Opinion
No. 60293-4-I.
October 6, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-8-00313-6, Carol A. Schapira, J., entered July 6, 2007.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
M.E. appeals her conviction for obstructing a law enforcement officer, contending that (1) the information provided in the charging document was inadequate to provide her with notice of the crime charged and (2) the findings of fact and conclusions of law are insufficient to support a guilty verdict. Because the charging document contained all elements of the crime and the findings adequately address the obstructing and knowledge prongs of the offense, we affirm.
FACTS
On November 11, 2006, at about 11:30 p.m., Federal Way police officers were dispatched to a local Comfort Inn hotel. The officers were responding to a call from hotel management, asserting that it had received noise complaints about a specific hotel room and that people in that room were coming in the hotel via locked side doors after management gave them warnings not to do so.
According to the officers' testimony, when they arrived at the hotel room, they announced and knocked several times at the hotel room door. They heard sounds of glass clanking and people running around and giggling inside the room. When none of the occupants answered, the hotel desk clerk opened the door for the officers. Inside, they found bottles of alcohol and a group of teenage girls.
The officers then told the group that they were being detained to determine whether anyone in the room was over 21. Officer Madeline Morikawa testified that she did not give anyone permission to leave the scene to retrieve their identification. But Officer Shon Smith, who was standing in the hallway outside the room, saw M.E., a juvenile, walk out of the room and toward the elevator. Smith repeatedly asked her to stop, but she ignored him and continued walking. He then grabbed a piece of her clothing in an attempt to stop her from leaving. M.E. refused to be handcuffed and then began yelling, calling Smith foul names, and slapping him. After hearing Smith repeatedly ask someone to "stop," some of the officers who were inside the hotel room also came to the hallway, took M.E. to the ground, and placed her in handcuffs. The hotel desk clerk, who was also at the scene, agreed with the officers' version of events.
According to M.E. and a few of the other girls present that evening, M.E. left the room for the elevator only when Officer Morikawa told her to retrieve her identification. She then claimed that once she attempted to comply with these instructions, Smith told her she was not allowed to leave. She further claimed that when she continued walking, several officers took her to the ground and caused her injuries that eventually required treatment in the emergency room.
The State charged M.E. with obstructing a law enforcement officer in violation of to RCW 9A.76.020(1) and minor in possession of alcohol in violation of RCW 66.44.270(2). The information alleging that she obstructed a law enforcement officer read as follows:
RCW 9A.76.020(1): "A person is guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer if the person willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties."
That the respondent, [M.E.], in King County, Washington on or about November 11, 2006, did willfully hinder, delay or obstruct a law enforcement officer, in the discharge of his/her official powers or duties;
Contrary to RCW 9A.76.020(1), and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.
The court held a fact finding hearing on May 31, 2007, and found M.E. guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer and not guilty of minor in possession of alcohol. The court imposed a disposition of one month of supervision and four hours of community service.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Information
M.E. contends that the information was constitutionally inadequate because it failed to allege a nonstatutory element of the offense of obstruction of a law enforcement officer, i.e., that she had knowledge that she was obstructing a law enforcement officer. The State contends that the knowledge element can be fairly implied from the language contained in the information. We agree with the State.
All essential elements of the charged crime, both statutory and nonstatutory, must be included in the charging document so that the defendant is given fair notice of the charges against her and can prepare an adequate defense. A charging document is constitutionally inadequate if it does not contain the essential elements. Here, because M.E. challenges the sufficiency of the information after the verdict, we construe the charging language more liberally and in favor of the document's validity.
State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 101-02, 812 P.2d 86 (1991); State v. Grant, 89 Wn.2d 678, 686, 575 P.2d 210 (1978).
City of Auburn v. Brooke, 119 Wn.2d 623, 636, 836 P.2d 212 (1992).
Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 102.
We apply the Supreme Court's two-prong test set forth in State v. Kjorsvik: (1) do the necessary facts appear in any form or, by fair construction, can they be found in the charging document and, if so, (2) can the defendant show that she was actually prejudiced by the inartful language?
117 Wn.2d 93, 101-02, 812 P.2d 86 (1991).
Id. at 105-06.
Here, the document explicitly provided all essential statutory elements of the crime: "[M.E.] . . . did willfully hinder, delay or obstruct a law enforcement officer, in the discharge of his/her official powers or duties." Yet M.E., relying on State v. Johnson, argues that the document failed to give her notice of the nonstatutory "knowledge" element of the crime — that she knew that Smith was a law enforcement officer. But Johnson is distinguishable. There, the charging document alleged only that the defendants "did unlawfully deliver a controlled substance." The court held that the defendants were not given adequate notice of the non-statutory "knowledge" element because "did unlawfully deliver a controlled substance," when fairly construed, does not imply knowledge of the substance's identity. But here, the document alleging that M.E. did "willfully hinder, delay, or obstruct a law enforcement officer" contained the word "willful." Unlike in Johnson, where it was unfair to conclude that "unlawfully" implies "knowingly," we can fairly conclude here that "willful" implies "knowingly." In fact, "willful" by statutory definition conveys the same meaning as "knowingly." In fairly construing the document in favor of its validity, we hold that M.E. was given fair notice of the knowledge element of the crime.
119 Wn.2d 143, 145, 829 P.2d 1078 (1992).
State v. CLR, 40 Wn. App. 839, 841-42, 700 P.2d 1195 (1985). The nonstatutory essential elements of the crime are: "(1) that the action or inaction in fact hinders, delays, or obstructs; (2) that the hindrance, delay, or obstruction be of a public servant in the midst of discharging his official powers or duties; (3) knowledge by the defendant that the public servant is discharging his duties; and (4) that the action or inaction be done knowingly by the obstructor." Id.
Johnson, 119 Wn.2d at 145.
Id. at 147.
RCW 9A.08.010(4): "Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears."
Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 102.
Next, we turn to the second prong, whether the defendant was actually prejudiced by the inartful language. M.E. incorrectly argues that prejudice is presumed because the essential elements were not contained in the charging document and makes no argument of actual prejudice. Because M.E. had notice of the charge against her and was fully able to prepare an adequate defense, M.E. was not prejudiced by the document's failure to explicitly state the elements of the crime.
Id. at 106.
II. Sufficiency of the Findings and Conclusions
The trial court must enter written findings of ultimate facts for each element of the crime. "Evidence is sufficient to support an adjudication of guilt in a juvenile proceeding if any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." We draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the State's favor and interpret the evidence most strongly against the defendant.
JrCR 7.11(d).
State v. Echeverria, 85 Wn. App. 777, 782, 934 P.2d 1214 (1997).
State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
M.E. contends that the court's findings fail to adequately address two necessary elements: that M.E.'s actions did in fact hinder, delay, or obstruct Officer Smith and that she knew he was a law enforcement officer performing his official duties. We disagree.
First, the court's findings include several acts in which M.E. obstructed Smith: she continued walking toward the elevator when he repeatedly asked her to stop, she jerked away when he attempted to detain her, and she screamed and slapped at him when he attempted to arrest her. In State v. Ware, the court held that when the trial court did not enter a specific finding on obstructing, but entered findings that the defendant approached and challenged the officers after repeated warnings to stop, the findings raised a permissible inference of obstructing. Likewise here, the court's findings raise a permissible inference that M.E. obstructed Smith.
State v. Ware, 111 Wn. App. 738, 744, 46 P.3d 280 (2002).
The court's findings also raise a permissible inference that M.E. had knowledge that Smith was a law enforcement officer. According to the court's findings, several police officers went to the hotel room and notified the girls "that they were being detained pending investigation." Smith, standing outside the room, saw M.E. walk away from the scene, told her to stop, and attempted to place her in handcuffs, at which point she began screaming and slapping at him. Under RCW 9A.08.010(4), a person acts knowingly when she has information which would lead a reasonable person to believe those facts to be true. Here, a reasonable person in M.E.'s situation would have concluded that Smith was an officer when a group of officers went to detain M.E. and her friends and when Smith attempted to place her in handcuffs. Thus, viewed in the light in the most favorable to the State, we hold that the findings and conclusions adequately support a disposition finding M.E. guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer.
We affirm.