State v. Lindsay

Full title: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. James Leroy LINDSAY, Sr., Appellant…

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Date published: Feb 8, 2013

171 Wn. App. 808 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013)

171 Wn. App. 808

171 Wash. App. 808

Opinion

Nos. 39103–1–II, 40153–3–II, 39113–9–II.

2013-02-8

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. James Leroy LINDSAY, Sr., Appellant. State of Washington, Respondent, v. Jennifer Sarah Holmes, Appellant.

Barbara L. Corey, Attorney at Law, Tacoma, WA, Thomas Michael Kummerow, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Appellant. Kimberley Ann Demarco, Pierce County Prosecutor's Office, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.

JOHANSON

Barbara L. Corey, Attorney at Law, Tacoma, WA, Thomas Michael Kummerow, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Appellant. Kimberley Ann Demarco, Pierce County Prosecutor's Office, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.

PART PUBLISHED OPINION

JOHANSON, A.C.J.

¶ 1 Jennifer Sarah Holmes appeals her jury convictions for first degree burglary, first degree robbery, unlawful imprisonment, second degree assault, and theft of a firearm. James Leroy Lindsay, Sr., appeals his jury convictions for first degree burglary, first degree robbery, second degree kidnapping, second degree assault, and theft of a firearm. Among other arguments, in the published portion of this opinion, Lindsay and Holmes argue that the prosecutor engaged in multiple acts of misconduct requiring reversal of their convictions and that the trial court violated constitutional protections against double jeopardy.

¶ 2 In the unpublished portion of this opinion, Holmes and Lindsay argue that the trial court violated their public and open trial right. Additionally, Lindsay argues that the jail guard's disposal of Lindsay's notebook violated his right to counsel. Holmes argues that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to admit evidence of the alleged victim's cocaine addiction; (2) her restitution hearing lacked due process; and (3) several errors combine to create cumulative error.

¶ 3 In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that although the prosecutor committed misconduct, the misconduct did not substantially affect the jury's verdict. We further hold that both Lindsay's conviction for second degree assault and his conviction for second degree kidnapping merge with his first degree robbery conviction. Additionally, we hold that Holmes's conviction for second degree assault merges with her first degree robbery conviction. Finally, in the unpublished portion of this opinion, we address and reject Holmes's and Lindsay's remaining issues. Thus, we affirm both Lindsay's and Holmes's convictions and remand for resentencing on the merged convictions.

FACTS

I. Substantive Facts and Procedure

¶ 4 Jennifer Holmes and Lawrence Wilkey began their seven-year romantic relationship in 1998. In 2004, after living in Washington State, the couple moved to Idaho. Thereafter, Holmes met James Lindsay, decided to marry him and told Wilkey that she no longer loved him. Three weeks later, when Holmes and Lindsay were away on a day trip, Wilkey moved out, taking many property items ¹ with him to Washington.

1 Throughout the trial, the parties contested who rightfully owned the property.

¶ 5 When Holmes returned home, she called the sheriff's office and reported that a theft had occurred. The deputies concluded that Holmes's property loss was a civil matter and advised her to consult with a civil attorney.

¶ 6 Months later, Holmes and Lindsay drove from Idaho to Wilkey's home in Pierce County. According to Wilkey, Lindsay “burst open” Wilkey's door and entered with a pipe in his raised hand. 25 VRP at 1901. After Lindsay and Holmes violently invaded his home, they bound him with zip ties and a leash, beat and choked him, with a pipe, rendered him unconscious, taunted him, and took his property.

¶ 7 In contrast, Lindsay told the police ² that Wilkey opened the front door and then ran toward the back door saying something about a gun. Lindsay claimed that he was worried Wilkey was about to arm himself, so he ran into the house and the two men wrestled. Lindsay admitted that he used zip ties to restrain Wilkey so he would not interfere as Lindsay and Holmes collected their belongings. According to Holmes, Wilkey seemed happy, albeit surprised, to see her and, although he did not protest to her entering his home, she remembered a scuffle between the two men. Holmes further claimed that she never saw Wilkey restrained in any way and that Wilkey never objected to her taking her property.

2 Lindsay gave a statement to police. He did not testify at trial.

¶ 8 After Lindsay and Holmes left his home, Wilkey eventually freed himself, went to his neighbor's house, and his neighbor called the police. The responding paramedic unit found Wilkey upset, with scratches and bruises on both legs and zip ties around his wrists and ankles, and they took him to the hospital. The attending doctor treated Wilkey for abrasions on his extremities, a contusion on his head, and issues relating to diabetes. But the doctor did not find bruises on Wilkey's torso consistent with being beaten with a pipe. Nor did Wilkey's computed tomography (CT) scan, x-rays, or urine tests reveal other assault injuries.

¶ 9 Based on the March 2006 events, the State charged Holmes and Lindsay with one count each for first degree burglary,³ first degree robbery, ⁴ first degree kidnapping,⁵ first degree assault,⁶ and four counts each for theft of a firearm.⁷ The jury found Holmes guilty of first degree burglary, first degree robbery, unlawful imprisonment, second degree assault, and one count of theft of a firearm. The jury found Lindsay guilty of first degree burglary, first degree robbery; the lesser-included charges of second degree kidnapping, second degree assault, and one count of theft of a firearm. By special verdict, the jury found that neither Holmes nor Lindsay was armed with a firearm during the commission of the crimes. Also, by special verdict, the jury found that Lindsay and Holmes committed the lesser-included charge for second degree assault on the basis of an “assault committed with the intent to commit a felony.” Clerk's Papers (Lindsay) (CPL) at 394; Clerk's Papers (Holmes) (CPH) at 732.

3 .RCW 9A.52.020(1)(a), (b).

4 Former RCW 9A.56.190 (1975) and RCW 9A.56.200(1)(a)(ii).

5 Former RCW 9A.40.020(1)(c) (1975).

6 .RCW 9A.36.011(1)(a).

7 .RCW 9A.56.020 and RCW 9A.56.300(1)(a).

¶ 10 The trial court sentenced Holmes on each count, to be served concurrently for a total of 89.5 months.⁸ The trial court sentenced Lindsay on each count, to be served concurrently for a total of 102 months.⁹ The trial court ordered both defendants to pay restitution. Holmes and Lindsay appeal.

8 The trial court sentenced Holmes to 66 months for first degree burglary, 89.5 months for first degree robbery, 14 months for unlawful imprisonment, 38 months for second degree assault; and 36 months for firearm theft.

9 The trial court sentenced Lindsay to 78 months for first degree burglary; 102 months for first degree robbery; 60 months for second degree kidnapping; 50 months for second degree assault; 36 months for firearm theft.

II. Objectionable Conduct

A. Trial Conduct

¶ 11 Holmes and Lindsay's joint trial occurred over more than a year and produced 98 volumes reporting the proceedings. Holmes and Lindsay had separate counsel. The record reveals objectionable conduct by the prosecutor and Holmes's counsel throughout the trial; much of which occurred outside the jury's presence.¹⁰ The following are descriptions of conduct that occurred in the jury's presence.

10 Because misconduct or unprofessional behavior occurring outside the jury's presence could not affect the jury's verdict, we do not discuss it extensively here. We note, however, that outside the jury's presence, the prosecutor described Holmes's counsel as having an absolute disregard for the truth, and Holmes's counsel described the prosecutor's conduct as “slimy” and disingenuous.

¶ 12 At one point, Holmes's counsel objected to the prosecutor's examination of Wilkey saying, “Oh, your Honor, let's lead a little bit more.” 24 VRP at 1852. The prosecutor objected and asked for a sidebar, and Holmes's counsel said, “I would like it on the record outside the presence of the jury if counsel is going to be personally attacking me for my meritorious objections.” 24 VRP at 1853.

¶ 13 Several days later, Holmes's counsel objected to the prosecutor's questions as eliciting hearsay, the prosecutor replied that he asked the question to put the defendant's statement into context. Holmes's counsel replied that she did not know the “context exception” and that perhaps the prosecutor could point it out for her. 40 VRP at 3222. The prosecutor asked that parties make objections to the court instead of insulting fellow counsel. Holmes's counsel requested an opportunity to argue outside the jury's presence and the prosecutor responded, “Maybe counsel should have asked that two minutes ago.” Holmes's counsel replied, “[M]aybe [the prosecutor] should keep his mouth shut.” 40 VRP at 3223.

¶ 14 Days later as Holmes's counsel cross-examined a witness, this exchange occurred:

[THE STATE]: Same objection [calls for speculation].

[HOLMES'S COUNSEL]: He said that he does

THE COURT: Can I hear the question?

[THE STATE]: She's making argument as we go and she doesn't care if the objection is sustained or not.

[HOLMES'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, once again we have Mr. Sheeran reporting to read my mind.
47 VRP at 4118.

¶ 15 During the State's redirect of Wilkey, Holmes's counsel objected to the prosecutor's question saying that the answer to that question would be new discovery that she had not been “blessed with” before her cross-examination of Wilkey. 51 VRP at 4341. The prosecutor stated, “I can't respond politely,” then offered, “I'll ask another question.” 51 VRP at 4341–42.

¶ 16 Later that day, when the prosecutor and Holmes's counsel argued about one of Holmes's objections, the prosecutor said, “We're going to have like a sixth grader [argument]—” 51 VRP at 4357. At that point, the trial court excused the jury.

¶ 17 The next day, although the trial court had previously determined that the defendants could elicit testimony regarding Wilkey's alleged drug use only for relevant time periods,¹¹ Holmes's counsel asked the witness whether 13 years ago, Wilkey's father had kicked Wilkey out of the house for drug use. Becoming upset, the prosecutor said:

11 The relevant time periods included the time of the Wilkey and Holmes's break up, the time of the division of property, and the time of the allegations.

[THE STATED]: Objection, Your Honor, and motion outside the presence.

And counsel walked right into this after freaking six weeks

THE COURT: Hold on just a minute.

[HOLMES'S COUNSEL]: Mr. Sheeran is having a tantrum.

THE COURT: If I could have the jury go into the jury room.

[THE STATE]: Tantrum, because you—
52 VRP at 4554. After the jury left, the parties continued to argue.

¶ 18 Several days later, as Holmes's counsel cross-examined a witness, the prosecutor objected saying, “[I]t seems like impeachment on a collateral matter and we're into silly.” 61 VRP at 5423. After the jury was at recess, Holmes's counsel told the trial court that the prosecutor's remark about “silly” denigrated the defense counsel and the prosecutor should know better. 61 VRP at 5428.

¶ 19 While Holmes testified on her own behalf that, during their relationship, Wilkey hurt her physically and emotionally, she added that while she was testifying, the prosecutor was laughing and that his behavior upset her. During cross-examination, the State asked Holmes if she remembered whether Wilkey ever owned guns during their relationship. Holmes responded, “That's a complicated question,” and the State replied, “Not really.” 87 VRP at 8092. Holmes's counsel objected noting that “she thinks that there are some—” 87 VRP at 8092. The prosecutor said, “Yeah, we all know that.” 87 VRP at 8092. Holmes's counsel told the prosecutor, “Counsel, I think your rudeness has reached a new low.” 87 VRP at 8092. After the jury recessed, the parties continued to argue.

B. Closing Argument

¶ 20 The prosecutor began closing argument with Holmes's counsel frequently objecting on grounds of misstatement or mischaracterization of the evidence. The trial court repeatedly responded, “[T]he jury will decide all issues of fact in this case.” 95 VRP at 8693; see also 8695.

¶ 21 The prosecutor then reviewed Holmes's testimony, characterizing parts of it as “the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard.” 95 VRP at 8708. He told the jury:

She sat there and told you she wasn't mad at him when he took the stuff; she wasn't mad that he took the kids' computer; she wasn't mad that he took the blender; she wasn't mad that he took the food; she wasn't mad that he took the entertainment center; she wasn't mad that he took the bed; she wasn't mad when the police told her it was a civil action and she should go hire an attorney; she wasn't mad when the insurance company wasn't paying out; she wasn't mad after six-plus hours of driving over here on her horribly bad back that had to be in excruciating pain, she still wasn't mad at [Wilkey].
95 VRP at 8708. Holmes's counsel objected to the prosecutor's statement as an expression of personal opinion; the trial court overruled her objection.

¶ 22 Referring to Holmes's testimony that her attorney advised her to repossess her things, the prosecutor commented, “Now that's a little ridiculous.” 95 VRP at 8711. The prosecutor characterized Holmes's testimony that Wilkey “was fine” with her taking things and her testimony that she had a good faith claim to the property she took as “funny,” “disgusting,” and “comical.” 95 VRP at 8717, 8722. Holmes's counsel objected repeatedly to his characterizations. The trial court responded that the jury would decide all issues of fact.

¶ 23 During his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the defense had tried to portray Wilkey as a bully and an abusive thug but that this portrayal did not make sense because Holmes and Lindsay were the aggressors who came into his house and Lindsay admitted that he tied up Wilkey. The prosecutor told the jury that this portrayal of Wilkey “is a crock.... What you've been pitched for the last four hours is a crock.” 95 VRP at 8877. There was no objection.

¶ 24 The prosecutor next referenced several exhibits regarding Holmes's financial documents and told the jury:

She sat up here day after day after day telling you she always made enough to pay for her bills. Always made enough. She didn't.

That a—you know, this is similar to when she started dating [Lindsay]—that a mother of three is having trouble paying her bills and not making enough to do so is understandable. It is not something that anybody would look down on. Own it. Don't get up here and sit here and lie.
95 VRP at 8882. Holmes did not object to this statement.¹²

12 Holmes did object shortly thereafter, but her objection appears to be connected to the statement the prosecutor made after this statement regarding evidence of guns in the house.

¶ 25 The prosecutor also responded to Lindsay's closing argument, saying:

You compare what Mr. Wilkey said with all the evidence when you're looking at his credibility, and then you compare what Jennifer Holmes said to you for two months.
95 VRP at 8884. Holmes's counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, arguing that the State was improperly asking the jury to consider Lindsay's statement against Holmes. The trial court stated it would consider the matter outside the jury's presence after all of the closing argument.

¶ 26 The prosecutor continued his rebuttal:

[THE STATE]: Ten months. Do they get ... (sotto voce)

Holmes's counsel: I can't hear you.

[THE STATE]: Do they?

[HOLMES'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I can't hear him. My clients have a right to hear what's going on at their—at her trial. Possibly Mr. Sheeran could raise his voice.

THE COURT: Keep your voice up, please, so everybody can hear.

[THE STATE]: Thank you.

Holmes's counsel: Could the court reporter read back the last couple of comments?

[LINDSAY'S COUNSEL]: Did the court reporter hear it?

COURT REPORTER: I said I couldn't hear it.

[HOLMES'S COUNSEL]: Oh, then it's not in the record.

[THE STATE]: Do these two get to get away with it? It's a simple question.
95 VRP at 8884–85.

¶ 27 Later, the prosecutor said, “I mean, the Jennifer Holmes story is arguably—well, it's silly ... (sotto voce).” 95 VRP at 8886. Holmes's counsel immediately stated she could not hear him. The prosecutor responded, “Maybe if counsel and her client could just be quiet for a few minutes they might be able to hear something.” 95 VRP at 8887. Holmes's counsel objected, arguing that the prosecutor must not behave so rudely. Both the court reporter and Lindsay affirmed that they had not heard the prosecutor. The prosecutor said:

I'll try to do my best, Your Honor. Thank you.

What I was saying was

...

—Ms. Holmes['s] story about what happened afterward is as silly as her claim that she wasn't mad.
95 VRP at 8887.

¶ 28 After a short while, the prosecutor continued addressing the jury:

[THE STATE]: So everything that happened happened in what, 90 seconds? Called Richard Vazquez, had him come running over, zip tie, beat him up, go to the cops? Yeah. Ask yourself who wants to find the truth and ... (sotto voce).

[COURT REPORTER]: Ask yourself ...?

[THE STATE]: Who wants to find the truth. Ask yourself what the truth is. Convict them.
95 VRP at 8888. Outside the jury's presence, the trial court ruled that the jurors had been instructed how to handle the charges with respect to each defendant who was joined for trial, and it denied Holmes's mistrial motion.

ANALYSIS

I. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 29 Holmes and Lindsay argue that we must reverse their convictions because of extensive prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial.¹³ Specifically, they argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct by denigrating Holmes's counsel numerous times; misstating and trivializing the burden of proof; expressing personal opinion about the credibility of the State's witness and the defendant; telling the jury it is to consider all the evidence, without clarifying that Lindsay's police statement must not be considered against Holmes; and speaking to the jury in a whisper. The State responds that Holmes and Lindsay do not meet their burden to show that the prosecutor's conduct caused prejudice. Although we strongly disapprove of both the prosecutor's and Holmes's counsel's repeated unprofessional conduct, we do not conclude that the prosecutor's misconduct prejudiced the jury.

13 Lindsay makes this same argument in his statement of additional grounds for review; we consider it here. RAP 10.10(a).

A. Standard of Review

¶ 30 Holmes and Lindsay bear the burden of showing that (1) the State committed misconduct and (2) the misconduct had prejudicial effect. State v. Anderson, 153 Wash.App. 417, 427, 220 P.3d 1273 (2009), review denied,170 Wash.2d 1002, 245 P.3d 226 (2010). If a defendant establishes that the State made improper statements, then we review whether those improper statements prejudiced the defendant under one of two different standards of review. State v. Emery, 174 Wash.2d 741, 760, 278 P.3d 653 (2012).

¶ 31 If the defendant preserved the issue by objecting at trial, we evaluate whether there was a substantial likelihood that the improper comments prejudiced the defendant by affecting the jury. Emery, 174 Wash.2d at 760, 278 P.3d 653;Anderson, 153 Wash.App. at 427, 220 P.3d 1273. But if the defendant failed to object to the improper argument at trial, defendant must show that the State's misconduct “was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice.” In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash.2d 696, 704, 286 P.3d 673 (2012) (citing State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wash.2d 438, 455, 258 P.3d 43 (2011)). This more stringent second standard of review requires the defendant to show that: “(1) ‘no curative instruction would have obviated any prejudicial effect on the jury’ and (2) the misconduct resulted in prejudice that ‘had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury verdict.’ ” Emery, 174 Wash.2d at 761, 278 P.3d 653 (quoting Thorgerson, 172 Wash.2d at 455, 258 P.3d 43). But we judge misconduct by the effect likely to flow from it and focus more on whether an instruction could have cured the State's misconduct. Emery, 174 Wash.2d at 762, 278 P.3d 653. We inquire whether the misconduct has engendered “a feeling of prejudice” that would prevent a defendant's fair trial. Emery, 174 Wash.2d at 762, 278 P.3d 653 (quoting Slattery v. City of Seattle, 169 Wash. 144, 148, 13 P.2d 464 (1932)).

B. The Unique Role of a Prosecutor

¶ 32 As a state agent, the prosecuting attorney represents the people and presumptively acts with impartiality in the interest of justice. State v. Fisher, 165 Wash.2d 727, 746, 202 P.3d 937 (2009). Prosecutors are quasi-judicial officers tasked with prosecuting those who violate the peace and dignity of the state and tasked with searching for justice. State v. Case, 49 Wash.2d 66, 70, 298P.2d 500 (1956) (quoting People v. Fielding, 158 N.Y. 542, 547, 53 N.E. 497 (1899)). Our Supreme Court has pronounced that although prosecutors must deal with all that is coarse and brutal in human life:

“[T]he safeguards which the wisdom of ages has thrown around persons accused of crime cannot be disregarded, and such officers are reminded that a fearless, impartial discharge of public duty, accompanied by a spirit of fairness toward the accused, is the highest commendation they can hope for. Their devotion to duty is not measured, like the prowess of the savage, by the number of their victims.”
State v. Warren, 165 Wash.2d 17, 27–28, 195 P.3d 940 (2008) (quoting State v. Charlton, 90 Wash.2d 657, 665, 585 P.2d 142 (1978)), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 2007, 173 L.Ed.2d 1102 (2009). Recently, our Supreme Court reiterated that prosecutors have a duty of fairness to the defendant:

Defendants are among the people the prosecutor represents. The prosecutor owes a duty to defendants to see that their rights to a constitutionally fair trial are not violated. Thus, a prosecutor must function within boundaries while zealously seeking justice.
State v. Monday, 171 Wash.2d 667, 676, 257 P.3d 551 (2011) (citations omitted).

C. Impugning Defense Counsel

¶ 33 Holmes and Lindsay argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct by denigrating Holmes's counsel numerous times and that this misconduct easily satisfies any definition of “the most intolerable government conduct.” Br. of Appellant (Holmes) at 41. The State responds that both the prosecutor and Holmes's counsel engaged in unprofessional conduct, which although regrettable, does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. We agree that both the prosecutor and Holmes's counsel acted unprofessionally, however, we conclude that denigrating counsel is prosecutorial misconduct.

¶ 34 Although a prosecutor may comment on the evidence before the jury, a prosecutor's comments demeaning defense counsel's integrity are improper. Thorgerson, 172 Wash.2d at 451, 258 P.3d 43. Prosecutorial expressions, maligning defense counsel, “severely damage an accused's opportunity to present his case before the jury.” Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied,469 U.S. 920, 105 S.Ct. 302, 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984). Therefore, such expressions constitute “an impermissible strike at the very fundamental due process protections that the Fourteenth Amendment has made applicable to ensure an inherent fairness in our adversarial system of criminal justice.” Bruno, 721 F.2d at 1195. We view any abridgment of this principle's sanctity as “particularly unacceptable.” Bruno, 721 F.2d at 1195.

¶ 35 In Thorgerson, our Supreme Court held that the prosecutor “went beyond the bounds of acceptable behavior” and committed misconduct by calling defense arguments “bogus,” and “sleight of hand.” Thorgerson, 172 Wash.2d at 451–52, 258 P.3d 43. Here, the prosecutor and Holmes's counsel displayed mutual animosity and frequently argued over legal objections. For example, referring to Holmes's counsel, the prosecutor said, “[S]he doesn't care if the objection is sustained or not,” “We're going to have like a sixth grader [argument],” and “we're into silly.” 47 VRP at 4118, 51 VRP at 4357, 61 VRP at 5423. Another time, Holmes's counsel was in the middle of an objection and the prosecutor interrupted her saying, “Yeah, we all know that.” 87 VRP at 8092. Yet another time, the prosecutor responded to Holmes's counsel's objection by stating, “Maybe if counsel and her client could just be quiet for a few minutes they might be able to hear something.” 95 VRP at 8887. At one point, the prosecutor became visibly upset and Holmes's counsel said the prosecutor is having “a tantrum.” 52 VRP at 4554. The prosecutor replied, “And counsel walked right into this after freaking six weeks” and said directly to Holmes's counsel, “Tantrum, because you—.” 52 VRP at 4554.

¶ 36 Over and over again, courts have reminded prosecutors that they are something more than mere advocates or partisans and that they represent the people and act in the interest of justice. Fisher, 165 Wash.2d at 746, 202 P.3d 937. In a similar ¹⁴ New York case, the prosecutor referred to defense counsel with words such as “puke” and “stinks” and accused defense counsel of untruth, befuddlement, entrapment, and trickery. People v. Steinhardt, 9 N.Y.2d 267, 270, 213 N.Y.S.2d 434, 173 N.E.2d 871 (1961). We agree with the Steinhardt court that a decent respect for the defendants' rights, the trial courts, and for the law itself, requires that we declare this degree of quarreling and bandying of insults between counsel misconduct. Steinhardt, 213 N.Y.S.2d 434, 173 N.E.2d at 873–74.

14 We note that the Steinhardt court does not specify that the jury was present during the outbursts. But we assume from the context that insults between counsel occurred in the jury's presence. See Steinhardt, 213 N.Y.S.2d 434, 173 N.E.2d at 872.

D. Misstating Burden of Proof

¶ 37 Holmes and Lindsay also argue that the prosecutor misstated and trivialized the State's burden of proof. Among their arguments, Holmes and Lindsay argue that the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof by comparing it to everyday decision making and by telling the jury it needed to find “the truth.” Br. of Appellant (Holmes) at 47. We agree that, in some matters, the prosecutor misstated and trivialized its burden.

1. Everyday decisions

¶ 38 When a prosecutor compares the reasonable doubt standard to everyday decision making, it improperly minimizes and trivializes the gravity of the standard and the jury's role. Anderson, 153 Wash.App. at 431, 220 P.3d 1273;see also State v. Walker, 164 Wash.App. 724, 732, 265 P.3d 191 (2011); State v. Johnson, 158 Wash.App. 677, 684, 243 P.3d 936 (2010), review denied,171 Wash.2d 1013, 249 P.3d 1029 (2011). We note that we came to a different conclusion distinguishing Curtiss from Anderson by stating, “Here, the State's comments about identifying the puzzle with certainty before it is complete are not analogous to the weighing of competing interests inherent in a choice that individuals make in their everyday lives.” State v. Curtiss, 161 Wash.App. 673, 700–01, 250 P.3d 496,review denied,172 Wash.2d 1012, 259 P.3d 1109 (2011).

¶ 39 Here, the prosecutor used a puzzle analogy to describe the experience of a person who begins a puzzle not knowing what picture it will make but eventually knows beyond a reasonable doubt that the picture is of Seattle. The prosecutor described for the jury, “[Y]ou put in about 10 more pieces and see this picture ... you can be halfway done with that puzzle.... You could have 50 percent of those puzzle pieces missing and you know it's Seattle.” 95 VRP at 8727. Additionally, the prosecutor compared “beyond a reasonable doubt” to the confidence a person feels walking with the “walk sign” at a crosswalk at a busy street without being run over by a car. 95 VRP at 8728. The prosecutor told the jury that although it is possible that the car will not stop, “it's not reasonable. We don't live our life in fear.” 95 VRP at 8729. The prosecutor told the jury that reasonable doubt “is not an impossible standard” but “a standard you probably use ... pretty much every day.” 95 VRP at 8728. Because these explanations involve comparisons to “everyday decision making,” they are improper. Anderson, 153 Wash.App. at 431, 220 P.3d 1273. Further, these analogies quantified the number of puzzle pieces (and the percentage of missing pieces) with a degree of certainty purporting to be equivalent to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. See Anderson, 153 Wash.App. at 432, 220 P.3d 1273. We conclude that the prosecutor's analogies minimized and trivialized the gravity of the standard and the jury's role.

2. Declare the truth statement

¶ 40 Holmes and Lindsay also argue that the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof by telling the jury it needed to find “the truth.” Br. of Appellant (Holmes) at 47.

¶ 41 The jury's duty is to determine whether the State has met its burden, not to solve a case. Anderson, 153 Wash.App. at 429, 220 P.3d 1273. We have distinguished the prosecutor's statement to “return a verdict that you know speaks the truth” from the prosecutor's statements to “declare the truth” and “decide the truth of what happened.” Walker, 164 Wash.App. at 733, 265 P.3d 191 (holding that the latter two are improper) (quoting Curtiss, 161 Wash.App. at 701, 250 P.3d 496).

¶ 42 Here, the prosecutor asked the jury, “[T]o do what you swore to do: Render verdicts.” He argued that “verdict” is a Latin word meaning, “to speak the truth” and “voir dire” is French for “speak the truth.” 95 VRP at 8730. The prosecutor explained to the jury that they started trial with “voir dire,” and now the jury would end the trial with “verdictum” or verdict. 95 VRP at 8730. The prosecutor urged the jury, “[T]o do what you know is true: Speak the truth. Convict both of these defendants.” 95 VRP at 8730. Finally, the prosecutor argued, “Ask yourself who wants to find the truth.... Ask yourself what the truth is. Convict them.” 95 VRP at 8888. Although these statements reminded the jury to do “what you know is true,” they also instructed the jury to “find the truth” and to “[s]peak the truth,” thereby finishing the trial. As we held in Anderson, this was improper. Anderson, 153 Wash.App. at 429, 220 P.3d 1273.

3. To “own” her behavior statement

¶ 43 Holmes also argues that the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof by telling the jury that Holmes needed “to ‘own’ ” her behavior. Br. of Appellant (Holmes) at 48, 50 (quoting 95 VRP at 8715, 8883). Holmes relies on State v. Fleming, 83 Wash.App. 209, 213, 921 P.2d 1076 (1996), review denied,131 Wash.2d 1018, 936 P.2d 417 (1997). In Fleming, Division One of this court held that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to argue that in order to acquit a defendant, the jury had to find that the State's witnesses are either lying or mistaken. Fleming, 83 Wash.App. at 213, 921 P.2d 1076.

¶ 44 Here, the prosecutor did not suggest that to acquit Holmes, the jury must conclude that Wilkey was lying. Instead, the prosecutor told the jury:

You know what, if you had a romantic relationship with somebody while you're living with somebody, it may not be ideal. It's not criminal. But own something. When you come into a courtroom and swear under oath that you're going to tell the truth, own something.
95 VRP at 8714–15. Here, the prosecutor argued that because Holmes was not forthright in her testimony about the timing of her relationship with Lindsay, the jury should question her general credibility. Because the prosecutor based this argument on reasonable inferences from the evidence, it was not improper. State v. Lewis, 156 Wash.App. 230, 240, 233 P.3d 891 (2010).

E. Personal Opinion of Credibility or Guilt

¶ 45 Next, Holmes and Lindsay argue that the prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly expressing his personal opinion about the credibility of witnesses and the accused's guilt. The State responds that the prosecutor properly based his closing arguments about Holmes's credibility on evidence presented at trial. We reject Holmes and Lindsay's argument relating to Wilkey's credibility, but we conclude that the prosecutor improperly asserted his opinion about Holmes's credibility.¹⁵

15 Relying on the same facts, Holmes also argues that the prosecutor impermissibly argued “prior bad acts” that the court had not admitted into evidence. Br. of Appellant (Holmes) at 51. Although we conclude that the prosecutor improperly expressed his personal opinion, in part because he stated, “Don't get up here and sit here and lie,” the record shows that the prosecutor did not discuss prior bad acts, and we reject that argument. 95 VRP at 8882.

¶ 46 The State may not assert its personal opinion as to the defendant's guilt or a witness's credibility. State v. McKenzie, 157 Wash.2d 44, 53, 134 P.3d 221 (2006); State v. Reed, 102 Wash.2d 140, 145, 684 P.2d 699 (1984). But a prosecutor enjoys wide latitude in closing argument to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and may freely comment on witness credibility based on the evidence. Lewis, 156 Wash.App. at 240, 233 P.3d 891. “ ‘[T]here is a distinction between the individual opinion of the prosecuting attorney, as an independent fact, and an opinion based upon or deduced from the testimony in the case.’ ” McKenzie, 157 Wash.2d at 53, 134 P.3d 221 (quoting State v. Armstrong, 37 Wash. 51, 54–55, 79 P. 490 (1905)). To determine whether the prosecutor is expressing a personal opinion of the defendant's guilt, independent of the evidence, we view the challenged comments in context and look for “ clear and unmistakable ” expressions of personal opinion. McKenzie, 157 Wash.2d at 53–54, 134 P.3d 221.

¶ 47 For example, in Anderson, we held that the prosecutor did not express a personal opinion when, without objection, he characterized the defendant's testimony as “made up on the fly,” “ridiculous,” and “utterly and completely preposterous.” Anderson, 153 Wash.App. at 430, 220 P.3d 1273. In contrast, in State v. Reed, our Supreme Court held that the prosecutor clearly asserted his improper personal opinion when he called the defendant witness a liar at least four separate times, stated that Reed “did not have a case,” asserted that Reed was clearly a “murder two,” and implied that the jury should not believe defense counsel because they drove from out of town in fancy cars. Reed, 102 Wash.2d at 146, 684 P.2d 699.

1. Statements about Holmes's credibility

¶ 48 Here, during closing argument, the prosecutor reviewed Holmes's testimony, characterizing various parts of it as “funny,” “disgusting,” “comical,” and “the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard.” 95 VRP at 8708, 8717, 8722. Taken in isolation, these comments are similar to the comments in Anderson, 153 Wash.App. at 430, 220 P.3d 1273. But additionally, the prosecutor told the jury that Holmes should not “get up here and sit here and lie.” 95 VRP at 8882. Further, we note with dismay that the prosecutor told the jury that Holmes and Lindsay's portrayal of Wilkey as a bully “is a crock.... What you've been pitched for the last four hours is a crock.” 95 VRP at 8877. As in Reed, “These statements suggest not the dispassionate proceedings of an American jury trial,” and such language “cannot with propriety be used by a public prosecutor,” who is presumed to act impartially in the interests of justice. Reed, 102 Wash.2d at 146, 146–47, 684 P.2d 699.

¶ 49 We note that the prosecutor did not merely argue that Holmes's and Lindsay's versions of events seemed unreasonable, illogical, or unlikely. We do not suggest that a prosecutor does not have “wide latitude” in closing argument to draw reasonable inferences regarding the witness's credibility from the evidence. Lewis, 156 Wash.App. at 240, 233 P.3d 891. Rather, we conclude that a prosecutor need not use language such as, “What you've been pitched for the last four hours is a crock” to express an inference from the evidence. 95 VRP at 8877. We conclude that such language is a “ clear and unmistakable ” expression of impermissible personal opinion. McKenzie, 157 Wash.2d at 54, 134 P.3d 221. Finally, here the prosecutor laughed while Holmes testified on the stand that Wilkey was abusive. The State does not rebut or explain this circumstance; we conclude it was improper conduct.

2. Statement about Wilkey

¶ 50 During a colloquy with the trial court, the prosecutor said, “The witness is under cross-examination in a criminal case doing the best he can to answer the questions one after another for the better part now of the whole day.” 33 VRP at 2461. Examined in context, the prosecutor's statement did not refer to Wilkey's credibility or veracity; rather, the statement referred to Wilkey's cooperativeness responding to Holmes's counsel. Specifically, the prosecutor made the comment while arguing to the trial court that Wilkey had not waived attorney-client privilege, despite responding to Holmes's counsel's surprise question, “Have you told that to your lawyer?” 33 VRP at 2460. We conclude that the prosecutor did not make an improper statement about Wilkey's credibility.

F. Asking the Jury To Consider All the Evidence

¶ 51 Holmes also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by informing the jury that the nontestifying codefendant's confession could be used as evidence against Holmes. Br. of Appellant (Holmes) at 50. We conclude that the prosecutor did not make an improper statement.

¶ 52 Under the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, an accused has a right to confront witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the confrontation clause prohibits admission of the witness's “testimonial” statements when that witness does not take the stand at trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Such was not the case here.

¶ 53 During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury:

You compare what Mr. Wilkey said with all the evidence when you're looking at his credibility, and then you compare what Jennifer Holmes said to you for two months.
95 VRP at 8884. Holmes's counsel immediately objected, arguing that contrary to the jury instructions, the prosecutor had asked the jury to consider Lindsay's statement against Holmes. On appeal, Holmes supplies no authority, other than the general rule from Crawford, to argue that the prosecutor's statement was improper.

¶ 54 Here, the prosecutor's statement properly highlighted the jury's role to weigh Wilkey's testimony against all the evidence, including Holmes's testimony and Lindsay's police statement. Although the statement did not clarify that the jury must not consider Lindsay's testimony against Holmes, we conclude that it was not by itself improper. Further, to the extent that it may have confused the jury, the trial court properly instructed the jury not to consider Lindsay's incriminating statement against Holmes and further instructed the jury to decide the charges against each defendant separately.

G. Inaudible Speech

¶ 55 Holmes and Lindsay further argue that during closing argument, the prosecutor purposefully whispered so that only the jury could hear him, thereby denying their right to appeal by denying them a complete record for review.¹⁶ The State does not respond to this argument.¹⁷

16 The dissent notes that the prosecutor's whispers in front of the jury amounts to private communication with the jury. Dissent at 663. Because private communication with the jury was not argued to the trial court or briefed on appeal, we decline to address it.

17 Holmes and Lindsay each make this argument regarding the prosecutor's inaudible voice in their SAGs; we consider it here.

¶ 56 A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to a “record of sufficient completeness” to permit effective appellate review of his or her claims. State v. Thomas, 70 Wash.App. 296, 298, 852 P.2d 1130 (1993) (quoting Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446, 82 S.Ct. 917, 921, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962)).

¶ 57 Here, while the prosecutor stood right next to the jury, his voice suddenly became inaudible. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor merely needed to repeat himself, which he did. Because of the peculiar circumstances, we are not satisfied with the trial court's reasoning that the prosecutor merely needed to repeat himself; we note that a prosecutor must never whisper to the jury off the record. Nonetheless, we conclude that the record is sufficiently complete overall to allow review of Holmes and Lindsay's claims of prosecutorial misconduct.

H. Prejudice

¶ 58 Holmes and Lindsay argue that the prosecutor's misconduct prejudiced their trial; they also argue that the cumulative effect of the misconduct requires reversal. Although we strongly disapprove of the unprofessional behavior as well as the misconduct, we conclude that there was no substantial likelihood that the improper comments affected the jury. Regarding Lindsay, this conclusion is more easily reached because Lindsay admitted to using zip ties to restrain Wilkey so that Wilkey would not interfere as Lindsay and Holmes removed the property from Wilkey's home. Because the jury had Lindsay's admissions as evidence before it, there is only a remote chance, not a substantial likelihood, that the jury's verdict was affected by the prosecutor's misconduct.

¶ 59 Once the defendant establishes improper prosecutorial conduct, we determine prejudice under one of two standards depending on whether the defendant objected at trial. Emery, 174 Wash.2d at 760, 278 P.3d 653. Here, Holmes and Lindsay objected to much (but not all) of the misconduct at trial. For example, Holmes did not specifically object when the prosecutor said, “Don't get up here and sit here and lie.” 95 VRP at 8882. Neither did Holmes or Lindsay object when the prosecutor asked the jury to find the truth nor when the prosecutor said the defense argument was a “crock.” ¹⁸ “Where the defendant failed to object, the defendant waives errors unless he or she establishes that the misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction would not have cured the prejudice and the misconduct resulted in prejudice that ‘had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury verdict.’ ” Glasmann, 175 Wash.2d at 704, 286 P.3d 673; Emery, 174 Wash.2d at 761, 278 P.3d 653 (quoting Thorgerson, 172 Wash.2d at 455, 258 P.3d 43). Because we concluded that the prosecutor committed misconduct by impugning defense counsel, by misstating and trivializing the burden of proof, and by expressing personal opinion about Holmes's testimony, we look at the effect of each on the jury's verdict.

18 Neither Holmes nor Lindsay objected to the prosecutor's comparison of the reasonable doubt standard to everyday decision making. But Holmes did criticize the comparison and clarify the actual burden in her closing argument.

¶ 60 Regarding misconduct from misstating the burden of proof and misconduct from expressing personal opinion, we examine the misconduct's affect on the jury in the context of the jury instructions. Anderson, 153 Wash.App. at 429, 220 P.3d 1273. Here, the trial court's instructions to the jury clearly set forth both the jury's actual duties and the State's proper burden of proof. Additionally, we note that all of these improper statements occurred during closing argument. Because the trial court directed the jury to disregard any argument not supported by the law and the trial court's instructions, the prosecutor's closing arguments do not carry the “ ‘imprimatur of both the government and the judiciary.’ ” Emery, 174 Wash.2d at 759, 278 P.3d 653 (quoting Suppl. Br. of Pet'r Olson). As in Anderson, we conclude that Holmes and Lindsay do not demonstrate a substantial likelihood that the prosecutor's improper statements affected the verdict. Anderson, 153 Wash.App. at 429, 220 P.3d 1273.

¶ 61 Regarding the prosecutor's remarks denigrating Holmes's counsel, we note that the majority of remarks and the blatant remarks occurred outside the jury's presence. The State does not deny the number and character of these remarks, but it argues that Holmes's counsel goaded the prosecutor into many of the improper statements and that, in almost every instance, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the incidents. Although we are dismayed by the repeated rude remarks, we note that a prosecutor's improper remarks are not grounds for reversal “ ‘if they were invited or provoked by defense counsel and are in reply to his or her acts and statements, unless the remarks are not a pertinent reply or are so prejudicial that a curative instruction would be ineffective.’ ” State v. Weber, 159 Wash.2d 252, 276–77, 149 P.3d 646 (2006) (quoting State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994), cert. denied,514 U.S. 1129, 115 S.Ct. 2004, 131 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1995)), cert. denied,551 U.S. 1137, 127 S.Ct. 2986, 168 L.Ed.2d 714 (2007).

¶ 62 Additionally, the trial court stated that it was not clear what effect the prosecutor's emotional outbursts had on the jury. Contrary to Holmes's counsel's argument that the jury would think poorly of her, the trial court opined that the outburst might instead prompt the jury to think poorly of the prosecutor. Nonetheless, out of caution, the trial court issued a curative jury instruction:

[Y]ou must disregard any conduct by an attorney that you consider unprofessional. You are instructed that you must not hold the conduct of any attorney against their party in this case.
53 VRP at 4605–06. We presume the jury was able to follow the court's instruction. Warren, 165 Wash.2d at 28, 195 P.3d 940. Therefore, considering only those denigrating remarks made in the jury's presence, we conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury and that the prosecutor's improper comments did not prejudice the jury.

¶ 63 Under the cumulative error doctrine, we may reverse a defendant's conviction when the combined effect of errors during trial effectively denied the defendant her right to a fair trial, even if each error standing alone would be harmless. Weber, 159 Wash.2d at 279, 149 P.3d 646. But cumulative error does not apply where the errors are few and have little or no effect on the outcome of the trial. Weber, 159 Wash.2d at 279, 149 P.3d 646. Although there are multiple improper statements in this case, as we discussed above, the misconduct occurred primarily outside the jury's presence and the trial court issued curative instructions for the misconduct in the jury's presence; therefore, the misconduct had little or no effect on the jury. Holmes and Lindsay do not persuade us that the combined effect of that misconduct denied them a fair trial; thus, their cumulative error claim regarding prosecutorial misconduct fails. Weber, 159 Wash.2d at 279, 149 P.3d 646.

¶ 64 The dissent cites to Glasmann, to support its conclusion that the prosecutor's misconduct here was reversible error. But Glasmann is easily distinguished. There, the Supreme Court stated that, “When viewed as a whole, the prosecutor's repeated assertions of the defendant's guilt, improperly modified exhibits, and statement that jurors could acquit Glasmann only if they believed him represent the type of pronounced and persistent misconduct that cumulatively causes prejudice demanding that a defendant be granted a new trial.” Glasmann, 175 Wash.2d at 710, 286 P.3d 673. The facts here simply do not rise to the level of prejudicial misconduct that requires reversal. The prosecutor here did not introduce altered exhibits to the jury; nor did he repeatedly assert his personal belief that the defendants here were guilty. Whether prosecutorial misconduct is so prejudicial that a new trial must be granted is necessarily fact specific, and the facts here do not support the grant of a new trial.

II. Double Jeopardy

¶ 65 Next, Lindsay ¹⁹ argues that the trial court violated his right to be free from double jeopardy by entering convictions against him for (1) first degree robbery and second degree kidnapping, (2) first degree robbery and second degree assault, and (3) second degree kidnapping and second degree assault. The State responds that Lindsay's convictions for first degree robbery, second degree kidnapping, and second degree assault do not violate double jeopardy protections because each crime is different in law and fact.

19 At the end of this section, we consider Holmes's double jeopardy claims separately.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 66 We review de novo double jeopardy claims. State v. Hughes, 166 Wash.2d 675, 681, 212 P.3d 558 (2009). Article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution protect persons from a second prosecution for the same offense and from multiple punishments for the same offense imposed in the same proceeding. State v. Turner, 169 Wash.2d 448, 454, 238 P.3d 461 (2010). Nevertheless, the legislature may constitutionally authorize multiple punishments for a single course of conduct. State v. Calle, 125 Wash.2d 769, 776, 888 P.2d 155 (1995). Where the legislature has provided a statutory scheme distinguishing different degrees of a crime, we may determine that the legislature intended a single punishment for a higher degree of a single crime rather than multiple punishments for several, separate, lesser crimes. State v. Vladovic, 99 Wash.2d 413, 420, 662 P.2d 853 (1983). Another tool for determining legislative intent is based on the merger doctrine. State v. Freeman, 153 Wash.2d 765, 777, 108 P.3d 753 (2005).

¶ 67 If the evidence proving one crime is also necessary to prove a second crime or a higher degree of the same crime, we consider whether the facts show that the additional crime was committed incidental to the original crime. State v. Johnson, 92 Wash.2d 671, 680, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979)( Johnson I). If one crime was incidental to the commission of the other, the merger doctrine precludes additional convictions; but if the offenses have independent purposes or effects, the court may impose separate punishment. Freeman, 153 Wash.2d at 778, 108 P.3d 753;Vladovic, 99 Wash.2d at 421, 662 P.2d 853. To establish an independent purpose or effect of a particular crime, that crime must injure the person or property of the victim or others in a separate and distinct manner from the crime for which it also serves as an element. Freeman, 153 Wash.2d at 779, 108 P.3d 753,Johnson I, 92 Wash.2d at 680, 600 P.2d 1249.

¶ 68 Here, the statutes at issue do not expressly permit multiple punishments for the same act and, Lindsay concedes, “[T]he offenses do not have the same elements.” Reply Br. of Lindsay at 6. Because evidence proving one conviction was also necessary to prove a second conviction or a higher degree of the same conviction, we consider whether some of Lindsay's convictions should have merged. Johnson I, 92 Wash.2d at 681, 600 P.2d 1249.

B. First Degree Robbery and Second Degree Kidnapping

¶ 69 Lindsay argues that the trial court's imposition of first degree robbery and second degree kidnapping convictions violated double jeopardy protections because the kidnapping was merely incidental to the robbery. The statutes at issue are RCW 9A.40.030 ²⁰ (second degree kidnapping), and RCW 9A.56.200 ²¹ and former RCW 9A.56.190 (1975) ²² (first degree robbery). The State responds that it presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lindsay's second degree kidnapping conviction was distinct from his first degree robbery conviction.

20 .RCW 9A.40.030 provides:
(1) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree if he or she intentionally abducts another person under circumstances not amounting to kidnapping in the first degree.


(2) In any prosecution for kidnapping in the second degree, it is a defense if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) the abduction does not include the use of or intent to use or threat to use deadly force, and (b) the actor is a relative of the person abducted, and (c) the actor's sole intent is to assume custody of that person. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, any other crime.

21 .RCW 9A.56.200:


(1) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree if:
(a) In the commission of a robbery or of immediate flight therefrom, he or she:
(i) Is armed with a deadly weapon; or

(ii) Displays what appears to be a firearm or other deadly weapon.

22 Former RCW 9A.56.190 provides:
A person commits robbery when he unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his presence against his will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his property or the person or property of anyone. Such force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; in either of which cases the degree of force is immaterial. Such taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that, although the taking was fully completed without the knowledge of the person from whom taken, such knowledge was prevented by. the use of force or fear.

¶ 70 Here, Lindsay burst through Wilkey's front door with a pipe in his raised hand. Lindsay struck and choked Wilkey with the pipe until Wilkey lost consciousness. Wilkey awoke in the living room area, hog-tied with zip ties, a telephone cord, and a dog leash. While the zip ties, cord, and leash restrained Wilkey, Holmes and Lindsay moved substantial amounts of property from Wilkey's home into their truck. The State argues that the robbery was complete before Lindsay tied up Wilkey, thus, Lindsay's restraint of Wilkey using zip ties was a separate act. Specifically, the State argues that for the purpose of robbery, Lindsay subdued Wilkey by striking him and choking him unconscious; thus, it was only after he was subdued that Lindsay restrained him with zip ties, a telephone cord, and a dog leash. First, State v. Manchester directly conflicts with the State's argument that the robbery was complete before Lindsay tied up and restrained Wilkey; thus, we reject that argument. 57 Wash.App. 765, 770, 790 P.2d 217 (1990) (holding that force or fear used to retain property and effectuate escape constitutes robbery).

¶ 71 Second, we reject the State's argument that Holmes and Lindsay hog-tied Wilkey so that they could humiliate and demean him. The State argues that after Lindsay and Holmes forcibly restrained Wilkey with zip ties, they poured Wilkey's medication down the toilet, hit him, wrapped a robe around his head, and poured alcohol on him. The State's argument is that the restraint had an independent purpose or injury. Although Lindsay and Holmes certainly did demean, humiliate, and assault Wilkey while they restrained him, this does not convince us that the restraint had an independent purpose to humiliate Wilkey. These additional assaults may have caused independent injuries for which the State could have charged those acts separately; but the restraint itself did not cause an independent injury. We reject the State's argument that the purpose of the restraint was to allow Lindsay and Holmes to demean, humiliate, and assault Wilkey.

¶ 72 Furthermore, in State v. Korum, we held as a matter of law that kidnapping was incidental to robbery when (1) the restraint was for the sole purpose of facilitating robbery; (2) the restraint was inherent in the robbery; (3) the victims were not transported from their home; (4) the duration of restraint was not substantially longer than necessary to complete the robbery; and (5) the restraint did not create an independent, significant danger. 120 Wash.App. 686, 707, 86 P.3d 166 (2004), rev'd in part on other grounds and aff'd in part, 157 Wash.2d 614, 620, 141 P.3d 13 (2006). Reversing the kidnapping convictions, we reasoned, “That all robberies necessarily involve some degree of forcible restraint, however, does not mean that the legislature intended prosecutors to charge every robber with kidnapping.” Korum, 120 Wash.App. at 705, 86 P.3d 166. As our Supreme Court held in State v. Green, restraint and movement of a victim that are merely incidental and integral to commission of another crime, such as rape or murder, do not constitute the independent, separate crime of kidnapping. 94 Wash.2d 216, 226–27, 616 P.2d 628 (1980).

¶ 73 Here, Lindsay and Holmes restrained Wilkey (1) for the purpose of facilitating robbery; (2) the restraint was necessary to allow Lindsay and Holmes to take a substantial amount of property from Wilkey's home and move it into the waiting truck; (3) Lindsay and Holmes did not transport Wilkey from his home; (4) the duration of Wilkey's restraint lasted no longer than necessary for Lindsay and Holmes to complete the robbery and leave; and (5) the restraint did not create significant danger. Korum, 120 Wash.App. at 707, 86 P.3d 166. We conclude that Wilkey's restraint (charged as kidnapping) was incidental to the crime of first degree robbery and these convictions merge. Freeman, 153 Wash.2d at 778, 108 P.3d 753.

C. First Degree Robbery and Second Degree Assault

¶ 74 Lindsay also argues that the trial court should have merged his conviction for second degree assault with his conviction for first degree robbery because the assault was the sole evidence of the force used to elevate his robbery conviction to first degree robbery.²³ The State responds that Lindsay committed more assaults than the one that elevated his robbery conviction to first degree robbery. We hold that Lindsay's first degree robbery and second degree assault convictions merge.

23 Neither Lindsay nor Holmes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support these convictions.

¶ 75 The statutes at issue are RCW 9A.56.200 ²⁴ and former RCW 9A.56.190 ²⁵ (first degree robbery), and former RCW 9A.36.021 (2003) ²⁶ (second degree assault). Considering first degree robbery and second degree assault, our Supreme Court concluded, “Generally, ... these crimes will merge unless they have an independent purpose or effect.” Freeman, 153 Wash.2d at 780, 108 P.3d 753. An exception to the merger doctrine arises when the “ included ” crime has an independent purpose or effect from the other crime. Freeman, 153 Wash.2d at 778, 108 P.3d 753. One example of an independent effect is when the crime “clearly created separate and distinct injuries.” Vladovic, 99 Wash.2d at 421, 662 P.2d 853. The Freeman court noted:

24 .RCW 9A.56.200 provides, in part:


(1) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree if:
(a) In the commission of a robbery or of immediate flight therefrom, he or she:
(i) Is armed with a deadly weapon; or
(ii) Displays what appears to be a firearm or other deadly weapon.

25 Former RCW 9A.56.190 provided:
A person commits robbery when he unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his presence against his will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his property or the person or property of anyone. Such force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; in either of which cases the degree of force is immaterial. Such taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that, although the taking was fully completed without the knowledge of the person from whom taken, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or fear.

26 Former RCW 9A.36.021 provided:
(1) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he or she, under circumstances not amounting to assault in the first degree:


(a) Intentionally assaults another and thereby recklessly inflicts substantial bodily harm; or
(b) Intentionally and unlawfully causes substantial bodily harm to an unborn quick child by intentionally and unlawfully inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child; or
(c) Assaults another with a deadly weapon; or
(d) With intent to inflict bodily harm, administers to or causes to be taken by another, poison or any other destructive or noxious substance; or
(e) With intent to commit a felony, assaults another; or
(f) Knowingly inflicts bodily harm which by design causes such pain or agony as to be the equivalent of that produced by torture.

This exception is less focused on abstract legislative intent and more focused on the facts of the individual case. For example, when the defendant struck a victim after completing a robbery, there was a separate injury and intent justifying a separate assault conviction, especially since the assault did not forward the robbery. However, this exception does not apply merely because the defendant used more violence than necessary to accomplish the crime. The test is not whether the defendant used the least amount of force to accomplish the crime. The test is whether the unnecessary force had a purpose or effect independent of the crime.
Freeman, 153 Wash.2d at 779, 108 P.3d 753 (internal citation omitted).

¶ 76 We agree with the State that the record supports several assaults against Wilkey, but this argument misses the question entirely. The precise issue here is whether the second degree assault, committed by Lindsay with the intent to commit a felony, had a purpose separate and distinct from his contemporaneous robbery of Wilkey.

¶ 77 The jury found Lindsay guilty of first degree robbery, but it also found that Lindsay did not commit first degree robbery while armed with a firearm. After finding Lindsay guilty of the lesser-included charge of second degree assault (and not first degree assault), the jury found by special verdict that Lindsay committed second degree assault with the intent to commit a felony. The jury specifically rejected that Lindsay committed second degree assault while either armed with a deadly weapon (i.e., the pipe) or by recklessly inflicting substantial bodily injury.

¶ 78 We do not know, however, to which felony the jury referred when it found Lindsay guilty of assault with the intent to commit a felony. An ambiguity in the jury's verdict under the rule of lenity must be resolved in the defendants' favor.²⁷ State v. Kier, 164 Wash.2d 798, 814, 194 P.3d 212 (2008). Applying the rule of lenity, we conclude that the second degree assault was committed with the intent to commit the felony of robbery. Based on the jury's special verdict finding that Lindsay committed second degree assault with the intent to commit a felony (unidentified), we conclude that under these facts the second degree assault was incidental to the robbery, that there was no distinct and separate purpose other than to commit this felony, and that there was no separate or distinct injury. We therefore conclude that Lindsay's convictions for first degree robbery and second degree assault merge.

27 To avoid this result, the jury instructions could have specified for the jury which felony the State must prove; alternately, the special verdict form could have instructed the jury to specify which felony Lindsay intended to commit by committing the assault.

D. Second Degree Kidnapping and Second Degree Assault

¶ 79 Lindsay further argues that the trial court should have merged his second degree assault conviction with his second degree kidnapping conviction because the prosecutor argued at closing that Lindsay restrained Wilkey with zip ties and also argued that Lindsay assaulted Wilkey by the use of zip ties. The State responds that after Lindsay restrained Wilkey with zip ties, he beat him and that this beating was unnecessary for the abduction. Because we find that the second degree assault merges with the first degree robbery,²⁸ it is unnecessary to address whether the second degree assault merges with the second degree kidnapping and we decline to do so.

28 The jury found that the second degree assault was committed with intent to commit “a felony.” Clerk's Papers (Lindsay) (CPL) at 394. Because the jury did not specify which felony, it is reasonable to conclude that the second degree assault was committed with the intent to commit the kidnapping. But because we conclude the kidnapping merges with the robbery, in any event, the result remains that both the assault and the kidnapping merge with the robbery.

¶ 80 In conclusion, we hold that the second degree kidnapping was incidental to the first degree robbery and therefore, the kidnapping and robbery convictions merge; additionally, the second degree assault was committed with the intent to commit the robbery and therefore, the assault and robbery convictions merge. Accordingly, we remand for resentencing of Lindsay.

E. Holmes's Double Jeopardy Arguments

¶ 81 Briefly, we turn to Holmes's double jeopardy argument. Solely by adopting Lindsay's argument, Holmes argues that the trial court violated her constitutional protections against double jeopardy by convicting her for robbery, kidnapping, and assault. She asks us to strike her convictions for unlawful imprisonment and assault and to remand for resentencing. But Lindsay's double jeopardy argument involved his second degree kidnapping conviction, and Holmes was not convicted of second degree kidnapping. Because Holmes did not brief double jeopardy as it pertains to her unlawful imprisonment conviction, we decline to review that argument. RAP 10.3(6).

¶ 82 Regarding Holmes's request to strike her assault conviction, however, we consider the merits of that request in order to secure a fair and orderly review, despite her cursory double jeopardy argument. RAP 7.3. Based on the jury's special verdict finding that Holmes committed second degree assault with the intent to commit a felony (unidentified), we conclude that, under these facts, her second degree assault was incidental to the robbery, that there was no distinct and separate purpose other than to commit this felony, and that there was no separate or distinct injury. We therefore hold that Holmes's convictions for first degree robbery and second degree assault merge.

¶ 83 In conclusion, although we do not condone the prosecutor's misconduct, we hold that the misconduct did not substantially affect the jury's verdict. We further hold that Lindsay's second degree assault and second degree kidnapping convictions merge with his first degree robbery conviction and that Holmes's second degree assault conviction merges with her first degree robbery conviction; thus, we remand for resentencing.²⁹

29 In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we address and reject Holmes's and Lindsay's remaining arguments and conclude there was no reversible error.

¶ 84 A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

******UNPUBLISHED TEXT FOLLOWS******

ADDITIONAL FACTS

I. Proffered Evidence

¶ 85 During the trial, Holmes moved the trial court in limine to admit evidence under Evidence Rule 404(b) that Wilkey was a cocaine addict. The trial court reserved its ruling, noting that the parties must ask for a hearing outside the presence of the jury for every piece of evidence of a prior crime or wrong act. The trial court further noted that drug-use evidence was relevant only when the drug use occurred during a relevant time period. Later in the trial, Holmes asked the trial court whether she could elicit evidence of Wilkey's drug use. The trial court determined that the relevant time periods included:

[W]hen [Wilkey] and Ms. Holmes broke up and there was a division of the property and him leaving Idaho and during the time frame concerning the allegations of the home invasion robbery and also during his times on the witness stand.
34 VRP at 2503.

II. Lindsay's Notebook

¶ 86 During the course of the trial, jail staff conducted a routine search of an entire jail tier. As part of the search, jail staff disposed of old newspapers, extra clothing, food, and extra hand soap. A correctional officer threw out newspapers found in Lindsay's jail cell. The correctional officer indicated that he did not see any legal documents, notepads, or notebooks with the newspapers.

¶ 87 Lindsay told his counsel that a notebook was missing from his cell, which notebook included some of his trial notes. The correctional officer had no information regarding the missing material. Lindsay's counsel moved the court for a mistrial because the missing notes could have been in the newspapers and the notes included information about trial preparation for witnesses Lindsay had yet to call or who he expected the State to call. Lindsay's counsel told the trial court that the lost materials harmed his ability to represent Lindsay effectively. The trial court denied the mistrial motion.

III. Taking the Jury Verdict; Mistrial Motion

¶ 88 On Friday evening shortly before 8 pm, the jury notified the trial court that it had reached a verdict. Holmes, Lindsay, both of their counsel, and family members were present in the courtroom. Access to the courthouse was through only the first floor doors; courthouse hours were 8:30 am to 4:30 pm. Judicial Assistant Matson checked the first floor entrance twice in a five-minute period to see if anyone wanted courthouse access; a deputy prosecutor also checked the first floor entrance for persons wanting courthouse access. Having heard that the jury would deliver its verdict, about a dozen people entered the courtroom. All of these people appeared to be associated with the prosecutor's office (i.e., employees and employees' spouses or friends). Holmes stated she believed there were persons who came earlier in the evening who wanted to hear the verdict but who could not gain access to the after-hours courthouse.

¶ 89 The trial court recessed and instructed the deputy prosecutor to recheck the first floor entrance and “call out” for anyone who wanted access to the courthouse, to check the inoperable second floor entrance for potential persons gathered there, and then to return a third time to check the first floor entrance. VRP (Mar. 6, 2009) at 30. After checking all entrances and checking with the security officer, the deputy prosecutor reported that the cleaning crew had just gained courthouse access but that no one else was there. Two other deputy prosecutors held the courthouse doors open throughout the trial court's taking of the jury's verdict. One deputy prosecutor reported that only cleaning staff and a Law Enforcement Support Agency employee came through the doors. The record does not show that anyone else sought entry.

¶ 90 The trial court considered sealing the jury verdict and requesting the jury to return on Monday. Holmes and Lindsay recommended that alternative and objected to the trial court's taking the jury verdict after the posted courthouse closing hours. The trial court inquired whether all of the jurors could return to give their verdict Monday. After two jurors stated that they could not return on Monday, the trial court accepted the jury's verdict on Friday evening.

¶ 91 In conjunction with the sentencing hearing a few weeks later, Holmes and Lindsay moved for a new trial on several bases, including the trial court's receiving the jury verdict after hours, the prosecutor's improper closing argument, the prosecutor's improper comments about Holmes's counsel, the trial court's refusal to admit evidence of Wilkey's prior cocaine use, and cumulative error. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial.

IV. Restitution Hearing

¶ 92 At the restitution hearing, the State offered Wilkey's declaration describing each item of damaged or stolen property and its value. Wilkey also testified at the restitution hearing; after direct examination, the State struck several items from Wilkey's list. Holmes cross-examined Wilkey. The trial court asked the State to submit a written amended restitution request including only those items the State thought appropriate. The trial court also requested that Holmes and Lindsay provide written responses to Wilkey's restitution request. Both Holmes and Lindsay filed detailed written objections, generally refuting Wilkey's ownership claims.

¶ 93 After reviewing the materials and RCW 9.94A.750,³⁰ the trial court responded to each page of the amended proposed restitution request. The trial court struck several items from Wilkey's list. The trial court issued an order setting restitution in the sum of $39,133.25. Regarding the specific amounts ordered, the trial court stated:

30 RCW 9.94A.750(3) provides:
[R]estitution ordered by a court pursuant to a criminal conviction shall be based on easily ascertainable damages for injury to or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for treatment for injury to persons, and lost wages resulting from injury. Restitution shall not include reimbursement for damages for mental anguish, pain and suffering, or other intangible losses, but may include the costs of counseling reasonably related to the offense. The amount of restitution shall not exceed double the amount of the offender's gain or the victim's loss from the commission of the offense.

I felt these amounts were easily ascertainable and fit within the case law requirements and were based on actual losses that were easily ascertainable.
VRP (Nov. 13, 2009) at 6.

¶ 94 Holmes and Lindsay objected to the restitution order. Lindsay noted that he based his objections on the same arguments contained in his court memorandum. Holmes argued that “the Court is basically awarding restitution for items that we think are made up of whole cloth.” VRP (Nov. 13, 2009) at 7.

ANALYSIS

V. Trial Court Declined To Admit Evidence

¶ 95 Holmes argues that the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence alleging Wilkey's prior drug addiction because Wilkey's prior drug addiction compromised his memory.³¹ We conclude that the trial court properly refused to admit evidence of alleged drug addiction occurring years before the night of the crime.

31 Holmes and Lindsay each make this argument and a similar argument in their Statements on Additional Grounds (SAG). Regarding the similar argument, Holmes and Lindsay argue that the trial court should have admitted evidence about Wilkey's abusive behavior to attack his credibility. But ER 404(b) explicitly prohibits admission of evidence to prove a defendant has a criminal propensity, and neither Holmes nor Lindsay argue that it should have been admitted to show other purposes “such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” ER 404(b).

A. Standard of Review

¶ 96 Evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible if a party offers it to establish a person's character or to show he acted in conformity with that character. State v. Lillard, 122 Wash.App. 422, 431, 93 P.3d 969 (2004), review denied,154 Wash.2d 1002, 113 P.3d 482 (2005); ER 404(b). We review the trial court's refusal to admit evidence of prior crimes or wrongs for abuse of discretion. Lillard, 122 Wash.App. at 431, 93 P.3d 969.

B. No Abuse of Discretion

¶ 97 Evidence of drug addiction is generally inadmissible because it is impermissibly prejudicial. State v. Tigano, 63 Wash.App. 336, 344–45, 818 P.2d 1369 (1991), review denied,118 Wash.2d 1021, 827 P.2d 1392 (1992). “ ‘It is well settled in Washington that evidence of drug use is admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness if there is a showing that the witness was using or was influenced by the drugs at the time of the occurrence which is the subject of the testimony.’ ” State v. Thomas, 150 Wash.2d 821, 863, 83 P.3d 970 (2004) (quoting State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 83, 882 P.2d 747 (1994).) Evidence of drug use is also admissible to impeach, where there is a reasonable inference that the witness was under the influence of drugs at the time of testifying at trial. Tigano, 63 Wash.App. at 344, 818 P.2d 1369.

¶ 98 Consistent with Washington case law, the trial court stated it would allow evidence of drug use occurring during these relevant time periods:

[W]hen [Wilkey] and Ms. Holmes broke up and there was a division of the property and him leaving Idaho and during the time frame concerning the allegations of the home invasion robbery and also during his times on the witness stand.
34 VRP at 2503. Here, Holmes's sought to elicit testimony regarding Wilkey's alleged prior drug addiction generally, not Wilkey's specific use on relevant occasions. Additionally, Holmes's evidence did not involve relevant time periods, such as in 2005 when the couple separated, in 2006 when the crimes occurred, or the time period of Wilkey's trial testimony. Instead, Holmes's proffered evidence dated to the beginning of Holmes and Wilkey's relationship, which began in 1998. Washington law does not support the use of general addiction evidence occurring many years before the events in question at trial or testimony at trial. Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 83, 882 P.2d 747. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Holmes's evidence alleging Wilkey's prior drug addiction.

VI. Jail Guard's Notebook Seizure and Right to Counsel

¶ 99 Lindsay next argues that the jail guard's seizure of his legal materials violated his constitutionally protected right to counsel. We agree with the State that the seizure of Lindsay's note pad by jail staff did not violate his right to counsel.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 100 This court reviews a trial court's denial of a mistrial ³² motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Greiff, 141 Wash.2d 910, 921, 10 P.3d 390 (2000). A trial court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on unreasonable or untenable grounds. State v. Rafay, 167 Wash.2d 644, 655, 222 P.3d 86 (2009). The reviewing court upholds a trial court's decision to deny a mistrial motion unless the irregularities, when viewed in the context of all the evidence, so tainted the entire proceeding that the defendant was denied a fair trial. State v. Post, 118 Wash.2d 596, 620, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992).

32 Lindsay moved the trial court to declare a mistrial. On appeal, Lindsay relies on case law that considers a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss. State v. Cory, 62 Wash.2d 371, 373–74, 382 P.2d 1019 (1963); State v. Garza, 99 Wash.App. 291, 293, 994 P.2d 868,review denied, 141 Wash.2d 1014, 10 P.3d 1072 (2000). We assume, however, that unlike the case law on which he relies, Lindsay is not asking this court to dismiss his charges.

B. No Governmental Intrusion

¶ 101 Both the federal and our state constitutions protect a criminal defendant's right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. V, VI; Wash. Const. art. I § 22. The constitutional right to assistance of counsel includes the right to confer with defense counsel in private. State v. Cory, 62 Wash.2d 371, 374, 382 P.2d 1019 (1963). The State cannot justify spying upon or intruding into the relationship between criminal defendants and their counsel. Cory, 62 Wash.2d at 374–75, 382 P.2d 1019.

¶ 102 Lindsay relies on Cory, where jail staff surreptitiously eavesdropped and recorded consultations between Cory and his counsel. Cory, 62 Wash.2d at 372, 382 P.2d 1019. After Cory brought the recordings to the trial court's attention, the trial court refused to dismiss the charge's and merely excluded evidence derived from the confidential conversations. Cory, 62 Wash.2d at 372, 382 P.2d 1019. Disagreeing with that remedy, our Supreme Court said:

[T]he shocking and unpardonable conduct of the sheriffs officers, in eavesdropping upon the private consultations between the defendant and his attorney, and thus depriving him of his right to effective counsel, vitiates the whole proceeding. The judgment and sentence must be dismissed.
Cory, 62 Wash.2d at 378, 382 P.2d 1019. Additionally, Lindsay relies on State v. Garza, 99 Wash.App. 291, 296–97, 994 P.2d 868,review denied, 141 Wash.2d 1014, 10 P.3d 1072 (2000). In Garza, jail officials discovered evidence of a possible escape attempt. In response, jail officials searched and examined the inmates' personal property, including legal documents containing private communications with their attorneys. Garza, 99 Wash.App. at 293, 994 P.2d 868. Division Three of this court held that officials' actions were purposeful and remanded for a hearing to determine whether the actions were justified, noting:

If on remand, the superior court finds the jail's security concerns did not justify the specific level of intrusion here, there should be a presumption of prejudice, establishing a constitutional violation.
Garza, 99 Wash.App. at 301, 994 P.2d 868.

¶ 103 Lindsay's reliance on this case law ignores the factual differences. In Cory and Garza, the government purposefully intruded into defendants' interactions with their counsel; in contrast, it is conjecture that Lindsay's notebook was among the newspapers of which jail staff disposed. Here, although the jail official purposefully cleared jail cells of “nuisance contraband,” nothing in the record supports a finding that jail officials engaged in any other purposeful conduct. 60 VRP at 5190. Because no facts in the record support Lindsay's argument regarding governmental intrusion or denial of a fair trial, we uphold the trial court's denial of Lindsay's mistrial motion. Post, 118 Wash.2d at 620, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599.

VII. Right to a Public Trial

¶ 104 Lindsay and Holmes also argue that the trial court violated their right to a public trial and the public's right to an open courtroom by accepting their jury verdicts after the courthouse's posted business hours without first conducting a courtroom-closure analysis under State v. Bone–Club, 128 Wash.2d 254, 906 P.2d 325 (1995). We agree with the State that because the trial court neither held a hearing outside of the courtroom nor denied courtroom access to anyone in the building, the courtroom was not closed.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 105 We review de novo whether the trial court violated a defendant's right to a public trial. State v. Strode, 167 Wash.2d 222, 225, 217 P.3d 310 (2009). There is a strong presumption that courts are to be open at all trial stages. State v. Momah, 167 Wash.2d 140, 148, 217 P.3d 321 (2009), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 160, 178 L.Ed.2d 40 (2010). Article I, section 22 of our state constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provide a criminal defendant with the right to a “public trial by an impartial jury.” Additionally, article I, section 10 of our constitution provides that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly,” granting the public an interest in open, accessible proceedings. State v. Lormor, 172 Wash.2d 85, 91, 257 P.3d 624 (2011) (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d 30, 36, 640 P.2d 716 (1982).)

B. No Closure

¶ 106 A courtroom closure occurs during trial when the trial court “completely and purposefully” closes the courtroom to spectators so that no one may enter or leave. Lormor, 172 Wash.2d at 93, 257 P.3d 624. The Bone–Club analysis ³³ comes into play when the trial court fully excludes the public from proceedings within a courtroom. Lormor, 172 Wash.2d at 92, 257 P.3d 624. Examples of fully excluding the public from the courtroom include the trial court's (1) not allowing spectators in the courtroom during a suppression hearing ( Bone–Club, 128 Wash.2d at 257, 906 P.2d 325); (2) conducting the entire voir dire closed to all spectators ( In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wash.2d 795, 807–08, 100 P.3d 291 (2004)); (3) excluding all spectators, including codefendant and his counsel, from the courtroom while codefendant plea-bargained ( State v. Easterling, 157 Wash.2d 167, 172, 137 P.3d 825 (2006)). Additionally, our Supreme Court has found the public trial right implicated when the trial court privately questioned individual jurors in chambers. Momah, 167 Wash.2d at 146, 217 P.3d 321.

33 To determine if closure is appropriate, the trial court is required to consider the following factors (or Bone–Club analysis) and enter specific findings on the record to justify any ensuing closure: (1) The proponent of closure must show a compelling interest and, if based on anything other than defendant's right to a fair trial, must show serious and imminent threat to that right; (2) anyone present when the motion is made must be given an opportunity to object; (3) the least restrictive means must be used; (4) the court must weigh the competing interests; and (5) the order must be no broader in application or duration than necessary. Bone–Club, 128 Wash.2d at 258–59, 906 P.2d 325.

¶ 107 Holmes argues that “[b]ecause the courthouse was closed, the courtrooms inside were de facto closed.” Br. of Appellant (Holmes) at 35–36. But there is no evidence that the trial court here “completely and purposefully” closed the courtroom to spectators so that no one may enter or leave. Lormor, 172 Wash.2d at 93, 257 P.3d 624. In fact, the trial court went to great lengths to ensure no one was excluded from the proceeding.

¶ 108 Here, the trial court received the jury verdict in an after-hours courthouse but an open courtroom. Instead of prohibiting or excluding the public from the courtroom, the trial court directed its assistant to make multiple door checks so that the public could enter. Additionally, after learning that Holmes had people who wanted to hear the verdict, the trial court ordered a recess, instructed officers of the court to recheck the doors and “call out” for anyone who wanted access to the courthouse. VRP (Mar. 6, 2009) at 30. Finally, court officers physically held the courthouse doors open throughout the trial court's taking of the jury's verdict. VRP (Mar. 6, 2009) at 79–80. Because nothing in the record supports that a court closure occurred, we conclude that no Bone–Club analysis was necessary. Lormor, 172 Wash.2d at 92, 257 P.3d 624.

¶ 109 Next, we consider whether, as a matter of courtroom operations, the trial court acted within its discretion to accept the jury's verdict after the posted courtroom hours. The trial court possesses broad discretion and inherent and statutory authority to direct courtroom operations. Lormor, 172 Wash.2d at 93–94, 257 P.3d 624;RCW 2.28.010. A trial court should exercise caution in conducting court proceedings and supply adequate explanation that the appellate courts can review. See Lormor, 172 Wash.2d at 94–95, 257 P.3d 624 (discussing the trial court's authority to remove a spectator). Here, the trial court accepted the jury's verdict after posted hours on Friday evening because two jurors stated that they could not return on Monday. The trial court heard from all parties before receiving the verdict at this hour and took every step to protect the parties' and the public's rights to open proceedings. We conclude that the trial court has discretion to conduct courtroom operations effectively and that here, it acted within that discretion.

VIII. Due Process at Restitution Hearing

¶ 110 Holmes argues that the trial court violated her due process rights at the restitution hearing by its reliance on Wilkey's list of items, which were “unsupported by affidavit and also were contrary to the evidence at trial.” ^{34 , 35} Br. of Appellant (Holmes) at 59. We conclude that the trial court did not violate her due process rights because she had the opportunity to rebut the evidence presented.

34 Lindsay raises this same issue in his SAG; we consider it here. In her SAG, Holmes also raises an issue regarding Wilkey's testimony and the restitution hearing, again, we consider it here.

35 Holmes's restitution hearing argument contains assertions but no citations to the record. Although, we may decline to consider the merits of insufficient argument, we elect to consider her arguments briefly. RAP 10.3(6).

A. Standard of Review

¶ 111 The trial court has discretion to determine the size of a restitution award and we will not disturb that determination absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Pollard, 66 Wash.App. 779, 785, 834 P.2d 51,review denied,120 Wash.2d 1015, 844 P.2d 436 (1992). We will find abuse of that discretion only where its exercise is “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” Pollard, 66 Wash.App. at 785, 834 P.2d 51 (quoting State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)). If substantial evidence supports the amount of restitution ordered, there is no abuse of discretion. Pollard, 66 Wash.App. at 785, 834 P.2d 51.

B. No Abuse of Discretion

¶ 112 The trial court must base its restitution determination “on easily ascertainable damages for injury to or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for treatment for injury to persons, and lost wages resulting from injury.” RCW 9.94A.753(3). Easily ascertainable damages are those tangible damages that the State proves by sufficient evidence. State v. Tobin, 132 Wash.App. 161, 173, 130 P.3d 426 (2006), aff'd, 161 Wash.2d 517, 166 P.3d 1167 (2007). “ ‘Evidence of damage is sufficient if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.’ ” Pollard, 66 Wash.App. at 785, 834 P.2d 51 (quoting State v. Mark, 36 Wash.App. 428, 434, 675 P.2d 1250 (1984)).

¶ 113 Although the rules of evidence do not apply at a restitution hearing, due process requires that the evidence be reliable and that the defendant have an opportunity to refute the evidence presented. Pollard, 66 Wash.App. at 784–85, 834 P.2d 51. The owner is always qualified to provide information about the amount of loss. McCurdy v. Union Pac. RR., 68 Wash.2d 457, 468–69, 413 P.2d 617 (1966). The party seeking restitution need not prove the certainty of damages with specific accuracy. Pollard, 66 Wash.App. at 785, 834 P.2d 51. When evidence is comprised of hearsay, due process requires corroborative evidence sufficient to give the defendant a basis for rebuttal. State v. Kisor, 68 Wash.App. 610, 620, 844 P.2d 1038,review denied,121 Wash.2d 1023, 854 P.2d 1084 (1993).

¶ 114 Here, Holmes cross-examined Wilkey at the restitution hearing and also filed a memorandum response to the State's restitution request. Before announcing its decision, the trial court stated that it reviewed and “took into account all the information” relating to restitution, including Holmes's memorandum. VRP (Nov. 13, 2009) at 3. Holmes's restitution memorandum referred to the “considerable testimony” and physical evidence she presented at trial. CPH at 867. Thus, the record does not support her claim that the trial court denied her an opportunity or basis for rebuttal regarding restitution. Nothing about the trial court's restitution decision, which considered the request page by page in careful detail, shows the trial court abused its discretion to determine the restitution sum of $39,133.25. Because the trial court acted within its discretion, we reject Holmes's argument that due process requires a new restitution hearing. State v. Mead, 67 Wash.App. 486, 490, 836 P.2d 257 (1992).

IX. Cumulative Error

¶ 115 Without specifying any specific errors, or explaining her argument, Holmes argues she is entitled to relief under the doctrine of cumulative error. We may reverse based on the cumulative effects of the trial court's errors, even if considered separately, it would conclude that each error was harmless. Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 93, 882 P.2d 747. Here, neither Holmes nor Lindsay show the trial court erred. Thus, there is no cumulative effect requiring our consideration. We conclude that Holmes fails to establish prejudicial error or fails to establish that her trial was so flawed with prejudicial error to warrant relief.

VI. Statement of Additional Grounds (SAG)

A. Effective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 116 In their SAGs, Holmes and Lindsay argue that their attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel because they received no payment for the last part of trial. Holmes also argues ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney made fun of the victim at closing.

¶ 117 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendants must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. State v. McFarland, 127 Wash.2d 322, 334–35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). If the defendants fail to satisfy either part of the test, the court need not inquire further. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash.2d 61, 78, 917 P.2d 563 (1996). The defendants are prejudiced if it is reasonably probable that, if not for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome would have differed. In re Pers. Restraint of Pirtle, 136 Wash.2d 467, 487, 965 P.2d 593 (1998). A defendant cannot base a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on conduct that can be fairly characterized as legitimate trial strategy or tactics. McFarland, 127 Wash.2d at 336, 899 P.2d 1251.

¶ 118 The record does not support Holmes's and Lindsay's arguments that their counsel performed deficiently because the attorneys reached the maximum payment for class A felonies. Instead, the record demonstrates that counsel for both Holmes and Lindsay zealously advocated for their clients. Additionally, Lindsay attaches a letter to his SAG from his trial counsel, which states, “I did not find out until after the trial was over that I was not going to be paid the other amount [the amount he had billed for his time].” Because this letter indicates that counsel did not know he would receive limited payment, it does not support the argument that counsel's performance diminished in response to limited payment. Finally, Holmes's attorney's attack of Wilkey's credibility during closing is a legitimate trial strategy or tactic. Thus, we conclude that Holmes's and Lindsay's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

B. Speedy Trial

¶ 119 Lindsay also argues that the trial court violated his constitutional speedy trial rights because he never requested or signed a request for delay. Holmes similarly argues that because of trial interruptions, her trial spanned almost two years. CrR 3.3(b)(1)(i) requires trial to begin within 60 days of arraignment if the defendant is in custody. The record shows, however, that the trial court validly ordered the continuances for appropriate reasons at the request of various parties. A motion for a continuance “by or on behalf of any party waives that party's objection to the requested delay.” CrR 3.3(f)(2). The trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion by granting defense counsel's request for more time to prepare for trial, even “ ‘over defendant's objection, to ensure effective representation and a fair trial.’ ” State v. Saunders, 153 Wash.App. 209, 220 P.3d 1238 (2009) (quoting State v. Campbell, 103 Wash.2d 1, 15, 691 P.2d 929 (1984)). Thus, we conclude that Holmes's and Lindsay's claims of violation of speedy trial rights fail.

C. Admission of Wilkey's Clothes as Evidence

¶ 120 Holmes also argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence items of Wilkey's clothing because investigators had not taken those clothing items as inventory after the crime. We review a trial court's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Stubsjoen, 48 Wash.App. 139, 147, 738 P.2d 306,review denied,108 Wash.2d 1033, 1987 WL 503425 (1987). A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises it on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State v. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d 668, 701, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997), cert. denied,523 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 1193, 140 L.Ed.2d 323 (1998). The record indicates that after Wilkey mentioned this clothing in his testimony, he brought it to court with him. The trial court appears to have admitted the evidence because Wilkey had already mentioned it in his earlier testimony and Holmes or Lindsay could later cross-examine him about that testimony. Holmes does not argue that any party actually used or relied on this evidence, or that it later became significant or prejudicial. Therefore, Holmes presents no reason to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and we conclude that it did not.

D. Amended Information

¶ 121 In his SAG, Lindsay argues that the State abused its authority by twice amending the charges against him, adding theft of a firearm charges in the amended charges, despite being in the position to include firearm charges from the beginning. Under CrR 2.1(d), “[t]he court may permit any information to be amended at any time before verdict or finding if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.” The defendant bears the burden of showing prejudice. State v. Guttierrez, 92 Wash.App. 343, 346, 961 P.2d 974 (1998). Here, the State amended information adding alternative means of committing the crimes and adding four counts of theft of a firearm. Lindsay does not explain how the State's delay in adding the firearm charges unfairly prejudiced him or why his convictions might be different had the State included those charges in the original charging information. Thus, we conclude that Lindsay's claim fails.

E. Motion to Dismiss

¶ 122 In his SAG, Lindsay argues that the trial court erred in denying his pro se motion to dismiss. Shortly before trial commenced, Lindsay brought a motion to dismiss with prejudice based on abuse of discovery. “A decision denying a motion to dismiss under [CrR 8.3(c) ] is not subject to appeal under RAP 2.2.” CrR 8.3(c)(3). Rather, the defendant may only challenge the sufficiency of the evidence produced at trial. State v. Richards, 109 Wash.App. 648, 653, 36 P.3d 1119 (2001). Lindsay does not argue that the State produced insufficient evidence at trial; he merely restates the reasons for his motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we conclude that his challenge of the trial court's denial of his dismissal motion fails.

F. Facts Outside The Record

¶ 123 Both Holmes and Lindsay make several arguments in their respective SAGs that involve facts outside of the record. Holmes and Lindsay argue that the prosecutor released Holmes's truck and horse trailer without notifying the defense or inventorying and photographing the contents. Holmes and Lindsay also state that evidence photographed at the scene was not the same as evidence produced at trial. Holmes states that “photos taken of the scene changed from one photo to the next even though the photos were of the same ‘evidence/scene.’ ” SAG (Holmes) Add'l Ground 20 (capitalization omitted). She also states that “photos taken showing evidence [were] not [the] exact same as produced from Pierce County evidence holding facilities at trial.” SAG (Holmes) Add'l Ground 21 (capitalization omitted). Holmes states that Wilkey stole a vehicle licensed and registered to her but the State never charged him with possession of stolen property.

¶ 124 Additionally, Lindsay states that Pierce County deputies retrieved evidence from a location different from the one in which the Idaho police stored it. Finally, Lindsay also argues that “the door security stated that [Wilkey's nephew and father] ... were both in the courtroom using a tape recorder” but no party moved to obtain the tape recorder. SAG (Lindsay) Add'l Ground 12. Because these issues rely on information, records, and photographs outside the record, we cannot review these claims; a personal restraint petition is the appropriate means to raise such issues. McFarland, 127 Wash.2d at 338, 899 P.2d 1251.

G. Issues Decided by the Jury

¶ 125 Holmes and Lindsay raise several claims regarding evidence considered by their jury. The reviewing court defers to the fact finder's credibility determinations, resolution of conflicting testimony, and persuasiveness of the evidence. Thomas, 150 Wash.2d at 874–75, 83 P.3d 970.

¶ 126 Holmes states that a failure on Wilkey's part to care for his own diabetes could explain Wilkey's “injuries.” SAG (Holmes) Add'l Ground 9 (capitalization omitted). Holmes and Lindsay also state that Wilkey wanted only money or retribution so he was not an innocent victim. Next, Holmes states that police and crime scene investigators found that Wilkey's house looked like sloppy housecleaning not burglary. Holmes and Lindsay both state that police did not secure Wilkey's house for over 12 hours and that Wilkey's good friend was there when police arrived. Holmes states that Wilkey's claim of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder could have been stage fright. She also states that other evidence could refute the prosecutor's inference during closing that Wilkey's abrasions were consistent with rug burns. Holmes also states that the prosecutor's arguments included many inferences outside the scope of the testimony.

¶ 127 But Wilkey's credibility was an issue decided by the jury and we will not disturb its findings on appeal. Similarly, Holmes and Lindsay presented their theories and evidence to the jury and the jury weighed their testimony. Again, we will not disturb the jury's findings regarding credibility determinations, resolution of conflicting testimony, and persuasiveness of the evidence.

H. Issues Too Vague To Address

¶ 128 In her SAG, Holmes states, “Only the bathroom and living[ ]room/kitchen areas and the hallway and parts of two of the three bedrooms on one end of the house were photographed leaving the rest of the house undocumented.” SAG (Holmes) Add'l Ground 11 (capitalization omitted). She implies, but does not explain, why photographs of the third bedroom may have been important. Additionally, Holmes states that a Del's Farm and Feed official stated they do not have a store in Hawaii but the trial court admitted as evidence a receipt for metal tube gates from Del's Farm and Feed. Although Holmes does not have to cite to the record in her SAG, she must inform us of the “nature and occurrence of alleged errors.” RAP 10.10(c). We are unable to address Holmes's vague arguments.

¶ 129 We affirm Holmes's and Lindsay's convictions and remand for resentencing.

******END OF UNPUBLISHED TEXT******

I concur: HUNT, J.

ARMSTRONG, J. (dissenting).

¶ 130 I agree with the majority that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct throughout the trial, culminating in further personal attacks on defense counsel during closing argument; an argument in which the prosecutor also misstated the State's burden of proof, characterized the defense argument as a “crock,” and spoke so softly to the jurors that neither the defense attorneys, the court reporter, nor the trial court could hear what he said. I disagree with the majority that we should conclude that this pervasive and serious misconduct was harmless.

A. Misconduct Outside the Jury's Presence

¶ 131 The majority assumes that misconduct or unprofessional behavior occurring outside the jury's presence could not affect the jury's verdict. But the misconduct in the jury's presence does not show the extent to which the attorneys' unrelenting misconduct and disrespect for the trial court permeated the trial. Accordingly, I set forth some samples of misconduct committed outside the jury's presence to demonstrate how it infected the whole trial, engendering “ ‘a feeling of prejudice,’ ” and undermining the sense of fairness. State v. Emery, 174 Wash.2d 741, 762, 278 P.3d 653 (2012) (quoting Slattery v. City of Seattle, 169 Wash. 144, 148, 13 P.2d 464 (1932)).

1. Acrimony and Examining Witnesses

¶ 132 Both Jennifer Holmes's counsel and the prosecutor complained that the other party inappropriately interrupted when they questioned a witness, including questioning occurring in the jury's presence. On one occasion, the prosecutor asked Holmes's counsel not to yell as she questioned a witness; she responded that she “can yell and it's a lot louder” and resumed her questioning. 19 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 1223. On another occasion, when Holmes's counsel questioned a witness, the prosecutor said that Holmes's counsel should ask her questions without badgering or assaulting the witness. Holmes's counsel responded that she did not like “being screamed at and berated” by the prosecutor; she added that the prosecutor was “pissed off.” 20 RP at 1338. The prosecutor described Holmes's counsel's witness examination saying:

This is silly. You want to ask stupid questions for four flippin' weeks, you're going to get a reaction from me, I'll grant you that. I mean, this is the most ridiculous, pathetic, long-ranging cross-examination of a witness in history.
51 RP at 4307.

2. Acrimony and Disrespecting the Trial Court

¶ 133 The open hostility between the prosecutor and Holmes's counsel displayed disrespect for the trial court and for the law itself. For example, not only did the prosecutor and Holmes's counsel interrupt each other, they interrupted the trial court, at one point causing the trial court to ask, “Can I finish for once?” 42 RP at 3569. Other examples of disrespect to the trial court include the prosecutor telling the trial court that Holmes's counsel's request to interrupt the trial was “a joke” and “ridiculous” and that Holmes's counsel wanted a “Burger King trial ... [h]ave it my way.” 34 RP at 2557. At another point, the prosecutor told the trial court, “I didn't object [earlier] because I was laughing so hard it was so stupid.” 53 RP at 4572–73. Later, the prosecutor told Holmes's counsel that she was repeating herself, she replied by telling him to “kindly shut up.” 51 RP at 4309. The prosecutor then asked the trial court to instruct Holmes's counsel not to repeat herself; Holmes's counsel replied, “Maybe [the prosecutor] could borrow Your Honor's gown and tell us all how to run this trial.” 51 RP at 4309.

¶ 134 In another instance, Holmes's counsel told the trial court that the prosecutor's comments were “obnoxious.” 44 RP at 3831. In response, the prosecutor said, “This is the same garbage that I was talking about days ago when I lost my temper in this courtroom, because it's what she does.” 44 RP at 3833.

¶ 135 After another altercation between the prosecutor and Holmes's counsel, the prosecutor told the trial court:

If I get one more comment out of counsel that I'm being rude in front of the jury, I'm going to friggin pop a gasket. It's the most—and I know she's smiling, she's laughing, and she's snotty, but it is the most unprofessional, unreasonable thing to do in a courtroom, and she knows it.
87 RP at 8100–01. Holmes's counsel told the trial court that she believed the prosecutor was rude. The prosecutor responded, “I'm telling the Court right now, I'm going to ...” 87 RP at 8101. The trial court asked the prosecutor, “Going to bring your checkbook with you, too?” ³⁷ 87 RP at 8101. The prosecutor told the trial court, “No, I'm going to ask the Court why a checkbook hasn't already been produced because that was exactly what the Court was talking about.” 87 RP at 8101. These samples of misconduct, committed outside the jury's presence, demonstrate more than the prosecutor's and Holmes's counsel's treatment of each other, they show an unthinkable disrespect for the trial court and the whole trial process.

37 After considerable unprofessional conduct, the trial court warned the parties if the behavior resumed, it would impose a $1,000 sanction, paid from the offending attorney's personal funds and payable to a charitable legal assistance foundation. Yet the trial court never imposed sanctions.

B. Misconduct During Closing Argument

¶ 136 Finally, the prosecutor capped his performance by whispering to the jury three times during his closing. After the court reporter stated she could not hear the prosecutor, the prosecutor commented only that the problem was defense counsel's for talking to her client. In a post-trial motion for a new trial, the defendants raised the issue and both defense counsels filed supporting declarations. The declarations reported that after the trial court advised the prosecutor to keep his voice up, the prosecutor moved behind counsel's table and shouted his next lines to the jury, which prompted the jurors to laugh. The prosecutor did not contradict this with an affidavit. Instead, he merely argued to the trial court that “it happens” during trials. 97 RP at 8985.

¶ 137 “In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed ... prejudicial.” Remmer v. U.S., 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). Once private communication with the jury is established, the party making the communication can overcome the presumed prejudice by showing that the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kell, 101 Wash.App. 619, 621, 5 P.3d 47 (2000); State v. Murphy, 44 Wash.App. 290, 296, 721 P.2d 30,review denied,107 Wash.2d 1002 (1986). Thus, the State had the burden to overcome the prejudice. Kell, 101 Wash.App. at 621, 5 P.3d 47. Yet, the State did not offer an innocent explanation to the trial court and, on appeal, the State does not address the issue. Accordingly, our record still contains no information as to what the prosecutor whispered. And, we should presume prejudice. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450. The majority concludes that the “record is sufficiently complete overall to allow review of Holmes and Lindsay's claims of prosecutorial misconduct.” Majority at 655. But without knowing what the prosecutor said to the jury, I am unable to agree.

C. Prejudice

¶ 138 The majority finds that the prosecutor committed misconduct by denigrating defense counsel. It also finds that the prosecutor minimized and trivialized the State's burden of proof by using the puzzle analogy, comparing the reasonable doubt standard to everyday decisions, telling the jury it had to find the truth, and commenting on Holmes's testimony. Majority at 656. We have previously reversed convictions where the same prosecutor's office employed the same arguments. See State v. Walker, 164 Wash.App. 724, 726, 265 P.3d 191 (2011).

¶ 139 Nonetheless, the majority reasons that regarding Lindsay, his admission to using zip ties to restrain Wilkey leaves only a “remote chance” the jury's verdict was affected by the prosecutor's misconduct. Majority at 656–57. Finally, despite acknowledging that there were “multiple improper comments,” the majority rejects the cumulative error doctrine relying on the reasoning that “cumulative error does not apply where the errors are few and have little or no effect on the outcome of the trial.” Majority at 656–57. I cannot agree.

¶ 140 Our Supreme Court recently stated that “deciding whether reversal is required is not a matter of whether there is sufficient evidence to justify upholding the verdicts.” Rather, the question is whether there is a substantial likelihood that the instances of misconduct affect the jury's verdict. In re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wash.2d 696, 711, 286 P.3d 673 (2012). Thus, the “focus must be on the misconduct and its impact, not on the evidence that [was] properly admitted.” Glasmann, 175 Wash.2d at 711, 286 P.3d 673. Here, focusing on misconduct as in Glasmann, the impact of “powerful but unquantifiable material on the jury is exceedingly difficult to assess but substantially likely to have affected the entirety of the jury's deliberations and its verdicts.” Glasmann, 175 Wash.2d at 711, 286 P.3d 673.

¶ 141 In addition, the majority concludes the prosecutor's misconduct was harmless because the court instructed the jury to “disregard any argument not supported by the law” and to “disregard any conduct by an attorney that you consider unprofessional.” Majority at 656–57. Generally, we presume the jury will follow the court's instructions, but we analyze possible prejudice from misconduct in the context of the whole argument, the issues in the case, the evidence, and the instructions. State v. Warren, 165 Wash.2d 17, 28, 195 P.3d 940 (2008).

¶ 142 The cumulative effect of repetitive prosecutorial misconduct may be so flagrant that no instruction or series of instructions can erase their combined prejudicial effect.³⁸ State v. Case, 49 Wash.2d 66, 73, 298 P.2d 500 (1956). Under the cumulative error doctrine, we may reverse a defendant's conviction when the combined trial errors effectively denied the defendant her right to a fair trial, even if each error standing alone would be harmless. State v. Weber, 159 Wash.2d 252, 279, 149 P.3d 646 (2006); State v. Hodges, 118 Wash.App. 668, 673–74, 77 P.3d 375 (2003). In Walker, 164 Wash.App. at 739, 265 P.3d 191, we held that the prosecutor's improper comments regarding (1) the fill-in-the blank argument, (2) comparing the reasonable doubt standard to everyday decision making, (3) telling the jury that its job was to declare the truth, and (4) misstating the law of defense of others had a cumulative effect warranting reversal.

38 For the most part, the trial court did not intervene to stop the behavior.

¶ 143 Like Walker, this case “ ‘turned largely on witness credibility.’ ” Walker, 164 Wash.App. at 738, 265 P.3d 191 (quoting State v. Venegas, 155 Wash.App. 507, 526, 228 P.3d 813,review denied,170 Wash.2d 1003, 245 P.3d 226 (2010)). Holmes testified that Wilkey did not protest her entering his home and he did not object to her taking her property. She also testified that she had contacted the Idaho police to pursue recovering her property. Lindsay's statement to the police followed the same theme. He told police that he entered the victim's home to help Holmes retrieve her own property. The majority mischaracterizes Lindsay's zip-tie statement as an “admission.” Majority at 655–56. But because Lindsay denied taking any property that did not belong to Holmes, his statement is not an admission of a crime. Although Lindsay acknowledged he “wrestled around” and “held” Wilkey, he explained that he did so because he believed that Wilkey was “going for the pistol” to stop Holmes and Lindsay from retrieving Holmes's property. Clerk's Papers (Holmes) at 88–89. The majority does not explain what crime, or element of a crime, Lindsay admitted with his zip-tie statement.

¶ 144 The State charged Holmes and Lindsay with burglary and robbery, alleging that the predicate crime for the robbery was theft of the victim's property. During closing argument, the State argued that the predicate crime for the burglary “could be theft.” 95 RP at 8688. Instruction 40 told the jury that a good faith claim of property title is a defense to theft. Thus, if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to whether Lindsay and Holmes intended to commit theft during the incident, it should have acquitted them. Additionally, even if we consider Lindsay's statement to be a confession, the jury could not consider it against Holmes. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).

¶ 145 Here, as in Glasmann, the jury needed to determine the intent of the defendant, thereby determining whether lesser included crimes were the appropriate conviction. Glasmann, WL 4944549, at *2. The Glasmann court found an “especially serious danger” that the misconduct affected the jury's verdict because “nuanced distinctions often separate the degrees of a crime.” Glasmann, 175 Wash.2d at 710, 286 P.3d 673. Here, as in Glasmann, the defendants conceded much of the conduct but denied the intent elements of the more serious crimes. Based on the prosecutorial misconduct here, I cannot say that “the jury would not have returned verdicts for lesser offenses.” Glasmann, 175 Wash.2d at 712, 286 P.3d 673.

¶ 146 Prosecutors are more than mere advocates or partisans; they represent the people and act in the interest of justice. State v. Fisher, 165 Wash.2d 727, 746, 202 P.3d 937 (2009). Although a prosecutor may act with a “fearless, impartial discharge of public duty,” it must be “accompanied by a spirit of fairness toward the accused.” Warren, 165 Wash.2d at 27, 195 P.3d 940. That spirit of fairness is missing here. I agree with the majority that this case is similar to Steinhardt, where the trial took on a circus atmosphere and the court gave mild reproofs from which the jury may have believed that the trial court considered the prosecution's tactics to be necessary and proper. People v. Steinhardt, 9 N.Y.2d 267, 271, 213 N.Y.S.2d 434, 173 N.E.2d 871 (1961). I am satisfied that the prosecutor's personal attacks on defense counsel, labeling counsel's closing argument a “crock,” and his characterization of Holmes and her testimony (“funny,” “disgusting,” and “comical”) engendered prejudice which infected the whole trial. Emery, 174 Wash.2d at 762, 278 P.3d 653. I am also unwilling to gloss over the prosecutor's improper discussion of the burden of proof and reasonable doubt in closing, and his whispered comments to the jury. I would reverse and remand for new trials for both Holmes and Lindsay.