Opinion
DA 22-0716
07-30-2024
STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. TRAVIS DEWAYNE LOHMAN, Defendant and Appellant.
For Appellant: Kathleen Foley, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorne General, Tammy K Plubell, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Kirsten Pabst, Missoula County Attorney, Eric Owens, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 10, 2024
For Appellant: Kathleen Foley, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorne General, Tammy K Plubell, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Kirsten Pabst, Missoula County Attorney, Eric Owens, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana
OPINION
James Jeremiah Shea Justice
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases p ublished in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Travis Dewayne Lohman appeals from the Fourth Judicial District Court's order denying his Motion to Suppress inculpatory statements made to law enforcement on the basis that Lohman was not in custody when he made the statements. Lohman asserts the District Court erred because he was subject to a custodial interrogation and was given an insufficient Miranda warning, rendering his statements involuntary. We affirm.
¶3 Lohman was charged by information of felony sexual assault on a minor on April 17, 2020. The minor had previously reported to their school counselor that Lohman had sexually assaulted them over a period of months. After this report, Missoula Police Department Detective Josh Harris contacted Lohman to schedule an interview. After a series of voicemails, Lohman agreed, and the two met as scheduled at the Missoula Police Department on October 30, 2019. At the beginning of the interview, Harris read Lohman a Miranda warning and obtained both verbal and written waivers of rights from Lohman. The interview lasted approximately three hours, and Lohman made several incriminating statements that formed the basis of the State's decision to charge him with felony sexual assault of a minor several months later.
¶4 On August 14, 2020, Lohman filed his Motion to Suppress the statements elicited by Harris, "as being involuntarily given, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination." The District Court held a hearing on Lohman's motion on March 3, 2021. The State called Detective Harris, who testified to the circumstances of the interview and Lohman's Miranda waiver. Lohman called Dr. Richard Rogers, Ph.D., ABPP, who provided his expert opinion that the Miranda warning, consisting of 86 words read in 21 seconds, was read too quickly to be comprehensible, thus rendering Lohman's waiver involuntary. Relying on our holding in State v. Reavley, 2003 MT 298, 318 Mont. 150, 79 P.3d 270, the District Court denied Lohman's motion on the basis that Lohman was not subject to a custodial interrogation, and thus any Miranda warning was given gratuitously. Lohman eventually pleaded guilty to one count of felony sexual assault involving a minor.
¶5 We review a district court's denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the court's conclusions of law were correct. State v. Olson, 2003 MT 61, ¶ 11, 314 Mont. 402, 66 P.3d 297 (citation omitted).
¶6 Miranda warnings are not necessary unless a person is subject to a custodial interrogation. Reavley, ¶ 18 (citation omitted). "Whether custodial interrogation has occurred is determined on a case-by-case basis and focuses on whether a 'reasonable person' would feel free to leave." Reavley, ¶ 19 (citation omitted). To determine whether a custodial interrogation has occurred, we consider: "(1) place of the interrogation; (2) time of the interrogation; (3) persons present during the interrogation; (4) whether Miranda warnings were gratuitously given; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; and (6) whether or not the suspect was arrested following the interrogation." Reavley, ¶ 19 (citation omitted). An interrogation is not custodial merely because the interrogation took place in a coercive environment (i.e., a police station). Reavley, ¶ 20 (citing State v. Dannels, 226 Mont. 80, 88, 734 P.2d 188, 194 (1987)).
¶7 In Dannels, we held that Miranda warnings were not required prior to a suspect's questioning, which occurred at the police station, because the suspect voluntarily went to the station, was not arrested before or after the questioning, willingly answered the questions, and left after the questioning was over. Dannels, 226 Mont. at 88, 734 P.2d at 194. The same holds true here. Lohman attended the interview voluntarily. The interview was scheduled to accommodate Lohman's work schedule, with Harris testifying that the interview was scheduled at 7 a.m. to allow Lohman to make it to work after. Lohman's contentions regarding the purportedly half-hearted Miranda warning also supports the conclusion that the warning was given gratuitously. While Harris's questioning of Lohman lasted for three hours, Lohman was able to leave and go to work after the interview, and he was not formally charged for nearly six months. The District Court correctly held that the interview did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation and it did not abuse its discretion in denying Lohman's Motion to Suppress.
Lohman's argument that the fourth factor of the test-whether the Miranda warning was gratuitously given-should be excluded from our analysis is unavailing, particularly given that it would not impact the outcome of our analysis on appeal.
¶8 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review. The District Court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion.
¶9 Affirmed.