Opinion
No. 1-847 / 01-0366.
Filed February 6, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, BRYAN H. MCKINLEY, Judge.
James Lynch appeals his conviction and sentence for burglary in the third-degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.6A (1999). AFFIRMED.
James Charles Lynch, pro se, for appellant.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, James G. Tomka, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, and Marilyn Dettmer, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and MAHAN and HECHT, JJ.
James Lynch was charged with burglary in the first-degree. The minutes of testimony alleged Lynch broke into his girlfriend's apartment and assaulted her upon entry. Lynch pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.6A (1999). The district court sentenced him to an indeterminate five-year term of incarceration. On appeal, Lynch contends his trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion in arrest of judgment when the district court (1) accepted his plea of guilty without sufficient factual basis, and (2) accepted his plea of guilty when it was not voluntarily made. We affirm.
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Brooks, 555 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1996). A defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel when (1) the defense attorney fails in an essential duty and (2) prejudice results. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); State v. Bugely, 562 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Iowa 1997). An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be disposed of if the defendant fails to prove either prong. State v. Cook, 565 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1997).
A failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment precludes direct appeal of a conviction. Iowa R. Crim. P. 23(3)(a). However, failure to do so will not preclude a challenge to a guilty plea if it resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Schoelerman, 315 N.W.2d 67, 71 (Iowa 1982). The district court may not accept a guilty plea without first determining that the plea has a factual basis. Iowa R. Crim. P. 8(2)(b); State v. Burtlow, 299 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Iowa 1980). Therefore, we will find counsel failed to perform an essential duty if defense counsel allows the defendant to plead guilty to a charge for which no factual basis exists and thereafter fails to file a motion in arrest of judgment challenging the plea. State v. Brooks, 555 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1996). Prejudice in such a case is inherent. State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999). In deciding whether a factual basis exists, we consider the entire record before the district court at the guilty plea hearing. Id.
Lynch contends there is no factual basis for his guilty plea to the charges of third-degree burglary. We disagree. During the plea colloquy, Lynch admitted he entered his girlfriend's apartment and committed an assault. Furthermore, according to the minutes of testimony, the police were dispatched to the home of Lynch's girlfriend in response to a phone call from her nine-year-old son that Lynch had broken into their home and was beating his mother. The minutes reflect Lynch knocked on the door, but when his girlfriend told him to go away, he kicked in the door, grabbed the victim by her hair, and began hitting and kicking her.
We have carefully reviewed the entire record before the district court and conclude that a factual basis was established for the plea. Under these circumstances, counsel breached no essential duty in connection with Lynch's entry of a guilty plea to third-degree burglary. See State v. Rice, 543 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Iowa 1996) (defense counsel breached no duty to make a meritless motion).
We conclude Lynch's assertion regarding the voluntariness of his plea should be preserved for postconviction relief. The record before us does not provide a sufficient basis for determining counsel's effectiveness and we decline to consider his claims on direct appeal. We affirm Lynch's conviction for burglary in the third degree and reject on direct appeal his claim that counsel was ineffective in allowing him to plead guilty to a charge for which no factual basis existed. We reserve his ineffective assistance of counsel claim challenging the voluntariness of his plea for a possible postconviction proceeding.
AFFIRMED.