Opinion
No. 1-950 / 01-0257.
Filed February 6, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, JOEL D. NOVAK and ROBERT A. HUTCHISON, Judges.
Maurice Moore appeals from his conviction and sentence for possession of a schedule III controlled substance with intent to deliver in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c) (1999). REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Bob DiBlasi, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and MAHAN and HECHT, JJ.
I. Facts and Background Proceedings.
On June 24, 2000, a Des Moines police officer recorded a conversation between Maurice Moore and a confidential informant with bugging and tape recorder equipment. During the conversation, Moore stated he had Tylenol with Codeine for sale. Upon being taken into custody, officers found a bottle of pills in Moore's clothing. The State charged Moore with possession of a schedule III controlled substance, Tylenol with Codeine, with intent to deliver, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c). Jury trial commenced on December 11, 2000.
At trial, a Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) lab report was admitted into evidence identifying the pills found on Moore as "codeine in a schedule III form;" however, Information regarding the weight of the tablets or the amount of codeine found in the tablets was not provided. The district court refused Moore's proposed jury instruction defining a schedule III controlled substance. The jury returned a verdict finding Moore guilty as charged.
On appeal, Moore contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, (2) the district court erred in refusing his proferred jury instruction regarding the definition of a scheduled III controlled substance, (3) the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant his motion to continue, and (4) his trial counsel was ineffective in a number of respects. Because we find the district court committed reversible error in refusing Moore's proffered jury instruction, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
II. Jury Instruction.
Moore contends the district court erred in refusing his proferred jury instruction regarding the definition of a scheduled III controlled substance as found in Iowa Code section 124.208(5)(b). In particular, Moore contends the jury could not determine whether he was guilty of the class C felony with which he was charged.
Defense counsel requested the following instruction in writing:
Schedule III — substances included
Narcotic drugs. Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any of the following narcotic drugs, or their salts calculated as the free anhydrous base or alkaloid, in limited quantities as set forth below:
a. Not more than one point eight grams of cocaine per one hundred milliliters or not more than ninety milligrams per dosage unit, with an equal or greater quantity of an isoquinoline alkaloid of opium.
b. Not more than one point eight grams of codeine per one hundred milliliters or not more than ninety milligrams per dosage unit, with one or more active, nonnarcotic ingredients in recognized therapeutic amounts.
Trial court determinations regarding jury instructions are reviewed on appeal for errors of law. Iowa R. App. P. 4; State v. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Iowa 1992). As long as a requested instruction correctly states the law, has application to the case, and is not stated elsewhere in the instructions, the court must give the requested instruction. State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996) (citing Adam v. T.I.P. Rural Elec. Coop., 271 N.W.2d 896, 901 (Iowa 1978)). In criminal cases, the court is required to instruct the jury on the definition of the crime. State v. Hoffer, 383 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Iowa 1986). Generally understood words of ordinary usage need not be defined; however, technical terms or legal terms of art must be explained. Henderson v. Scurr, 313 N.W.2d 522, 523 (Iowa 1981); State v. McKinnon, 158 Iowa 619, 626-27, 138 N.W. 523, 527 (1913). Error in giving or refusing jury instructions does not merit reversal unless it results in prejudice to the defendant. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d at 516.
The State concedes the district court committed error in refusing to give the definitional instruction, but contends the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and Moore cannot establish the requisite prejudice. The State further contends the district court's failure to properly define "schedule III substance" was not fatal because Moore did not claim he was in possession of some drug other than a schedule III substance. Finally, the State contends Moore cannot claim prejudice because he failed to require the DCI technician to testify at trial and made no effort to challenge the lab report's conclusion that the substance in question was a schedule III substance.
We find the State's arguments unpersuasive. Whether the evidence was minimally sufficient to support Moore's conviction is irrelevant to our analysis. With proper instruction, the jury might have found the State's proof inadequate. By pleading not guilty, Moore put the State to its proof that the items in his possession were a schedule III substance. Moore's entitlement to a proper definitional instruction does not hinge upon whether he contended he was in possession of something other than a schedule III substance. Moreover, the State offers no authority for its assertion that Moore's failure to require a State technician to testify resulted in a waiver of his right to demand an instruction defining an element of the offense charged.
III. Conclusion.
Having determined Moore suffered prejudice as a result of the district court's refusal of his proferred jury instruction, we reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial on that charge. Accordingly, we need not address the other alleged errors raised by Moore on appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
MAHAN, and HECHT, J.J. concur; SACKETT, C.J. dissents in part.
I would affirm.