Opinion
KENCD-CR-2022-01244
08-03-2023
STATE OF MAINE, v. CHARLES W. LIMPERT, Defendant
Attorney: Dominic Parent Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion LLC State's Attorney: Maeghan Maloney
Attorney: Dominic Parent Libby O'Brien Kingsley & Champion LLC
State's Attorney: Maeghan Maloney
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Before the Court are the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion for Sanctions. The Court conducted a hearing on the motions on May 31, 2023. The Defendant was represented by Dominic A. Parent, Esq., and the State was represented by Assistant District Attorney Jacob C. Demosthenes, Esq. The Court received testimony from Officer Kirk Barkman of the Monmouth Police Department. The Defendant submitted a supporting Bench Memorandum at the hearing, to which the State submitted a written response on June 13, 2023. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the motions.
FACTS
Shortly after Midnight on July 2, 2022, Officer Barkman was dispatched to a possible domestic dispute at the Jelly stone Campground in North Monmouth. He was met there by Sergeant Joshua Hammond of the Winthrop Police Department. They walked to the Defendant's campsite, passing his camper, then followed a path for a short distance to a nearby lake. They came upon the Defendant and used their flashlights to illuminate him. He appeared to be making his way to a boat. He gave his name when they asked for it, and he was visibly intoxicated. The officers knew the State Police also had been alerted to the call and were sending a trooper. Officer Barkman asked the Defendant "why don't you come on over and sit down at the picnic table?" He sat down and said "I really don't need this; I'm in the middle of a divorce." Officer Barkman proceeded to ask the Defendant some questions including "who were you with tonight?" and "what started the whole conflict here?" The Defendant responded he had been with the alleged victim and "the next thing I know she went and called you guys." Fie said he was drinking that evening, that he believed die alleged victim got upset first, and that they did not have physical contact. Officer Barkman told the Defendant his explanation "did not add up." The Defendant insisted there was no physical altercation with the alleged victim, that he simply had tried to talk to her, and then he walked away.
The Court received into evidence the body-cam videos of Officer Barkman (State's Exhibit 1) and Sergeant Hammond (State's Exhibit 2).
Officer Barkman's initial conversation with the Defendant lasted about 15 minutes, at which point Trooper Keith Barton arrived. The Defendant remained seated at the picnic table while Trooper Barton asked him questions similar to those posed by Officer Barkman. During all these interactions, which lasted about 40 minutes in total, the Defendant did most of the talking, and at times he joked with the officers. He became emotional at one point for a short time but remained seated and calm. The officers were calm, non-confrontational, and not deceptive with the Defendant. They did not tell him he was under arrest prior to questioning him, nor did they tell him they had probable cause to arrest him. At no point during the conversation did the officers place the Defendant in handcuffs or restrain him in any way, nor did they advise him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
While Officer Barkman had been talking with the Defendant, Sergeant Hammond interviewed the alleged victim. She told him the Defendant grabbed her breast and threw her down. She showed Sergeant Hammond a rip in the shirt she was wearing, which she said was caused by the Defendant when he grabbed her. The officers did not take the shirt from her. She also said the Defendant had tried to take her cell phone to prevent her from calling the police. At the conclusion of the officers' conversations with the alleged victim and the Defendant, they arrested him. He was charged with Domestic Violence Assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A), and Obstructing Report of Crime or Injury (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 758(1)(A).
The rip is visible at 2 minutes, 35 seconds into Sergeant Hammond's body-cam video. See State's Exhibit 2.
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Suppress
The Defendant contends any statements he made to the officers should be suppressed because they resulted from a custodial interrogation without a Miranda warning. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. He also argues his statements were obtained involuntarily. Motion to Suppress, at 4. The State concedes the Defendant was subject to interrogation, but it argues he was not in custody at the time of the questioning by the officers, and it contends his statements were voluntary. See State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 3, 724 A.2d 1222, 1226 (a Miranda warning is necessary only if a defendant is "in custody" and subject to interrogation).
A statement made to a law enforcement officer is not admissible as evidence if the defendant is in custody and subject to interrogation without receiving a warning of the defendant's rights against self-incrimination. State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶¶ 52-53, 1 A.3d 455, 464; see also Miranda at 478-79. Whether or not a Miranda violation has occurred, once a defendant waives his Miranda rights, subsequent statements are admissible only if given knowingly and voluntarily. See State v. Smith, 675 A.2d 93, 97 (Me. 1996) (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985)).
A. Custodial Interrogation
The Law Court has held that "a person not subject to formal arrest may be 'in custody' if 'a reasonable person standing in the shoes of [the defendant would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave' or if there was a 'restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 23, 928 A.2d 746, 750 (quoting State v. Holloway, 2000 ME 172, ¶ 14, 760 A.2d 223, 228). In State v. Michaud, the Law Court outlined ten factors that, viewed in totality, determine whether a defendant was in custody at the time of questioning:
1. The locale where the defendant made the statements;
2. The party who initiated the contact;
3. The existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent communicated to the defendant);
4. Subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
5. Subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the extent the officer's response would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
6. The focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive it);
7. Whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings;
8. The number of law enforcement officers present;
9. The degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect;
10. The duration and character of the interrogation.State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d at 1226. Applying the Michaud factors in this case, the Defendant was not in custody for purposes of triggering a Miranda warning. Officer Barkman did not order the Defendant to remain in place; he merely asked him "why don't you come on over and sit down?" The Defendant was not handcuffed or physically restrained. He was questioned in the familiar surroundings of his campsite. The officers did not tell him he was under arrest or that they had probable cause to arrest him. Their style of questioning was calm and non-confrontational. They made no effort to deceive or trick him. Although there were three officers on scene and the interaction with the Defendant lasted for about 40 minutes, those factors alone, viewed in the totality of the circumstances, would not have been enough to cause a reasonable person to think he was in custody. The Defendant's Miranda rights were not violated.
On cross examination, Officer Barkman agreed if the Defendant had tried to leave, he would have stopped him, for at least two reasons: (1) the Defendant was visibly intoxicated, and it would not have been safe for him to get in his boat and leave, and (2) Officer Barkman wanted the Defendant to be present when the State Trooper arrived. However, Officer Barkman never communicated these thoughts to the Defendant and never had to act on them because the Defendant stayed voluntarily.
B. Voluntariness
The Defendant also argues his statements should be suppressed because they were involuntary. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant's statements were voluntary, which the Court must weigh by viewing the totality of the circumstances. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶¶ 32-33, 928 A.2d at 752. A voluntary statement "is the result of defendant's exercise of his own free will and rational intellect, as opposed to one that results from threats, promises, or inducements made to the defendant." State v. Poblete, 2010 ME 37, ¶ 24, 993 A.2d 1104, 1109-10. Factors the Court should consider in evaluating the voluntariness of statements include:
the details of the interrogation; duration of the interrogation; location of the interrogation; whether the interrogation was custodial; the recitation of Miranda warnings; the number of officers involved; the persistence of the officers; police trickery; threats, promises or inducements made to the defendant; and the defendant's age, physical and mental health, emotional stability, and conduct.State v. Hunt, 2016 ME 172, ¶ 22, 151 A.3d 911, 918. The Law Court has clarified that the "degree to which police conduct appears to have motivated the defendant's decision to confess is one of the factors to be considered in determining the legal question of whether that conduct constituted an improper inducement." Id. at ¶ 35.
Viewing the totality of the circumstances in this case, the Court finds the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant's statement to the officers were voluntary. As discussed above, their questioning was non-custodial, was conducted in a calm, non-confrontational manner, and did not employ improper tactics. The officers did not threaten, coerce, or make promises to the Defendant, and there was nothing about his behavior to suggest his statements were anything but the product of his own free will and rational intellect.
II. Motion for Sanctions
The Defendant argues the State should be barred from presenting video evidence and police testimony relating to the ripped shirt the alleged victim wore the night of July 2, 2022, which she claimed was torn by the Defendant when he grabbed her breast. Citing State v. Cote, 2015 ME 78, 118 A.3d 805, the Defendant argues these sanctions are appropriate because the officers failed to take the shirt and preserve it as evidence. The Court disagrees.
In Cote, the Law Court explained the proper analysis of an alleged failure by the State to preserve evidence. First, the trial court must determine whether the evidence possessed "an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed." Cote, 2015 ME 78, ¶ 15 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984)). If so, the defendant then must show only that the evidence was "of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." Id. If, however, the "exculpatory value of the evidence was not apparent at the time of its loss or disappearance, the defendant cannot establish a constitutional deprivation without proof that the State also acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the evidence." Cote, 2015 ME 78, ¶ 15 (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988)).
In this case, the ripped shirt was, at most, potentially useful evidence for the Defendant, not exculpatory evidence. That distinction is significant. As the Law Court noted in Cote, the Due Process Clause does not "impose[] on police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution." Cote, 2015 ME 78, ¶ 12 (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333). The shirt falls into this category. The Defendant argues if it had been preserved, he could have examined it to test the alleged victim's statement that the Defendant ripped it while grabbing her. This shows the shirt may have had evidentiary significance, not that it was exculpatory. Moreover, even if the shirt had exculpatory value, the Court finds it would not have been apparent to the officers at the time of the Defendant's arrest, and he has failed to show bad faith on their part in not collecting the shirt as evidence. Cf. State v. Wai Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 20, 236 A.3d 471, 479 (applying Cote and finding no bad faith in the State's failure to preserve a complete set of video surveillance recordings). In this case, the officers' failure to preserve the shirt was at worst negligent. The Court finds no basis on which to impose sanctions.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds the Defendant's Miranda rights were not violated because he was not in custody at the time of his interrogation and his statements to the police were voluntary. The Court also finds the State did not fail to preserve exculpatory evidence, and any failure on the part of the police to collect the alleged victim's shirt was not the product of bad faith. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion for Sanctions are DENIED. The Clerk may incorporate this order into the docket by reference.