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State v. Linerud

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One
Nov 16, 2009
153 Wn. App. 1004 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)

Opinion

No. 60769-3-I.

November 16, 2009.

The unpublished opinion in this cause was withdrawn by order of the Court of Appeals dated January 4, 2010. Substitute opinion filed.


Randy Linerud appeals his sentence for a conviction of failure to register as a sex offender. Because the standard range sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, the court included a notation in the judgment and sentence that the total time served could not exceed the statutory maximum. Linerud contends that the sentence is indeterminate because the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum and he may earn early release credits. He also argues that the court violated the separation of powers doctrine by delegating its sentencing power to the Department of Corrections (DOC). The potential for earned early release does not render a sentence indeterminate. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

Randy Linerud pled guilty to the charge of failure to register as a sex offender. At sentencing, both parties agreed that the standard range sentence of 43 to 57 months combined with the mandatory 36 to 48 months of community custody would exceed the 60 month statutory maximum for a class C felony. The court then imposed a standard range sentence of 43 months of incarceration and 36 to 48 months of community custody and included a notation in the Judgment and Sentence that "combined maximum of prison time + community custody may not exceed the stat[utory] max[imum] of 60 months." Linerud appeals this sentence.

DISCUSSION

Linerud claims his sentence is (1) indeterminate because he may earn early release and the total time served may exceed the statutory maximum and (2) invalid because it permits the DOC to determine whether he qualifies for earned early release and thus violates the separation of powers doctrine. The State contends that the appeal should be dismissed because (1) the clarifying language included in the judgment and sentence validated the sentence imposed; (2) the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, explicitly states that earned early release does not render a sentence indeterminate; and (3) the DOC has authority expressly granted by the Legislature to determine when an offender earns early release time.

We initially issued an opinion in this case agreeing with Linerud's argument that the procedure followed here made the sentence indeterminate in violation of the SRA. Since we issued that opinion, the Supreme court decided In re Personal Restraint of Brooks, in which it agreed with the State that the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum and is not indefinite if the trial court "explicitly state[s] that the combination of confinement and community custody shall not exceed the statutory maximum."

State v. Linerud, 147 Wn. App. 944, 948, 197 P.3d 1224 (2008), remanded, 166 Wn.2d 1019 (2009).

Based on that ruling, the court remanded this case to us. Because the trial court followed the procedure approved in Brooks, we affirm the trial court.

WE CONCUR.


Summaries of

State v. Linerud

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One
Nov 16, 2009
153 Wn. App. 1004 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
Case details for

State v. Linerud

Case Details

Full title:THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. RANDY N. LINERUD, AKA FRANK CAIN…

Court:The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One

Date published: Nov 16, 2009

Citations

153 Wn. App. 1004 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
153 Wash. App. 1004