substantial risk of physical injury to either the peace officer or another." The instructions also correctly stated that "intentionally" means "defendant's objective is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct."
¶12 Recognizing a defendant's state of mind "is seldom, if ever, susceptible of proof by direct evidence," intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence. State v. Harm, 236 Ariz. 402, 406 ¶ 13 (App. 2015) (citations omitted). Furthermore, as quoted above, the third element of the jury instruction required the State to prove that Nix intentionally prevented, or attempted to prevent, the arrest. See State v. Cagle, 228 Ariz. 374, 378-79 (App. 2011).
¶13 As applied, the trial evidence sufficiently allowed the jury to find that Nix intentionally prevented, or attempted to prevent, the officers from making an arrest. The trial evidence included recordings from two different body-worn cameras showing Nix adopting a boxer stance after being told he was under arrest and struggling with the sergeant when he tried to bring Nix to the ground to effectuate the arrest. The recordings also show two more officers getting involved and Nix continuing to resist their attempts to bring him to the ground until he was tased a second time. The sergeant also testified that, even after officers brought Nix to the ground, he "scooted his hips out and tried to stand back up" to prevent the officers from laying him on his stomach and pinning his shoulders to the ground to effectuate the arrest. The officer that fired his taser also testified that he asked Nix to roll over, but Nix refused. This evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude Nix intentionally prevented, or attempted to prevent, peace officers from arresting him. Accordingly, the superior court properly denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal.
CONCLUSION
¶14 Because Nix has shown no error, his conviction and resulting probation grant are affirmed.