Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0078
04-06-2018
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. FLDAA ASAREL MERAZ, Appellant.
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel By Amy M. Thorson, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Malanga Law Office, Bisbee By Rafael Malanga Counsel for Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e). Appeal from the Superior Court in Cochise County
No. CR201500600
The Honorable James L. Conlogue, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel
By Amy M. Thorson, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Malanga Law Office, Bisbee
By Rafael Malanga
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Brearcliffe concurred. ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge:
¶1 Fldaa Meraz appeals from her conviction and sentence for second-degree murder, claiming the trial court erred in refusing to suppress her statements to police and in admitting certain hearsay statements as excited utterances. For the following reasons, we affirm her conviction and sentence.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 In July 2015, Meraz shot A.E. in the presence of several witnesses, killing her. After a jury trial, she was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to a sixteen-year prison term. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13-4031 and 13-4033(A)(1).
Motion to Suppress
¶3 Meraz first contends the trial court erred in refusing to suppress her statements to police, contending that the detective who conducted the interrogation did not provide an adequate warning pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). She further claims that she did not validly waive her rights, that any waiver of her rights was not voluntary, and that her statements were not voluntary. We review these claims for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. See State v. Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233, ¶ 4 (2014). Adequacy of Miranda Warning
¶4 Meraz argues that the Miranda warning provided to her was inadequate because it did not contain a specific admonition that she could have an attorney present during questioning. As this court has stated, "there is no 'talismanic incantation' required by Miranda," and "[i]f the sum total of statements in a Miranda advisory reasonably conveys the essential information, the warning will be deemed constitutionally adequate." State v. Carlson, 228 Ariz. 343, ¶ 9 (App. 2011), quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per curiam). The essential information of a Miranda warning contains four parts: that the suspect has the right to remain silent, that anything she does say may be used against her, that she has a right to an attorney, and that if she cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59-60 (2010). The detective who conducted the interrogation advised Meraz of all of these rights two times, and, during the first warning, did specifically advise her that she had the right to an attorney before questioning began. The advisory therefore contained all of the essential information required by Miranda and was not inadequate. Waiver of Miranda Rights
¶5 Meraz next claims she did not actually waive her Miranda rights. Although it is correct that the detective never specifically asked her if she wanted to waive her rights, "[a]nswering questions after police properly give the Miranda warnings constitutes a waiver by conduct." State v. Tapia, 159 Ariz. 284, 286 (1988). Meraz attempts to distinguish Tapia by noting that the defendant there was advised of his rights "at least four times." But nothing about the language of Tapia supports such a distinction, and our case law has continued to state that once a proper advisory is given, a suspect who continues to answer questions has waived their rights. See State v. Moreno-Medrano, 218 Ariz. 349, ¶ 4 (App. 2008). Here, as discussed above, Meraz was given a proper Miranda advisory and proceeded to answer questions, thereby waiving her rights by her conduct.
Voluntariness
¶6 Finally, Meraz contends that her statements and her waiver of her rights were involuntary. As to both issues, the crux of the inquiry is whether the officers conducting the interrogation used any coercive methods. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986). Meraz claims she was coerced because she was not given adequate Miranda warnings, she was under the influence of drugs and injured, and she was isolated. We have already addressed the adequacy of the Miranda warning. "A defendant's mental or physical condition is relevant to the inquiry, but generally is insufficient by itself to render a statement involuntary." State v. Brown, 233 Ariz. 153, ¶ 7 (2013). Here, as in Brown, nothing in the record shows that Meraz was incoherent, unable to answer questions, or did not understand what was happening. Id. ¶ 8. The detective made no promises or threats. And, although Meraz was not allowed contact with family or friends during the interrogation, she cites no authority, and we can find none, suggesting that this would be a factor in the analysis for a person who is over the age of eighteen. Accordingly, we conclude that neither her waiver of her rights nor her statements were involuntary.
Although Meraz mentions the issue of whether she invoked her right to counsel, which was raised at trial, she acknowledges that she "cannot prevail" on this independent claim. We do not address it further.
Admission of Hearsay Statements
¶7 Meraz also argues that certain hearsay statements should not have been admitted under the excited-utterances exception. "We review the trial court's application of the hearsay rule for an abuse of discretion." State v. Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, ¶ 77 (2014). An excited utterance is "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused." Ariz. R. Evid. 803(2). Meraz claims that statements made by a witness, G.B., were not admissible under this hearsay exception because the statements were made about half an hour after the shooting. The passing of time is relevant because the more time passes, the less likely a statement is to be spontaneous and made without reflection. See State v. Rivera, 139 Ariz. 409, 411 (1984). However, "time lapse is not in itself a bar to admission of the statement." Id. The critical question, rather, is whether the declarant was still under the stress of the event. Id. Indeed, "[s]ince before statehood our supreme court has consistently found the physical and emotional condition of the declarant at the time of the statement to affect spontaneity more than the mere lapse of time between the event and statement." State v. Anaya, 165 Ariz. 535, 539 (App. 1990).
¶8 Here, the officer who interviewed G.B. testified that he was "very distraught," "crying," and "very upset" when he gave his statements. The record therefore supports a conclusion that G.B. was still under the stress of the exciting event. See State v. Beasley, 205 Ariz. 334, ¶ 30 (App. 2003). The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting G.B.'s statements as excited utterances. Id. ¶ 29.
Meraz also claims the trial court erred because it did not make specific findings as to "the factors it considered." Courts are not generally required to make specific findings as to discretionary decisions unless specifically called for by statute or rule. Compare State v. Williams, 220 Ariz. 331, ¶ 6 (App. 2008) (court not required to make findings before imposing natural life sentence because statute did not require it), with State v. Taylor, 216 Ariz. 327, ¶ 25 (App. 2007) (court required by statute to make findings before imposing attorney assessment fee); cf. State v. Aguilar, 209 Ariz. 40, ¶¶ 30-36 (2004) (trial court must make specific findings when admitting evidence pursuant to Rule 404(c), Ariz. R. Evid., because findings required by rule). Moreover, Meraz did not request such findings in the trial court and does not now argue that the absence of findings was fundamental, prejudicial error. He has therefore waived this claim. See Williams, 220 Ariz. 331, ¶¶ 7-10. --------
Disposition
¶9 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Meraz's conviction and sentence.