Opinion
NO. 2012 KA 1586
05-06-2013
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CHRISTOPHER LLOYD MARICLE
Walter P. Reed District Attorney Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee, State of Louisiana Kathryn W. Landry Special Appeals Counsel Baton Rouge, Louisiana Frederick H. Kroenke, Jr. Louisiana Appellate Project Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, Christopher Lloyd Maricle
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the
22nd Judicial District Court,
In and for the Parish of St. Tammany,
State of Louisiana
Criminal Docket No. 507544
The Honorable Allison H. Penzato, Judge Presiding
Walter P. Reed
District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee,
State of Louisiana
Kathryn W. Landry
Special Appeals Counsel
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Frederick H. Kroenke, Jr.
Louisiana Appellate Project
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant,
Christopher Lloyd Maricle
BEFORE: PARRO, WELCH, AND KLINE, JJ.
Hon. William F. Kline, Jr., retired, is serving as judge ad hoc by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
KLINE , J.
The defendant, Christopher Lloyd Maricle, was charged by bill of information with one count of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:68.4, and pled not guilty. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to three years at hard labor and ordered to pay $12,000 in restitution to the victim. He moved for reconsideration of sentence, but the motion was denied. He now appeals, challenging the sentence as unconstitutionally excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
FACTS
In 2010, Deborah Piazza purchased a 2009 Chevrolet Aveo automobile for her daughter, Jessica Piazza, to use to travel back and forth to school. Deborah Piazza did not give Jessica Piazza permission to let anyone else use the vehicle and did not give the defendant permission to drive the vehicle. The vehicle cost $12,678.52 and was insured for basic liability only.
On October 23, 2010, without her mother's knowledge, Jessica Piazza, age sixteen years, drove the vehicle to a party. At the party, she became "too drunk" to drive home. At Jessica Piazza's request, the defendant, age eighteen years, drove her home in the vehicle. She told the defendant he could drive the vehicle back to his grandmother's house, where he lived, but nowhere else. She did not tell him he could drive the vehicle to New Orleans. The defendant told her he would take the car to his grandmother's house.
The next day, the defendant told Jessica Piazza he had left the keys in the vehicle and the windows down, and someone had stolen the vehicle. He initially gave the same account to the police. However, he later stated that he, his cousin, Chad Burns, and Jessica Piazza had tried to take the vehicle to New Orleans, but had stopped at a convenience store for directions. The defendant claimed a black male at the store needed a ride to the same location, and so they let him drive. The defendant stated the black male wrecked the vehicle. Subsequently, in a third account, the defendant claimed that after the vehicle had been wrecked, he and Jessica Piazza agreed to say it had been stolen, so an insurance claim could be made to replace the vehicle.
Although the police officer's testimony indicates that defendant stated that an unidentified black male knew of the location where they were going so they let him drive, it is the defendant's taped statement where he indicates that the black male needed a ride to the same location so they let him drive.
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The vehicle was subsequently recovered with the front end "smashed in all the way." Thereafter, it was sold as scrap metal for $220. Deborah Piazza could not afford to replace the vehicle for her daughter.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court imposed an unconstitutionally excessive sentence upon him, because he was only eighteen years old at the time of the offense, was a first offender, and was doing Jessica Piazza a favor by taking her home after she had become intoxicated.
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth items which must be considered by the trial court before imposing sentence. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1. The trial court need not recite the entire checklist of Article 894.1, but the record must reflect that it adequately considered the criteria. In light of the criteria expressed by Article 894.1, a review for individual excessiveness should consider the circumstances of the crime and the trial court's stated reasons and factual basis for its sentencing decision. State v. Hurst, 99-2868 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/3/00), 797 So.2d 75, 83, writ denied, 00-3053 (La. 10/5/01), 798 So. 2d 962. Remand for full compliance with Article 894.1 is unnecessary when a sufficient factual basis for the sentence is shown. State v. Harper, 07-0299 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/5/07), 970 So. 2d 592, 602, writ denied, 07-1921 (La. 2/15/08), 976 So. 2d 173.
Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 20 prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. Generally, a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of justice. A trial judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. Hurst, 797 So. 2d at 83.
Whoever commits the crime of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than ten years or both. La. Rev. Stat. 14:68.4(B). The defendant was sentenced to three years at hard labor.
At sentencing, the trial court noted: the defendant was nineteen years old; he had no prior conviction, but had prior arrests; he was currently being held following an arrest for aggravated rape; and he had shown "absolutely no remorse in connection with this particular incident." The court found the defendant was in need of correctional treatment, which could most appropriately be provided by an institution. The court also found any lesser sentence than the sentence it was imposing would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. Additionally, the court found the testimony at trial established that the victim had suffered an actual pecuniary loss of $12,000.
A thorough review of the record reveals the trial court adequately considered the criteria of Article 894.1 and did not manifestly abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence herein. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 894.1(A)(2), (A)(3), (B)(9), and (B)(21). Further, the sentence imposed was not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, and thus, was not unconstitutionally excessive.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.